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Abstract 
Laclau and Mouffe's Theory of Radical Democracy, and 
Political Identity in Contemporary Europe 
The rapid social and political transformation of post- 
Communist Europe has necessitated a re-examination of the 
question of political identity, particularly in relation 
to democracy and the nation-state. Laclau and Mouffe's 
post-Marxist notion of 'radical democracy', incorporating 
a non-essentialist conception of hegemony, promises much 
in this regard. Their work on the contingent nature of 
political identity and their understanding of the range 
and importance of the political and social changes in 
contemporary Europe is especially valuable. Although their 
work is a significant contribution in this area their 
project is ultimately more applicable to post-industrial 
Western Europe before the collapse of Communism than it is 
to post-'89 Europe. 
Laclau and Mouffe's work can be divided into 'early' and 
'later' periods. Their 'early' work includes their Marxist 
and post-Marxist formulations, while their 'later' period, 
influenced by post-Communist events, is characterised by a 
growing liberalisation of their thought. As a result of 
the epochal changes stemming from the fall of Communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe the question of Europe becomes 
crucially important in this 'later' period. Mouffe holds 
to a notion of Europe that is constituted through its 
democratic heritage. It is argued that this constitutes an 
exclusive identity and that European identity should not 
be dependant upon such a narrowly defined sense of 
tradition. Laclau and Mouffe place great emphasis on the 
constitutive role of antagonism in the construction of 
both identity and democracy. Throughout their work it is 
possible to identify a tendency towards a politics of 'us 
and them'. An emphasis on the role of exclusion in 
identity formation is particularly marked in their 'later' 
work. 
The case of nationalism highlights a problem with Laclau 
and Mouffe's approach to conceptualising collective 
identity. This stems from their reliance upon democratic 
political identity as the sine qua non of democracy. 
Against this it is argued that the construction of 
national and ethnic identity cannot be understood in this 
way. The nation-state has been the single biggest factor 
in shaping European political identities in the post-war 
period. Challenges to the primacy of the nation-state from 
regional or ethnic separatism are having a similarly 






Europe has undergone a dramatic transformation in the last 
ten years. The most significant change has been the 
collapse of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union. This has not only put an end to the 
Cold War and fragmented what was a powerful Soviet empire 
but has also had a profound effect on the politics of 
Western European countries. The fall of Communism means 
that the terms Eastern and Western Europe have lost much 
of their former meaning, but until a new European order 
comes into being the weight of that 40 years division will 
continue to impress upon the events of the present. 
It will not be possible to dispense with the dichotomous 
Eastern/Western Europe division until a new relationship 
between what was East and what was West has been 
established. The signs are that this new order is taking 
the form of a structured, hierarchical relation between an 
expanding and hegemonic European Union (EU) and the 
emerging market economies of the former Eastern bloc. The 
development of democracy and market economies in what was 
Eastern Europe is very closely bound up with the policies 
and ambitions of the EU. This is a process that is still 
in its early stages, and for which the outcome will not be 
known for some time. What is clear however, is that a new 
kind of East/West division is emerging along the lines of 
EU member/non-EU member, with Eastern European countries 
vying with each other to be first in the queue for 
membership. 
The end of the Yalta-inspired division of Europe has 
focussed attention on the question 'what is Europe? '. 
Issues concerning a European unity in terms of culture and 
history have been widely debated both in connection with 
the dismantling of the Iron Curtain, and the regeneration 
of interest in, and expansion of, the EU. There are 
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problems associated with the dominant position of the EU, 
highlighted by the development of 'Fortress Europe' 
through which member states regulate the movement of 
foreigners across their borders leading to the 
establishment of 'permeable internal borders and 
watertight external seals'. This development has been 
particularly noticeable during a time when EU members have 
had to respond to an unprecedented post-war refugee 
problem, itself being another consequence of the break-up 
of Communist states. Establishing a Europe/non-Europe 
distinction has become more important than ever, expressed 
by Stuart Hall in the following terms; 
"Where does Europe stop and Asia begin? The 
question is critical - European prosperity 
depends on finding an answer to it. In the 
negotiations between European capitalism and 
disintegrating communist empires of eastern 
Europe - the Second World - we are about to 
discover the answer. " (Hall, 1991) 
The search for an answer has centred on the possible 
existence -of a cultural heritage that can be said to be 
the determinant of European identity. In this sense 
Europe is now looking backwards to find suitable cultural 
justifications, reference points and themes of commonality 
that will enable a Europe/non-Europe distinction to be 
made. History and tradition are being fused with cultural 
boundary markers in the search for a blueprint for 
Europe's future. 
Both within and without the EU other common trends can be 
observed Europe-wide. The former Communist countries have 
all taken steps towards democracy, but in many cases the 
process of democratisation has been sacrificed to economic 
expediency. The EU has compounded this trend by rewarding 
stability over democracy in its dealings with its Eastern 
neighbours. In several cases the path to democracy has 
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been short-circuited by a nationalist impulse. This rise 
in nationalism has tended to have an ethnic complexion and 
the last few years we have witnessed the advent of 
attempts to form nation-states based on ethnic exclusion. 
This pattern has been mirrored in the West not only in 
terms of a search for European identity but also with a 
plethora of regionalist movements, also largely ethnic in 
nature, but so far free of the attendant tragic 
consequences. 
r 
The work of Laclau and Mouffe 
These have been epochal changes, the consequences of which 
have been felt in the sphere of political and social 
theory. The trajectory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe has been instructive in this context. From their 
critiques of Marxism in the late 70s and early 80s they 
have developed a post-Marxist theoretical ensemble 
designed to embrace the political fragmentation of post- 
industrial, postmodern, post-war Europe characterised by a 
displacement of the working class from the centre of 
political theory and practice. They offer a strategy for 
the Left based on the transformatory democratic potential 
of 'new social movements' (NSMs). Their view is that 
socialism must wholeheartedly embrace liberal democracy if 
it is to retain any purchase on contemporary social 
change. Hegemonic articulation of disparate social 
movements is the key to radical political strategy. 
Laclau and Mouffe developed these ideas with a great 
degree of confidence during the period prior to the 
epochal changes outlined above, but the turbulence and 
uncertainty of the years that followed has had an effect 
on their subsequent theorising. They have been profoundly 
affected by the loss of traditional certainties and 
familiar political reference points. Tne 'constitutive 
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outside', to use one of their phrases, has undergone a 
massive change. The 'givens' of democracy in the West are 
no longer fixed, democratic identity can no longer be 
guaranteed by the Communist 'other', and the post- 
industrial society with its democratic potential and NSMs 
has been subordinated to the phenomena of post-Communism. 
Political change has had yet another effect on the work of 
Laclau and Mouffe. An increasing reliance upon liberal, 
democratic traditions informing their work has been 
reinforced by a post-Cold War interest in the nature of 
democracy in a post-Communist world. Although their work 
never assumes the triumphalist tones of Fukuyama they have 
come to increasingly valorise democracy in its liberal' 
variant, increasingly divorced from the radical democracy 
of the earlier works. Liberalism, citizenship and 
democratic identity have become key themes. One of the 
main lines of investigation throughout this thesis is the 
extent to which Laclau and Mouffe's focus becomes too 
narrow to. enable them to satisfactorily address some very 
important issues thrown up by post-Communist Europe. 
Nationalism and its increasingly ethnic inflection as a 
major influence on identity formation is a case in point. 
Laclau and Mouffe's post-Marxism 
The work of Laclau and Mouffe represents a cogent example 
of the general shift from Marxism to post-Marxism that has 
been widespread in social and political thought since the 
early 1980s. Indeed it could be argued that they have 
done as much as anyone to expedite that shift and 
reorientate the old Marxist left around a new set of 
concerns. They have been able to do this in part by 
conceiving of socialism as a project of which Marxism is 
but one part, and that a radical leftist politics can 
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exist independently of adherence to the tenets of Marxism. 
In order to do this they have attempted to demonstrate 
that it is possible to utilise fragments of Marxism, re- 
articulated in a new theoretical matrix. Their starting 
point is a powerful critique of Western Marxism, 
demonstrating that Marxism, in pursuing its economistic, 
essentialist and deterministic project, fails to allow for 
the political construction of oppositional subject 
positions and socialist political identities. On 
establishing these limitations they have chosen to move on 
from Marxism while holding onto its 'best bits'. 
The merits of Laclau and Mouffe's ideas vis-a-vis those of 
Marxism is not the central question that this thesis sets 
out to explore. The transition from Marxism to post- 
Marxism has to be viewed within a much wider context. A 
more pertinent question to explore therefore, is the 
extent to which Laclau and Mouffe's adopted methodology is 
bound by the logic of its post-Marxist preoccupations. 
The fall of Communism and fragmentation of the Soviet 
Union has meant that we are all living in a post-Marxist 
world now irrespective of our views on the merits of 
Laclau and Mouffe's critique of Marxism. It is clear that 
Laclau and Mouffe are correct to assert that even as a 
theoretical project the usefulness of Marxism has been 
much reduced in recent times. It can be argued for 
example that Marxism has little to contribute to an 
analysis of the rise of ethnic-nationalism in contemporary 
Europe, but this does not automatically mean that Laclau 
and Mouffe's post-Marxism is the most satisfactory 
alternative framework through which to understand this 
change. 
If neither Marxism or post-Marxism are sufficient the 
question of what interpretive framework to adopt becomes a 
-6- 
central concern. The problem cannot be solved simply or 
immediately however. This thesis takes the form of an 
extended critique of Laclau and Mouffe's post-Marxism; its 
theoretical underpinning, its origins and development, and 
its applicability. Thus, it acknowledges the centrality 
of the work of Laclau and Mouffe and the need to 'work 
through' it if an alternative interpretive framework is to 
be found. This may well involve taking the 'best bits' 
not just from Marxism, but from radical democracy as well. 
In the age of post-Communism, and if only for that reason, 
we are all post-Marxists now. 
From their earliest (Marxist) writing Laclau and Mouffe 
have been interested in the extent to which political 
actors are not necessarily (or only) class actors. An 
understanding of the category of 'the people' exercised 
them in their deliberations on Gramsci's notion of 
collective will (Mouffe), and the process of popular 
identification with the Nazis in pre-war Germany (Laclau). 
This accounts in some way for their predisposition towards 
ideas associated with the notion of post-industrial 
society. They were much taken with theories that depicted 
the emergence of social structures and social movements 
that were not tied directly to class. The confluence of 
various post-structuralist and postmodernist streams of 
thought with the general swathe of post-industrial society 
theses was also instrumental in re-orienting them away 
from purely Marxist concerns. 
The attraction of this idea about post-industrial society 
stems from its central assumption that the working class 
is being displaced from centre stage. This leads 
consequently to the need to think of politics in terms 
other than those arising purely from class antagonisms. 
In other words, a productivist model is replaced by one 
which acknowledges a plurality of possible social 
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identities and conflicts, and incorporates recognition of 
NSMs with their concomitant revaluation of different forms 
of status distinction (ethnicity, gender, consumption). 
Laclau and Mouffe have sought to develop a politics that 
would have relevance to these new, non-class struggles. 
The Hegemony and Socialist Strategy project is a 
contribution to this thinking; a post-Marxist politics for 
post-industrial times. 
Their passage from Marxism to post-Marxism has also to be 
understood in another context; that of the impetus given 
to their post-Marxism by postmodernism. At its most 
general level this consisted of the growing influence the 
ideas of post-structuralist thinkers such as Lacan and' 
Foucault. This influence has been present in all their 
work. The early work of Laclau and Mouffe is marked by 
the influence of the structuralist Marxism of Althusser 
and Poulantzas, and this influence quickly extends to 
incorporate theories of language, discourse and 
subjectivity. 
The primary sources of inspiration from the post- 
structuralist camp demonstrate the powerful influence of 
anti-essentialist thought on Laclau and Mouffe. Derrida's 
philosophy of language and his critique in the metaphysics 
of presence facilitates a deconstruction of universalistic 
and foundationalist thought, of which Marxism is the 
relevant example in this context. The appeal of Derrida 
for Laclau and Mouffe lies in his concept of the 
instability of identity; for Derrida language is a chain 
of signifiers and meaning is always undecideable and never 
fixed. Language is constitutive of identity, and 
signification is always partial and incomplete. Lacan's 
influence can also be discerned. He holds that it is 
language that constitutes us as subjects. Laclau and 
Mouffe also value his work because it too rests on the 
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idea of non-fixity of meaning. Identity is never fully 
complete and is open to change. It is bound up with the 
recognition of the existence of 'the other' whose presence 
is a potential threat; the exterior can subvert identity. 
Lacan's anti-essentialism - we do not have a fixed set of 
(biologically determined) characteristics - has also 
exerted an influence. Foucault's notion of discourse has 
had a profound influence on the thought of Laclau and 
Mouffe. It is also relevant that Foucault developed the 
view that the (Marxist) condept of ideology was inexorably 
linked to economic determinism. Discourse refers to the 
system of rules which permit statements to be made, and 
also to the history and the conditions of existence of 
those statements. Discourses include written and spoken 
statements as well as practices and the actions of 
institutions. In the context of Laclau and Mouffe's work 
discourse can properly be understood as an alternative to 
ideology, that is to say it is the post-structural 
equivalent of ideology, formulated as a concept without 
the contaminating baggage of classical Marxism. 
More generally, the influence of post-structuralist 
thought can be detected in the move from Marxism to post- 
Marxism, particularly with the emphasis on anti- 
essentialist categories and discursive formations. It 
could be said that post-structuralism provides Laclau and 
Mouffe not only with the language in which to express 
their post-Marxist ideas, but the conceptual tools upon 
which those ideas are founded. It also constrains them 
within its own logic; the logic of anti-essentialism will 
not tolerate any lingering traces of Marxism. Once Laclau 
and Mouffe embarked on the postmodernist enterprise they 
were operating within the logic of a different paradigm 
and there was little opportunity to mediate between the 
two. 
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The periodisation of Laclau and Mouffe's work 
It is necessary to turn our attention to the question of 
the periodisation of Laclau and Mouffe's work. Their work 
can be divided into two main periods; 'early' and 'late'. 
The 'early work' contains everything up to and including 
New Reflections, and the 'later work' is the work 
published after 1990. This division is not based on any 
profound change in their position but rather the impact of 
the events surrounding the collapse of Communism on the 
development of their ideas. ' 
The reason for this division needs further explanation. 
It is necessary to resist the temptation to divide their 
work into 'Marxist' and 'post-Marxist' episodes because, 
although there is a sense in which this is meaningful, it 
fails to take into account a less obvious, but more 
important aspect of their work. Rather than see the 
Marxist and post-Marxist periods as being distinct they 
should be viewed as a continuum, in the sense that they 
are part of the same overall project. Their post-Marxism 
is not a radical break with what went before but the 
outcome of their overhaul of its major categories. The 
main division is between their post-Marxist project, which 
was largely concluded by the early 1990s, and the later, 
more liberal, less collaborative work. 
The justification for including both Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy and the more Marxist early writing in 
the 'early period' is as follows. Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy is the outcome of their deliberations on Gramsci 
and Althusser which occupied them in their earliest 
writing. As such Hegemony and Socialist Strategy does 
not constitute a break with this earlier writing but in 
many ways is the direct consequence of it. Likewise, the 
essays in defence of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
(Post-Marxism Without Apologies, for example) are a part 
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of this period. The period ends with New Reflections, 
which both re-works some of Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy's themes and leads Laclau in new directions. 
This also marks the end of the close collaboration between 
Laclau and Mouffe as tneir positions have begun to diverge 
in the later period. 
The later period includes all the essays published in 
Dimensions of Radical Democracy, The Making of Political 
Identities, and The Return of the Political. This period 
is characterised by a greater distancing of themselves 
from the (post) Marxist concerns of their previous work, 
and an attempt to come to terms with post-89 Europe, and 
the problems it has posed for their notion of radical 
democracy. The epochal nature of the changes associated 
with the collapse of the Communist regimes of Eastern 
Europe has not been kind to Laclau and Mouffe and their 
work of this period is less successful than the project 
associated with Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
The earliest of the writings of Laclau and Mouffe are the 
subject of Chapter 2. This work is notable for containing 
the origins of the politics of hegemony which would find 
full expression in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and 
also maps their retreat from the state, civil society and 
the nation via their rejection of Marxist categories. 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (the subject of Chapter 
3) represents the fulfilment of Laclau and Mouffe's desire 
to reject the working class as the central agent of social 
change. The work demonstrates the importance of, and 
mechanisms for, the construction of non-essentialist 
identity. There are two theoretical tensions that run 
through Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. (i) Democratic 
politics is a politics of antagonism, and is constitutive 
of 'us and them', an increasingly characteristic theme in 
Laclau and Mouffe's work. (ii) Society is in constant 
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conflict (and is consequently unstable) between, on the 
one hand the need to forge unity, and on the ocher the 
tendency of democracy (through equivalence) to split the 
social into antagonistic camps. 
Chapter 4 considers how New Reflections develops many of 
these themes in greater detail. The 'us and them' 
distinction is drawn more vividly and the question of 
political agency is more central. This marks the end of 
their 'early period'. The later work sees the rise to 
prominence of the politics of 'us and them' and its 
centrality to Laclau and Mouffe's ideas on democracy in 
post-Communist Europe. The work of this period consists 
of essays and commentaries and lacks a major theoretical 
focus or sustained attempt to apply their earlier work to 
changing circumstances. A further tension is revealed in 
their work; the problem of ascriptive versus constructed 
identity. Chapter 5 addresses Mouffe's collection 
Dimensions of Radical Democracy which announces the 
liberalisation of their work and introduces themes of 
liberal democratic traditions, citizenship and their 
relation to the idea of Europe. Chapter 6 looks at 'the 
question of Europe' more directly, and deals with the 
problem of European identity and what it could conceivably 
consist of. 
Looking at Laclau and Mouffe's work as a whole one would 
have to conclude that theirs is a collaborative venture. 
This is much more true of the early phase however. The 
collaboration of course centres on Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy but was in place before this and continued 
afterwards. Laclau himself says that their earliest work 
was mutually informative and compatible. The work 
immediately after Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and 
linked to it in the form of a defence or reiteration of 
their position is equally so. In the later work their 
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positions seem to diverge slightly (see Chapter 6) but 
nevertheless retain a commonality through their insertion 
into the Phronesis project, a series of books they 
commission for the publisher Verso. 
The Phronesis project enables them to collect together the 
work of writers who aspire to the same general outlook and 
who make a contribution to a non-essentialist socialist 
project, as defined by Laclau and Mouffe. That is to say, 
socialism as reformulated ih terms of an extension and 
deepening of democracy. They state that "... the critique 
of essentialism... is the necessary condition for 
understanding the widening of the field of social 
struggles characteristic of the present stage of 
democratic politics. " (Publisher's note) Thus, the 
Phronesis project can accommodate all those who believe 
that "an anti-essentialist theoretical stand is the sine 
qua non of a new vision for the Left conceived in terms of 
a radical and plural democracy" (Publisher's note). It is 
for this reason that I believe that it is permissible to 
talk about the work of Tassin (Chapter 6) as an adjunct to 
the work of Laclau and Mouffe. 
Chapter 7 looks at the construction of collective 
political identities, particularly nationalist, ethnic and 
regionalist identities, and their relation to the nation- 
state. It draws attention to the absence in Laclau and 
Mouffe's theorising of democratic politics of a role for 
the (nation-) state. The thesis concludes by placing the 
work of Laclau and Mouffe in the wider tradition of post- 
industrial society theses, a position from which they have 
difficulty in conceptualising the post-communist 
transformation of Europe: their idea of radical democracy 
is ultimately too specific to encompass ethnic- 
nationalism, and other identities that do not directly 
involve a 'deepening of democracy'. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LACLAU AND MOUFFE AND THE LIMITS OF MARXISM 
-14- 
Introduction 
The early work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe is 
interesting not just in comparison with what was to come 
later, but also in terms of the enthusiasm with which it 
was received at the time. Laclau and Mouffe were viewed 
primarily as theorists working within and around central 
problems in Marxist theory. They engaged with Gramsci and 
Althusser and wrote on the topics of class, ideology and 
politics in a way that was seen as exciting and 
potentially very productive: 
Laclau and Mouffe's project was widely seen as an 
extension of Gramsci's work, but one which took them 
outside (or even beyond) Marxism itself. Their 
involvement with the theorisation of the social 
construction of meaning and a concomitant re-theorisation 
of the nature and role of ideology, was seen to take them 
to the very limits of Marxism and exacerbate the 
increasing vulnerability and fragility of the Marxist 
model to critique from post-structuralist and 
postmodernist positions. 
Of course Laclau and Mouffe's work was becoming 
increasingly influenced by these problematics too, and 
their transformation from Marxists to post-Marxists, 
accomplished sometime between the early work reviewed in 
this chapter and Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, was as 
much a result of the impact of post-structuralism on their 
thinking as it was on their reaching the limits of 
Marxism. I have outlined the main post-structuralist 
influences on their work in the introduction to this 
thesis, and some of the themes will be taken up again in 
the following chapter. 
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It is true that ultimately - the point marked by Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy - Laclau and Mouffe reject Marxism, 
if not in entirety then at least in terms of its 
epistemological underpinnings and its universalist 
pretensions. This was far from the case however when 
Laclau was writing the essays that comprise Politics and 
Ideology in Marxist Theory and Mouffe was contributing to 
Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, the work considered in 
this chapter. This early work was seen more simply as a 
contribution to Marxist theory which pushed Marxism to the 
limits, but nevertheless was still loyal to the project of 
historical materialism. 
Their reputations were established on the basis of theN, 
work they were doing with Gramscian categories, notably 
hegemony. Laclau was appraised as having made a valuable 
contribution to our understanding of ideology by 
demonstrating that ideology or ideological elements had no 
necessary class belonging. In other words, he was 
allowing a, great deal of autonomy between base and 
superstructure. He also allowed for the construction of 
'the people' through interpellation in a way that was not 
tied to the formation of social classes, by arguing that 
"... fascism operated not at the level of class struggle 
but rather in the area of popular-democratic struggle. " 
(Mercer, p. 214). The idea that political ideology could 
be historically detached from class interest was new and 
exciting. Such developments were very well received. 
For example, Stuart Hall could write, 
"The question as to how the articulation of 
ideological discourses to particular class 
formations can be conceptualized, without 
falling back into a simple class reductionism, 
is a matter on which important work has been 
done (the work of Laclau... is, once again, 
seminal). " (Hall, 1982, p. 50) 
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Mouffe was more concerned with Gramsci and the use to 
which his Marxism could be put in theorising the 
construction of non-class categories such as 'the people'. 
At the time she concluded that Gramsci could provide 'the 
solution' to many Marxist problems as he was able, through 
his ideas of hegemony and collective will, to break with 
the essentialism that bedevilled Marxism. 
By the time of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau and 
Mouffe had 'worked through''Gramsci and his ideas of 
hegemony, discarded him, and put quite a lot of distance 
between themselves and the whole project that Marxism 
represents. All Marxists became irredeemably essentialist 
and economistic and had to be discarded, Laclau and Mouffe 
going-as far as to say that they could have arrived at 
their new position within going through Marxism at all. 
There is more than a touch of hyperbole in this statement. 
Not only are Laclau and Mouffe heavily influenced by 
Gramsci, Althusser and other Marxists, both in their early 
work and in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, but as I 
argue in this chapter their subsequent work betrays the 
signs of having rejected Gramscian concerns. The 
consequences of their abandonment of key Marxist themes 
are very evident in their later work (that is, post- 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy), particularly their 
problem over the construction of national identities, 
whose root lies in their rejection of a distinction 
between the state and civil society, and a consequent 
under-theorisation of the nation-state. 
The early work of Laclau and Mouffe represents not just 
the period in which they engaged more directly with the 
Marxist problematic, but a high point in the Marxist 
theory of the time. Their interest in developing a non- 
reductionist form of radical democratic theory, evident 
from the earliest writings, was originally conceived as an 
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extension of Marxism. The key to this type of politics 
was to be found in the non-reductionist writings of 
Gramsci. Their work at this time should be seen as a 
major contribution to Marxist base/superstructure writing 
and an advancement of our understanding of ideology in 
Marxist theory. Mouffe in particular provides a 
significant contribution to our understanding of Gramsci, 
her early work in stark contrast to various unsatisfactory 
contemporaneous attempts (for example, Boggs, 1976). 
Laclau's work contributes arpractical application of their 
ideas and his classic piece on fascism demonstrates both 
the subtlety and flexibility of his approach, and the 
advance he was able to make on previous Marxist attempts 
to tackle this difficult area. 1 
The early work of Laclau and Mouffe represents an 
impressive collection of writing. It could be argued that 
their Marxist analytical framework of this period was far 
from exhausted, and could have yielded some impressive 
results if they had chosen to continue in this mode. They 
chose instead to embark upon their project of post- 
Marxism, which in the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
period at least yielded impressive results, and in 
retrospect can be seen to be their most successful period. 
Rather than criticise them for moving on from Marxism it 
is perhaps more appropriate to argue that the loss of the 
more dynamic form of post-Marxism associated with Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy has contributed to the structural 
instability of a political project which has looked 
increasingly precarious in the post-Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy period. 
Laclau and Mouffe's Early Work 
The following general points can be made about the 
earliest work of Laclau and Mouffe (ie. that prior to 
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Hegemony and Socialist Strategy). Even though they are 
working independently they are working from roughly the 
same theoretical and political perspectives, share many of 
the same concerns and address very similar problems. In 
fact, Laclau himself states at one point that their work 
is interrelated, and says of Mouffe; "Her contribution to 
the formulation of some of the central theses has been so 
decisive that in some respects they may be regarded as a 
collaborative venture". (Laclau, 1977, p. 13) 
r 
There are differences of course; Mouffe's work on ideology 
is more strongly the product of a Marxist lineage, whereas 
Laclau is already more critical of the Marxist canon. 
Mouffe's stance is the result of working through Gramsci 
from a position informed by Althusserian Marxism. Whereas 
in Laclau, an earlier shift away from Marxism and towards 
discourse theory can be detected. Laclau dispenses with 
the Althusserian limits of ideology: there is no 
science/ideology dichotomy, there is now nothing outside 
of discourse. There is an obvious correspondence between 
Mouffe's work on ideology and ideological elements and 
Laclau's own work on populism and fascism. For example, 
that ideological elements are the stakes in political 
struggle is common to both. Both claim to espouse a non- 
reductionist politics but while Mouffe can find this 
within the fragmented work of Gramsci, Laclau avers that 
it is necessary to move beyond the perimeter of orthodoxy 
in order to avoid a reductionist paradigm. 
The claims Mouffe makes for Gramsci in her early work are 
not reiterated in the collaborative venture of Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy. If we compare Mouffe's early 
interpretation of 'collective will' (political agency 
which is not class-bound - although it is class based), 
with the later reading of Gramsci in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, we might well be surprised. Gone is 
-19- 
the 'sophisticated Marxism' associated with the best of 
Gramsci. Now all Marxism is irredeemably essentialist and 
Laclau and Mouffe are no longer interested in questions 
such as the extent to which ideologies are class based. 
Apart from the different language in which the concepts in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy are expressed, class has 
long since been replaced by 'the people', undoubtedly as a 
result of Laclau's influence. It is permissible to say 
that in Mouffe's Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci we have 
classes, in Hegemony and Sofialist Strategy 'the people', 
and Laclau's work provides the pivotal moment in the 
transition between the two. 
Since the term 'discourse' is so central to Laclau's work, 
it is necessary to say something about how it is employed 
throughout Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory and 
what relation it enjoys with 'ideology'. Or, to put it 
another way, what sense can we make of a statement such 
as, "The overdetermination of non-class interpellations by 
the class. struggle consists, then, in the integration of 
those interpellations into a class ideological discourse" 
(Laclau, 1977, p. 109), or even, "... how are ideologies 
transformed?... through class struggle, which is carried 
out through the production of subjects and the 
articulation/disarticulation of discourses" (Laclau, 1977, 
p. 109) It would seem that there is no rigid conceptual 
boundary that prevents 'ideology' and 'discourse' being 
used together in a consistent, coherent way. Before we 
can properly address this question it will be necessary to 
look in more detail at the Althusserian influences in 
Laclau's early work. 
One of the most important features of the Althusserian 
problematic is the concept of 'social formation'. This is 
against both a base/superstructure model and a more 
Hegelian, expressive view of the social totality. Every 
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social formation has a particular unity of levels or 
instances. Each level (economic, politics, ideology) 
differs in its capacity to determine the others. 
"The unity which they form 
hierarchical relationship 
in which we find that the 
in the last instance, the 
ideological levels but at 
overdetermined by each of 
is based on a 
between the levels 
economic determines, 
political and the 
the same time is 
them. " (Mclennan, p. 79) 
On this model the superstruq. tures are not merely an 
expression of the economic base. The relationship is best 
characterised as one of reciprocal determination; 
overdetermination is governed by determination in the last 
instance by the economic and as such, this is where we scan 
find the origin of Althusser's idea of relative autonomy. 
It is possible to'distinguish between levels that are 
determinant (the economic) and those which are dominant. 
In certain social formations for example, politics can be 
dominant, but even where this occurs the economic mode of 
production is still determinant. 
"Determinancy, then, for Althusser, is thought 
principally in terms of the economic level 
(determining) having, as one of its effects, 
the deciding which of the levels of the social 
formation - economic, political or ideological 
- will be 'dominant"' Hall, 1977, p. 69) 
Althusser defines ideology as constitutive of subjectivity 
and interpellation is the means by which individuals are 
so produced. Interpellation is a discursive practice 
which produces political subjects. As such we are now 
able to see the link between ideology and discourse, 
although when compared to the status accorded discourse in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, ideology in the early 
work seems to be the subject of a less rigorous 
definition, and more of a transitional concept 
(transitional that is between orthodox Marxism and post- 
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Marxism). In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy the more 
overtly Althusserian themes have gone, to be replaced with 
elements from post-structuralism and discourse theory. 
The concept of ideology does not have any purchase in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, it unable to transcend 
its base/superstructure origins, nor can it easily be 
accommodated into the 'logic of contingency' tradition. 
In a universe where meaning is never fixed and social 
identity has to be negotiated, ideology is displaced by 
discourse. This displacemetit becomes necessary when 
Laclau abandons the notion of social totality, in other 
words sometime after the essays in Politics and Ideology 
in Marxist Theory. In the context of Laclau and Mouffe's 
work discourse can be defined (in general terms) as the 
constant negotiation and construction of meaning. The 
move begun by Althusser and continued by Laclau in 
Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory is finally 
completed in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
Mouffe's work on Gramsci 
This chapter aims to compare the reading of Gramsci 
offered by Chantal Mouffe in Hegemony and Ideology in 
Gramsci with the rather different utilisation of Gramsci 
found in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Initially, we 
should note the most obvious difference: In Hegemony and 
Ideology in Gramsci Mouffe argues that Gramsci provides a 
non-reductionist conception of ideology, whereas in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe treat 
Gramsci as an economic determinist. This change in 
position is best understood in terms of Laclau and 
Mouffe's approach to, and appreciation of, Althusser 
rather than a simple reversal of fortunes for Gramsci. 
In Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci, Mouffe asserts that a 
non-reductionist concept of ideology is possible only if 
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an Althusserian notion of overdetermination is accepted. 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy by contrast, Laclau and 
Mouffe give a very different definition of 
overdetermination; one which eschews any notion of 
(economic) determination. It is also important to note 
that Mouffe's use of ideology has strong Althusserian 
overtones; that is to say it is defined as a practice 
producing subjects, (in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
discourse largely fulfils this function). Ideology will 
also occupy centre stage inrthe comparison between early 
Mouffe and Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, in particular 
the question of the origin and meaning of the term 
'ideological elements': we can say that one of the central 
problems in Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci is the nature 
of the relationship between ideology and ideological 
elements. 
Ideological elements can tentatively be defined as those 
principles of subjectivity which exist in a relationship 
of mutual implication, and, importantly, which are of a 
non-class nature. For example, social agents are 
interpellated as members of a family, of a nation, as 
consumers etc. Ideological elements are introduced by 
Mouffe in her examination of the problems associated with 
a reductionist ideology. 
"The Second International was strongly 
reductionist from an ideological point of 
view, and since it considered that all 
ideological elements had a necessary class 
belonging it concluded from this that all 
elements belonging to the discourse of the 
bourgeoisie had to be decisively rejected by 
the working class... " (Mouffe, 1979, p. 173) 
What is less clear is the actual origin of the term 
ideological elements. Mouffe does not provide this 
information, nor does she give a definition, or even 
explain the relationship between Gramsci's concept of 
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ideology and her use of the term 'ideological elements'. 
At times she leaves the reader with the impression that 
the term is in fact Gramsci's, although there is no 
evidence that Gramsci used the term in any of his 
writings. I would attribute the term to Ernesto Laclau, 
who develops it in Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory 
as an antedote to the perceived reductionism of 
Poulantzas. 
Given the Althusserian input, overdetermination in 
Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci means that any social 
agent possesses several principles of ideological 
determination. Althusser moves away from the idea that 
the contradictions constituting the social formation are 
simply of the economic type, "... the overdetermination of 
a contradiction is the reflection in it of its conditions 
of existence within the complex whole, that is, of the 
other contradictions in the complex whole... " (Althusser, 
p. 253) In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau and 
Mouffe's use of the term is distinct from Althusser's. 
There is no longer any determination in the last instance, 
subject positions are discursive positions and due to 
overdetermination are never fully complete; in Laclau and 
Mouffe's own words, "... a field of identities which never 
manage to be fully fixed... " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 111). 
In Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci a social agent is not 
simply interpellated as a class subject, an individual can 
be interpellated as a member of a sex, a family, a 
religion as well as a social class. This leads Mouffe to 
ask the question; what is the relation between these 
ideological elements? She answers thus; from a 
reductionist perspective each has a necessary class 
belonging; 
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"But if, on the contrary, we accept the 
principle of overdetermination, we must 
conclude that there can exist no necessary 
relation between them, and that it is 
consequently impossible to attribute a 
necessary class-belonging to them. " 
(Mouffe, 1979, p. 171) 
It is necessary to comment on overdetermination and its 
relation to reductionism, especially in the context of the 
Althusserian shadow it casts over Mouffe's own 
formulation. Firstly, the Althusserian concept of 
overdetermination allows Moüffe freedom to develop her 
ideas on ideological elements. She makes the point that a 
reductionist paradigm treats all ideological elements as 
having a necessary class belonging. Viewing ideological 
elements as obtaining their political connotation fromýthe 
ideology they become articulated to, opens up the 
possibility for politics to embrace ideological struggle. 
In other words, the ideological elements become the stake 
in ideological struggle. 
These assumptions raise several issues and question the 
validity of her interpretation. Firstly, from a 
reductionist perspective there could surely be no 
overdetermination at all, only simple determination by the 
economic. All contradictions would be expressive of the 
fundamental contradiction within capitalism, that is 
between capital and wage labour. Overdetermination only 
has currency in a world where relative autonomy has 
already been established. Secondly, can we accept 
Mouffe's assertion that family, sex and class are examples 
of ideological elements? Even if we accept Mouffe's 
comments on overdetermination, it is difficult to see how 
social class could ever have anything other than a class 
belonging. 
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Before moving on to consider Mouffe's work in detail it is 
necessary to give some further consideration to another 
aspect of Mouffe's position; namely, the tendency she 
shares with Laclau to reduce Marxism to economic 
determinism. This has serious consequences not simply 
because it is an unfair and inaccurate picture of Marxism, 
but mainly because both Laclau and Mouffe ground so many 
of their own theoretical strategies on this critique of 
Marxism. The following example serves to highlight the 
problem. 
r 
Determination in the last instance Mouffe says, means 
determination in the last instance by social classes. 
"To stress determination in the last instance 
by the economic is equivalent to saying 
determination in the last instance by the 
social classes inasmuch as we define classes 
as constituting antagonistic poles in the 
dominant relations of production. " (Mouffe, 1979, p. 171) 
So by extension she can say, 
"... if the ideological elements referred to 
do not express social classes, but if 
nevertheless classes do in the last instance, 
determine ideology, then we must thereby 
conclude that this determination can only be 
the result of the establishing of an 
articulating principle of these ideological 
elements, one which must result in actually 
conferring upon them a class character. " (Mouffe, 1979, p. 171-2) 
What Mouffe offers us is the possibility of a non- 
reductionist concept of class, but one which is 
paradoxically made possible by a reductionist conception 
of class. The contradiction stems from her insistence 
that determination by the economic is the same as 
determination by social classes. This is a reductionist 
move; classes can only determine in the last instance on a 
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reductionist view of class. The relation between the 
class configuration in any given social formation and the 
underlying economic order is a complex one. In any case 
it can never simply be the result of a direct causality. 
This type of homology is out of place in a serious non- 
reductionist account of politics. 
Gramsci and collective will 
If we look at Gramsci's wori on hegemony we can find his 
most important contribution to Marxist theory; namely, an 
anti-economistic notion of ideology. Hegemony can never 
be reduced to class alliance, it is political leadership 
coupled with intellectual and moral leadership. In 
Gramsci's writings we can trace the development of a non- 
economistic conception of state, termed the 'integral 
state' by Mouffe, and characterised by what she refers to 
as dictatorship plus hegemony. Hegemony should be thought 
of as the ability of one class to articulate the interests 
of other social groups to its own. Only a fundamental 
class (ie. one which occupies one of the two poles in the 
capitalist relations of production) can become hegemonic. 
"... for Gramsci... hegemony is not to be found 
in a purely instrumental alliance between 
classes through which the class demands of 
the allied classes are articulated to those 
of the fundamental class, with each group 
maintaining its own individuality within the 
alliance as well as its own ideology. 
According to him hegemony involves the 
creation of a higher synthesis, so that all 
its elements fuse in a 'collective will' 
which becomes the new protagonist of political 
action... " (Mouffe, 1979, p. 184) 
If Gramsci is here credited with the notion of collective 
will, (anti-economistic notion of ideology + hegemony = 
political subjects that are not simply social classes), 
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how can he ever be accused of economism? This point 
should not be underestimated; Mouffe actually says that in 
Gramsci, political subjects are no longer classes as such, 
but collective wills, which is a "higher synthesis". 
Collective will, or national-popular collective will as 
usually referred to by Gramsci, can be understood as a 
common world view, the unifying principle that allows a 
class and its allies to fuse. This unifying principle is 
always provided by the hegemonic class. 
r 
It is this notion of a unifying principle or hegemonic 
principle that allows Laclau and Mouffe to say in Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy that Gramsci is still an 
economistic Marxist. Collective will may break with 
determinism in some respects, but at the most basic level 
it is still an idea that turns on the existence of 
economically determined class interests. It is equally 
important to note that in Gramsci's thought collective 
will and hegemony are compatible with a conception of 
class, in fact they actually depend on his theorisation of 
class. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy by contrast 
classes and hegemony are no longer compatible. The 
'higher synthesis' represented by collective will in 
Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci gives way in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy to 'the people'; classes are split by 
equivalence, a new type of polarisation is possible, and 
the conditions for the emergence of hegemony are secured. 
Mouffe characterises Gramsci's view of ideology as one 
rejecting both false consciousness and its reduction to 
mere epiphenomenon. It is, on the contrary the terrain on 
which men move, acquire consciousness of their position 
and struggle. Ideology has material existence and is 
embedded in institutional practices. It is also embedded 
in economic practices and thus Gramsci is able to conceive 
of reciprocal determinations between base and 
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superstructure in a non-mechanistic, non-reductionist way. 
For Gramsci, 
"... the level of the superstructure where 
ideology is produced and diffused is called 
civil society. This constitutes the ensemble 
of 'private bodies' through which the political 
and social hegemony of a social group is 
exercised. " (Mouffe, 1979, p. 187) 
Gramsci holds that subjects that exist at the economic 
level are not necessarily duplicated at the political 
level. Inter-class subjects are thus possible, enabling 
Gramsci to think hegemony beyond a simple class alliance. 
The hegemony of a fundamental class consists in the 
creation of a collective will allowing that class and its 
allies to fuse. 
"The creation of a new hegemony, therefore, 
implies the transformation of the previous 
ideological terrain and the creation of a 
new world-view which will serve as a unifying 
principle for a new collective will. This is 
the process of ideological transformation which 
Grämsci designates with the term 'intellectual 
and moral reform'. " (Mouffe, 1979, p. 191) 
Intellectual and moral reform then, transforms and 
rearticulates existing ideological elements. Ideological 
struggle consists in breaking the dominant ideology into 
its basic elements, choosing suitable elements and 
rearticulating them into another system. 
"It is obvious that viewed in this way moral 
and intellectual reform is incomprehensible 
within a reductionist problematic which 
postulates the existence of paradigmatic 
ideologies for each social class, and the 
necessary class-belonging of all ideological 
elements. If, in effect, one does accept the 
reductionist hypothesis, moral and intellectual 
reform can only amount to replacing one class 
ideology by another. " (Mouffe, 1979, p. 192) 
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The common world view or collective will is an organic 
expression of the whole historic bloc. 
"This world view will therefore include 
ideological elements from varying sources, 
but its unity will stem from its articulating 
principle which will always be provided by 
the hegemonic class. Gramsci calls this 
articulating princi le a hegemonic principle. " 
(Mouffe, 1979, p. 1935 
Ideological elements acquire their class character by 
their articulation to a hegemonic principle. Ideological 
struggle is a process of disarticulation and 
rearticulation of given ideological elements in a contest 
between two hegemonic principles to appropriate these 
elements. This allows Mouffe to say that ideological 
ensembles existing at a given time are the outcome of 
relations of forces between rival hegemonic principles. 
A successful hegemony manages to create a collective 
national-popular will. In order to achieve this the 
dominant class must articulate to its hegemonic principle 
the national-popular ideological elements. The national- 
popular can thus be the site of struggle between 
antagonistic classes. Through hegemony, the contending 
classes attempt to forge a collective will of a national- 
popular nature. According to Mouffe national-popular 
ideological elements are of the non-class sort and as such 
they are the site of struggle. We can explore this 
further by considering the following quotation. 
"The conception of ideology found in the 
practical state in Gramsci's problematic 
of hegemony consists therefore of a practice 
which transforms the class character of 
ideological elements by the latter's 
articulation to a hegemonic principle 
differing from the one to which they are 
presently articulated. " (Mouffe, 1979, p. 195) 
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Perhaps this should read, 'transforms the non-class 
character' as we are repeatedly told that ideological 
elements are of a non-class nature and only acquire a 
class connotation as a result of articulation. There is 
certainly evidence enough in the rest of her article to 
support the view that the whole point about ideological 
elements is that they do not have a necessary class 
connotation. 
The importance of ideology is summarised as follows; 
"Once 
... the problematic of ideology which is operating in the practical state in 
Gramsci's conception of hegemony, has been 
established, all the other conceptions fall 
quite naturally into place in a perfectly 
structured ensemble and the underlying 
meaning of his thought is revealed in all 
its coherence. " (Mouffe, 1979 p. 196) 
Ideology, in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy becomes a 
concept far too heavily implicated in base/superstructure 
to have any meaning in a universe ruled by contingency. 
But in the pages of Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci 
Gramsci's ideology provides a springboard for a non- 
reductionist, non-essentialist political strategy. 
"... Gramsci reaches the conclusion that 
political struggle does not only take place 
between two fundamental antagonistic classes, 
since the 'political subjects' are not social 
classes but 'collective wills' which are 
comprised of an ensemble of social groups 
fused around a fundamental class. " (Mouffe, 1979, pp. 196-197) 
The crucial point about collective will is that it is the 
culmination of a double process, both the self awareness 
of the fundamental class and the creation of a basis of 
consensus. Mouffe describes collective will as an 
ensemble of social groups fused around a fundamental 
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class, an ensemble in which the class comes to self 
awareness ( becomes a class for itself) and a (democratic) 
basis for consensus is created. 
It is interesting to note how this same point is dealt 
with in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Laclau and 
Mouffe write that 
"... Gramsci's thought appears suspended 
around a basic ambigiity concerning the 
status of the working class which finally 
leads it to a contradictory position. On 
the one hand, the political centrality of 
the working class has a historical, 
contingent character: it requires the class 
to come out of itself, to transform its own 
identity by articulating to it a plurality 
of struggles and democratic demands. On the 
other hand, it would seem that this 
articulatory role is assigned to it by its 
economic base - hence that this centrality 
has a necessary character. " (Laclau and Mouffe, 
p. 70) 
War of position is the name given to a process of 
ideological struggle between the two fundamental classes 
where the stakes are the non-class ideological elements, 
(for example, the national-popular) which have to be 
articulated to the contending articulating principles. 
War of position is only compatible with a non-reductionist 
conception of ideology and politics. The new ideological 
bloc resulting from this process of disarticulation/ 
rearticulation will contain ideological elements that 
formed part of the old dominant ideological bloc. Moral 
and intellectual reform allows the working class must 
become the national class. It must disintegrate the 
historical basis of the bourgeoisie's hegemony by 
disarticulating the ideological bloc by means of which the 
bourgeoisie's intellectual direction is expressed. In 
other words; 
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... a class is hegemonic when it has managed to articulate to its discourse the overwhelming 
majority of ideological elements characteristic 
of a given social formation, in particular 
the national-popular elements which allow 
it to become the class expressing the national 
interest. " (Mouffe, 1979, p. 195) 
Mouffe states that there are, "... three principles 
underlying the reductionist problematic of ideology. " 
(Mouffe, 1979, p. 189) 
r 
- all subjects are class subjects 
- social classes have paradigmatic ideologies 
- all ideological elements have a necessary class 
belonging 
When these criteria are applied to Gramsci, Mouffe is able 
to show that he is not guilty of a reductionist view of 
ideology. This is Gramsci's apogee in Mouffe's 
interpretation; he never rises so high in her estimation 
again. The terrain has shifted by the time Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy is completed. Gramsci the non- 
essentialist is subsequently indicted in the court of 
post-Marxism and found guilty of essentialism. What has 
caused this about turn? Were Mouffe's original criteria 
invalid, and if not, what is the reason for Mouffe's 
different reading of Gramsci in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy? 
Let us take these possibilities one at a time. In 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau and Mouffe play 
down collective will and highlight economic determination, 
ignore the celebrated non-reductionist concept of ideology 
and foreground class essentialism. It is clear that the 
above criteria are not readily applied to Gramsci in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and the degree to which 
ideological elements have a necessary class belonging is 
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no longer a valid question. The very assumptions on which 
this question is formulated have been rejected. The 
choice in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is no longer 
between non-class elements and class ideology, it now 
centres on the rationale for assuming that the belonging 
must have a class or non-class nature at all. In other 
words, why can there not be a multiplicity of (partially 
completed) subject positions? 
The premise that Mouffe is working from in this early 
essay is that Gramsci is a non-reductionist. In Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy this has been displaced by an 
assertion that he is an economic determinist, despite his 
best attempt to provide a non-reductionist account of ', 
ideology. In this sense Laclau and Mouffe do give a very 
different reading of Gramsci, and one which fails to 
credit him with the considerable, (and previously 
acknowledged) achievement that national-popular collective 
will represents. 
Gramsci and the integral state 
The definitions used by Mouffe in this period of her work 
rely heavily on a Gramscian notion of ideology. One 
aspect of this notion, the materiality of ideology, is 
neatly summed up by Roger Simon who writes; 
"... ideologies have a material existence in 
the sense that they are embodied in the 
social practices of individuals and in the 
institutions and organisations within which 
these social practices take place. " (Simon, p. 59) 
Its other important aspect is that "... ideology [is] 
understood as a practice producing subjects... " (Mouffe, 
1981, p. 172) In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy ideology 
is not a term that has much currency and is largely 
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displaced by the terms discourse and political imaginary, 
although this is not to suggest that they are in any way 
similar. From a position in the early work where ideology 
produces subjects, in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy by 
contrast, subjects are discursively constructed. 
The integral state, a concept developed by Gramsci to 
specify that the state includes political society and 
civil society, and that civil society is the terrain of 
ideological - hegemonic - struggle. 
"The integral state is, in effect, that state 
which has gone beyond the economic-corporate 
phase and which establishes itself as the 
organizer of a real historical bloc through 
the creation of an intellectual and moral 
unity. " (Mouffe, 1981, p. 178) 
The positive contribution this represents is expressed by 
Mouffe in the following terms; 
"... the notion of the integral state clearly 
represents an enlargement of the conception 
of the state [... ] articulated around his 
conception of hegemony... Hegemony involves 
the supersession of the classist and 
reductionist conception of politics which 
presents it as a simple confrontation of 
antagonistic classes, because it embodies a 
conception of politics as an articulation of 
the interests of a fundamental class and 
those of other social groups in the formation 
of a national-popular collective will. " (Mouffe, 1981, pp. 179-180) 
This demonstrates the theoretical linkages between the 
integral state, hegemony, and Gramsci's other key 
concepts. 
In her introduction to Gramsci and Marxist Theory, the 
volume which includes Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci 
Mouffe says, 
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"... the increasing intervention of the state 
in the countries of monopoly capitalism has 
led to an increasing politicisation of social 
conflicts. In fact it has multiplied the 
forms of confrontation between masses and 
the state and created a series of new 
political subjects whose demands must be 
taken up by the working class. " 
(Mouffe, 1979, p. 11) 
Again, we can note the pre-Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
nature of this passage, with the emphasis still very 
clearly on the role of the corking class as political 
agents (and the role of the state creating this 
antagonism) The most significant feature of this passage 
is its treatment of the construction of political 
subjectivity. Political subjects are created outside of a 
strict class antagonism but their interests can only be 
represented by the working class. 
The problematic relationship between hegemony and 
determinism that can be adduced from Gramsci's writings is 
explored in another of Mouffe's early essays, Working 
Class Hegemony and The Struggle for Socialism, published 
in 1983. This can be said to belong to a transitional 
period exemplified by the emergence of her criticism that 
Gramsci accorded an a priori, determinist centrality to 
the working class. For example, Gramsci says that only 
the working class can provide the articulating principle 
for a national-popular collective will. 
According to Mouffe, this view, endemic within Marxism, 
has its origins in Marx and, 
".. is based on three presuppositions that 
are untenable today: (1) the neutrality of 
the productive forces; (2) the homogenization 
of the working class via the double process of 
proletarization/pauperization; and (3) the 
statement that this homogeneous working class 
has a fundamental interest in the construction 
of socialism. (Mouffe, 1983, p. 8) 
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Mouffe exhorts us to 'go beyond Gramsci' and abandon his 
economistic framework. She also poses the question; why 
should the working class alone have a fundamental interest 
in socialism? She also states that; 
"I shall maintain that in order to break 
completely and definitively with economism 
it is necessary to introduce political 
struggle into the very heart of the economy, 
and to abandon the thesis that the development 
of capitalism will create both the material 
base of socialism... and its social base. " 
(Mouffe, 1983, p. 8) 
For reasons such as this Mouffe believed that neither 
Gramsci nor any other Marxist writers could 'solve' the 
kinds of problem that her work was posing. Marxism itself 
was proving to be a barrier to working through issues in a 
non-reductionist way. It was a problem that was to 
prevent Mouffe advancing her socialist political project 
until she was ready to reject the economistic basis of 
political theory. That moment would arrive with Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy. However, as we shall see 
rejecting the economistic base of Marxism had other far 
reaching consequences. The sophisticated and inter- 
related ideas represented by ideology, hegemony, the 
integral state and national-popular collective will also 
rely on Gramsci's economistic, class based politics. 
Laclau on politics and ideology 
We will now consider the early work of Ernesto Laclau, in 
particular the essays Fascism and Ideology and Towards a 
Theory of Populism which were published in 1977 in his 
book Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. In these 
essays Laclau advances a rather Althusserian view of 
ideology which consists of a theory of the production of 
political subjectivity through interpellation. Having 
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said that Laclau starts from an Althusserian position I 
would also stress that his work is characterised by 
important divergences from Althusser's own work. We can 
summarise this Althusserian basis in the following way; 
(i) ideology refers to the representations through which 
people 'live', in an imaginary relation, their relation to 
the real conditions of their existence. 
(ii) ideology only exists through material practices 
inscribed within (material) institutional state 
apparatuses (ISA's). 
(iii) ideology interpellates individuals as subjects. , 
(iv) there is no practice except in and by ideology. This 
is where Laclau departs from Althusser's own position 
(which maintains the distinction between ideology and 
science). Laclau recognises no such distinction and 
reformulates ideology as discursive practice. This shift 
from ideology to discursive practice, one of the key 
motifs in Laclau's work from Politics and Ideology in 
Marxist Theory to Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and one 
of the most significant elements in the development of 
post-Marxism, is established very early in Laclau's work. 
Despite his rejection of the scientific determinism 
characteristic of Althusser's work, Laclau does inherit 
one major flaw. Agents can, according to Laclau, 
depending on the type of antagonism, be interpellated as a 
class or as the people. This is a central plank of his 
argument, but, it presumes that subjectivity and agency 
can exist outside (or prior to) the practice of 
interpellation, and hence, ideology. If subjects 
construct themselves by representing in an imaginary way 
their relation to their conditions of existence, then in 
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order to carry out this representation they would have to 
be subjects in the first place. In other words, this 
appears to be a circular argument and does not 
satisfactorily theorise the relationship between 
subjectivity and interpellation. 
There are also problems associated with the concepts 
'ideological elements' and 'non-class ideologies'. For 
Laclau 'populism' is defined as a non-class ideology when 
it should perhaps be described as an ideological element. 
This is symptomatic of a deeper problem in his work, which 
manifests itself in the form of conflicting positions that 
undermine the coherence of his early essays. These 
positions can be summarised as follows; 
(i) Class ideologies are constituted by non-class 
ideological elements. This position is prevalent in the 
essay Fascism and Ideology. 
(ii) Class, ideologies are articulated to non-class 
ideologies. This tendency is represented by the essay 
Towards a Theory of Populism. This ambivalence poses 
certain conceptual problems which are not adequately 
resolved in these essays. For example, can there be non- 
class ideologies as well as class ideologies 7 Can 
ideological elements interpellate, or can only ideologies 
do this ? Before we can attempt to answer these questions 
it is necessary to look in more detail at the two essays 
in question. 
Laclau's work on fascism 
In his essay Fascism and Ideology Laclau develops a 
critique of the work of Poulantzas as the starting point 
for his own analysis. It is evident that Laclau considers 
Poulantzas' work a major advance over previous attempts at 
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explaining Fascism. As Laclau says, until Poulantzas's 
interpretation, "... the complexity of fascism was 
eliminated and reduced to a single contradiction: that 
existing between monopoly capitalism and the rest of 
society. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 88) What Poulantzas does is to 
present fascism, "... as the result of a very complex over- 
determination of contradictions. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 88) 
Apart from explaining why Laclau should be interested in 
Poulantzas it also indicates how both can be located 
within the sphere of Althusser's influence. 
In summary then the main theses advanced by Poulantzas are 
as follows: 
(i) Fascism belongs to the imperialist stage of 
capitalism. 
(ii) Accumulation of contradictions was due to rapid 
expansion of capital in a country where the bourgeois 
revolution, was carried out under the hegemony of the 
Junkers (feudal relics), not the bourgeoisie. 
(iii) Fascism corresponds to a reorganisation of the power 
bloc which imposes the hegemony of a new class fraction: 
big monopoly capital. 
(iv) The rise of fascism presupposes defeat for the 
organised working class. 
(v) Fascism creates an alliance between big monopoly 
capital and the petty-bourgeoisie (who are in ideological 
crisis). 
Laclau identifies two problem areas which he wishes to 
explore. He states that, "... the validity of Poulantzas's 
analysis as a whole rests on two fundamental components: 
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his conception of ideology, and his conception of the 
petty-bourgeoisie. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 92) 
According to Laclau, Poulantzas has a, "... limited and 
ambiguous conception of ideology... " (Laclau, 1977, p. 93) 
For Poulantzas ideology consists of elements. All 
elements have a class belonging. 
"Class determination of ideological elements, 
concrete ideologies as an amalgam of elements, 
transformation of ideologies through an 
incorporation/articulation of ideological 
class elements - what criticisms does this 
approach merit? " (Laclau, 1977, p. 97) 
Laclau holds that the reverse is true, "... ideological., 
'elements' taken in isolation have no necessary class 
connotation, and... this connotation is only the result of 
the articulation of those elements in a concrete 
ideological discourse. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 99) The signal 
is clear; Laclau is already working towards a non- 
reductionist conception of ideology (which by implication 
Poulantzas cannot manage). 
Equally interesting is the use of the term ideological 
elements. Laclau develops all his ideas on ideology and 
discursive formations around these ideological elements 
and as such they constitute a central feature of his work. 
Not only are they the key to understanding his work on 
populism and fascism, but they also help explain the 
emergence of post-Marxism which characterises his later 
work (they also constitute a major problem area). Of the 
two essays considered in this paper the one on fascism 
relies more heavily on this conception of ideological 
elements (the other is more geared to the relationship 
between class and non-class ideologies). It is here that 
we discover how class ideologies, far from being 
determined by some structural configuration are infact 
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constituted by ideological elements which have a non-class 
origin. 
Laclau sets out to address two important questions; (i) 
what comprises the unity of an ideological discourse?, 
and, (ii) what is the process of transformation of 
ideologies? We will see how important ideological 
elements are in his answer to both of these questions. 
Althusser's most important Contribution to the study of 
ideologies is, "... the conception that the basic function 
of all ideology is to interpellate/constitute the 
individual as subjects. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 100) Thus, in 
answer to the first of his questions Laclau says, 
"... what constitutes the unifying principle of an 
ideological discourse is the 'subject' interpellated and 
thus constituted through this discourse. " (Laclau, 1977, 
p. 101) For Laclau then, interpellation is a discursive 
practice which produces political subjects. 
Laclau is of course opposed to a reductionist, approach to 
Marxism. He advances the thesis that not every 
contradiction is a class contradiction, but every 
contradiction is overdetermined by the class struggle. 
Therefore, if an antagonism is not a class antagonism the 
ideologies which express it cannot be class ideologies. 
This type of contradiction is, "... expressed through the 
interpellation of the agents as the people. " (Laclau, 
1977, p. 107) In other words, he is not simply concerned 
with the terrain of class struggle but also the realm of 
popular-democratic struggle. On one level this is a 
project that extends all through his early work and 
reaches fruition in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
However, there is another sense in which this should be 
viewed. Although Laclau's thought in this essay is 
expressed through an Althusserian vocabulary the idea 
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itself is Gramscian to the core. For what is the popular- 
democratic if not collective will, that higher synthesis 
that transcends the limits of mere class? 
"The popular-democratic interpellation not 
only has no precise class content, but is 
the domain of ideological class struggle 
par excellence. Every class struggles at 
the ideological level simultaneously as 
a class and as the people, or rather tries to 
give coherence to its ideological discourse 
by presenting its class objectives as the 
consummation of opular objectives. " (Laclau, 
1977, pp. 108-1095 
This is a reworking of the Gramscian notion of collective 
will, recast in the emerging language of post-Marxism. 
The notion of a class struggling to become 'the people' is 
only intelligible as a Marxist notion through a reading of 
Gramsci, and an extension of Althusser's notion that they 
are interpellated as 'the people'. Laclau takes this even 
further, using a terminology that prefigures one of the 
central themes of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. The 
passage is-worth quoting in full. 
"The overdetermination of non-class 
interpellations by the class struggle 
consists, then, in the integration of those 
interpellations into a class ideological 
discourse. Since ideology is a practice 
producing subjects, this integration is the 
interpellation of a subject in whom partial 
interpellations are condensed. But as classes 
struggle to integrate the same interpellations 
into antagonistic ideological discourses, the 
process of condensation will never be complete: 
it will always have an ambiguity, a greater 
or lesser degree of openness according to the 
level of class struggle, and various 
antagonistic attempts at fusion will always 
coexist. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 109) 
Although this passage talks of classes and class struggle, 
terms which have lost their currency in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, we can easily establish the origin of 
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Laclau and Mouffe's partially completed subjects, and the 
open and contingent nature of the social. Laclau is now 
able to answer his second question: Ideologies are 
transformed through class struggle, through the production 
of subjects and the articulation/ disarticulation of 
discourses. It is interesting to compare this 'answer' 
with the premise in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy that 
what prevents identity from ever becoming fully fixed, and 
disrupts/transforms the social formation is the political 
imaginary. P 
Poulantzas fails because he attempts to find a class 
belonging in every ideological element and reduces every 
contradiction to a class contradiction. In contrast 
Laclau asserts that, "... popular-democratic 
interpellations have no precise class connotation and can 
be incorporated into quite distinct political discourses. " 
(Laclau, 1977, p. 111) Consequently he hopes to establish 
that fascism was one possible way of articulating popular- 
democratic, interpellations. This limitation in 
Poulantzas's work is highlighted in Laclau's treatment of 
his categorisation of the petty-bourgeoisie. 
The rise of fascism was the result of monopoly capitalism 
attempting to assert its political hegemony but finding 
that it could only achieve its aims by means of a mass 
movement. It had to utilise, "... interpellations which 
would prevent any identification between radical popular 
objectives and socialist objectives... " (Laclau, 1977, 
p. 119), hence, "... the production of interpellations which 
hindered the identification between 'the people' and the 
working class - was the specific achievement of fascism. " 
(Laclau, 1977, p. 119) Furthermore, fascism was possible 
because the working class had vacated the political 
terrain described by Laclau as the arena of popular- 
democratic struggle: 
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"... fascism arose from a dual crisis: a crisis 
of the dominant sectors who were incapable of 
neutralizing by traditional methods the jacobin 
potential of popular-democratic interpellations; 
a crisis of the working class which was 
incapable of articulating them in socialist 
political discourse. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 135) 
Laclau challenges the essentialist, economistic idea that 
democratic ideology can be nothing but bourgeois ideology. 
If, "... it is accepted that popular-democratic ideologies 
are not class ideologies ... the basic ideological 
struggle of the working class consists in linking popular- 
democratic ideology to its discourse... " (Laclau, 1977, 
p. 141) What Laclau has achieved in this essay is co 
demonstrate the non-class character of popular 
interpellations. Fascism was, "... a popular radical 
discourse, neutralized by the bourgeoisie and transformed 
by it in a period of crisis... " (Laclau, 1977, p. 142) 
Laclau on populism 
In his essay Towards a Theory of Populism Laclau's main 
object is to look at various theories of populism and 
present an alternative theoretical schema centred on the 
concept of popular-democratic interpellation. So, as we 
can see, there is a lot of common ground with the essay on 
fascism, although as I mentioned earlier there is a change 
in emphasis, away from ideological elements in this essay. 
Laclau identifies four basic approaches that have been 
advanced to interpret the phenomenon of populism. 
(i) Populism is the expression of a determinate social 
class. 
(ii) Populism should be ignored in favour of an analysis 
of the class nature of a movement. 
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(iii) Populism is an ideology not a movement. 
(iv) Populism is an aberration produced by the transition 
from traditional to industrial society. 
What these theses have in common is that they all present 
populism as the expression of situations where classes 
cannot fully express themselves. This is of course one of 
Laclau's (and Mouffe's) main criticisms of Marxism, as 
expressed in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, that the 
more orthodox Marxists who adhere to the 'iron laws' of 
capitalist development have great difficulty in explaining 
any phenomenon that does not conform to these 'laws' (not 
that all the above positions can be said to be Marxist>. 
Instead, historical events tend to be either categorised 
by the extent to which they deviate from the perceived 
norm (Perry Anderson's view of the Bourgeois revolution in 
England as being 'incomplete', for example), or have a 
Marxist worldview imposed on them irrespective of the 
suitability of such an operation (Kautsky's attempt to 
reduce every historical event to the unfolding of a grand 
teleological design). 
Laclau asserts that contrary to a reductionist approach, 
we should view classes as, "... the poles of antagonistic 
production relations which have no necessary form of 
existence at the ideological and political levels. " 
(Laclau, 1977, p. 159) Let us pause for a moment in order 
to assess the importance of this statement, because it is 
a clear exposition of both Laclau's intentions and his 
relationship to Marxism. Firstly, it signals Laclau's 
interest in a non-reductionist politics, which we will 
find developed in full in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
However, we should note that in the populism essay he is 
still working with a non-reductionist class politics, and 
with the base/superstructure metaphor. Incidentally, we 
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should not be too concerned with Laclau's adherence to the 
idea of 'levels', as he says, "The conception of ideology 
and politics as levels presents a series of difficulties 
which we cannot pursue here. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 159) 
Secondly, the passage is interesting because it prefigures 
another move made in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
namely, the distinction drawn between 'reductionism' and 
Laclau's own work. In this case reductionism equals; 
"... an economist perspective common in the 
Marxism of the Second or Third Internationals 
- that theorizes superstructures as a 
reflection of relations of production, or 
a 'superstructuralist' perspective (Lukacs 
or Korsch) that makes 'class consciousness' 
the basic, constitutive moment of class as 
such. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 159) 
Laclau outlines three consequences that follow from his 
non-reductive emphasis; (i) the class character of an 
ideology is not to be reduced to an economic 
determination. Instead, it is revealed in its specific 
articulatipg principle. In other words, the class 
connotation of an ideology, "... only derives from its 
specific articulation with other ideological elements. " 
(Laclau, 1977, p. 160) 
(ii) articulation requires the availability of non-class 
interpellations and contradictions, which act as the raw 
material on which class ideological practices operate. 
"A class is hegemonic not so much to the extent 
that it is able to impose a uniform conception 
of the world on the rest of society, but to 
the extent that it can articulate different 
visions of the world in such a way that their 
potential antagonism is neutralised. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 161) 
This clearly demonstrates the influence of Gramsci on this 
area of Laclau's work. In particular, the reference to 
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the articulating principle should be noted, not least 
because for Gramsci the articulating principle could only 
be provided by a fundamental class. Laclau continues, 
"... it is not in the presence of determinate contents of a 
discourse but in the articulating principle which unifies 
them that we must seek the class character of politics and 
ideology. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 162) 
(iii) it is possible to assert both the class belonging of 
an ideology and the non-class character of some of the 
interpellations which constitute it. The value of this is 
that it allows Laclau to propose a satisfactory 'answer' 
to the problem of populism. 
"If we can prove that the strictly 'populist' 
element does not lie in the movement as such, 
nor in its characteristic ideological 
discourse - for these always have a class 
belonging - but in a specific non-class 
contradiction articulated into that discourse, 
we will have resolved the apparent paradox. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 164) 
This ties in with his statement that "... populism 
consists in the presentation of popular-democratic 
interpellations as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with 
respect to the dominant ideology. " (Laclau, 1977, pp. 172- 
173) He goes on to explain, that as 
"... the ideology of dominant classes not 
only interpellates dominant subjects but 
also dominated classes, with the effect of 
neutralising their potential antagonism... 
the basic method of this neutralisation lies 
in a transformation of all antagonism into 
simple difference. The articulation of 
popular-democratic ideologies within the 
dominant discourse consists in an absorption 
of everything in it which is a simple 
differential particularity and a repression 
of those elements which tend to transform 
the particularity into a symbol of 
antagonism" (Laclau, 1977, p. 173) 
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This point is echoed in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
with the assertion that antagonisms are the prerequisite 
for equivalence, whereas difference on the other hand 
prevents the formation of chains of equivalence. 
"Populism starts at the point where popular-democratic 
elements are presented as an antagonistic option against 
the ideology of the dominant bloc. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 173) 
This formulation allows Laclau to explain why it is 
possible to describe Hitler; Mao and Peron as populist. 
They all present popular interpellations in the form of 
antagonisms rather than mere difference. 
In summary we can say that what is populist in an ideology 
is the presence of popular democratic interpellations in 
their specific antagonism, and the articulation of this 
antagonistic moment within divergent class discourses. 
One thing that Laclau makes quite clear is that populism 
"... can ne. ver constitute the articulating principle of a 
political discourse... " (Laclau, 1977, p. 194) Of course 
this is quite consistent with a Gramscian notions of 
ideology and hegemony. Where Laclau differs from Gramsci 
is that he assigns a very high status to the category 'the 
people'. Again, his thinking on this topic prefigures 
some of his work in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
"It is precisely because 'the people' can 
never be totally absorbed by any class 
discourse, because there is always a certain 
openness in the ideological domain, whose 
structuring is never complete, that the class 
struggle can also occur as an ideological 
struggle. " (Laclau, 1977, p. 195) 
This is compatible with Laclau and Mouffe's assertion that 
the social is open and contingent. Interestingly, Laclau 
goes as far as to say that "... classes cannot assert their 
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hegemony without articulating the people in their 
discourse... " (Laclau, 1977, p. 196) Populism is one way 
that a dominated class can confront the existing power 
bloc and assert its hegemony. 
Conclusions 
I have identified elements in the transformation of Laclau 
and Mouffe from Marxists to post-Marxists. In fact, their 
trajectories have traced distinct but compatible paths on 
the way from their Marxist, or quasi-Marxist tracts of the 
late seventies and early eighties, to the post-Marxist 
ensemble represented by Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
In the concluding section of this chapter I will draw dut 
some of the political repercussions of this shift and the 
resultant implications for both their early work and for 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
Firstly, how true is it to speak of the early Laclau and 
Mouffe as Marxists? On one level it is true as a general 
indication of their political position but a good deal 
more needs to be explained if this label is to have any 
real meaning. Mouffe, in Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci 
is working quite openly within a Marxist framework 
informed by Gramsci, Althusser and Laclau. She gives an 
account of Gramsci which places him at the apex of Marxist 
political writing. His development of the concept of 
hegemony, in Mouffe's account, results in a most flexible 
and sophisticated tool of political analysis. Gramsci 
represents a tradition within Marxism (anti-economism, 
non-mechanistic determinism and anti-reductionism) which 
both Laclau and Mouffe admire greatly and in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy designate as exhibiting the 'logic of 
contingency'. This is the 'lost' tradition in Marxism, 
which they wish their work to be seen as a continuation 
of. 
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The main difference between Laclau and Mouffe's 
appreciation of Gramsci in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
and Mouffe's early work is easy to establish: whereas 
Mouffe was able to work with the economic, deterministic 
underpinning of Gramsci's base/superstructure Marxism, in 
collaboration Laclau and Mouffe find Gramsci tainted with 
too many Marxist residues which fatally flaw his undoubted 
achievement of developing a superior theory of class 
politics. In essence Gramsci was unable to '. go beyond' 
the limits imposed by adherence to orthodoxy; his politics 
were always those of class politics. The Marxist 
foundations which he built upon so well in the end prove 
to be no more than limitations, preventing the 
construction of a truly non-essentialist politics. 
When considering the shift in position in Mouffe's work it 
is important to note that Mouffe is correct in asserting 
that for Gramsci the working class is central, in as much 
as it acts as the articulating principle of a national- 
popular will. Thus, Gramsci's Marxism contains the 
fundamental premise that hegemony must be class hegemony. 
This position is criticised by Mouffe, who sees the 
fundamental nature of the working class as sure evidence 
of essentialism. There is, however, another aspect to 
class hegemony that Mouffe ignores; the fact that for 
Gramsci the capitalist class, can also achieve hegemonic 
status. The bourgeoisie are a fundamental class too, (the 
two classes occupy antagonistic poles at the heart of the 
capitalist relation: the owners of the means of production 
and those who sell their labour power), and as such can 
also act as an articulating principle, and as Mouffe 
herself acknowledges, the post-war period witnessed the, 
"hegemony of capital". (Mouffe, 1983, p. 17) If, as Mouffe 
maintains, we should jettison any notion of a fundamental 
class, and specifically the centrality of the working 
class, we must also consider the possibility that, we 
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should cease to talk about the possibility of bourgeois 
hegemony. Failure to do so would be inconsistent. 
However, such a move would only serve to empty the concept 
of hegemony of all explanatory power and take away the 
political edge that Gramsci endowed the concept with. 
Mouffe criticises Marxists for holding to the belief that 
the working class has a fundamental interest in the 
overthrow of capitalism. The question that needs to be 
asked of Mouffe is; why have the New Social Movements of 
which she writes, (Feminism, the Greens etc. ) any interest 
in the overthrow of capitalism either? "There is 
absolutely no reason to suppose that only a movement led 
by the working class can put an end to the domination of 
capital over paid labour. " (Mouffe, 1983, p. 23) However, 
the argument for their centrality to anti-capitalist 
struggles is more compelling than that of say, the anti- 
nuclear movement. Moreover, it is evident that many'of 
these social movements do not incorporate an anti- 
capitalist, element and, as such, it is difficult to see 
where an anti-capitalist impulse would come from, unless 
the working class acts as an articulating principle. 
These ideas will be considered more closely in the 
following chapter. 
Laclau's relationship with other Marxist writers, as 
demonstrated in the pages of Politics and Ideology in 
Marxist Theory is a little more complicated. It is 
possible to label Laclau as an Althusserian, but only if 
certain caveats are observed. I have argued in this 
chapter that some of the important elements in the 
development of post-Marxism are established early in 
Laclau's work, and in this way some Althusserian ideas are 
subject to criticism. It is also the case that he is 
engaged in debate with another Althusserian (Poulantzas) 
of whom he is critical. I have also mentioned that I 
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believe Laclau's work to be the origin of many of the 
strands of what later became called post-Marxism. In fact 
it could be argued that his early work is already post- 
Marxist, in the limited sense that it is no longer 
Marxist, but still engages with what we might want to call 
a Marxist agenda. Strictly speaking though the term post- 
Marxism should be reserved for the Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy period rather than the earlier collection of 
essays. 
The distinction that can be drawn from Laclau's work 
between Marxism and post-Marxism stems from the assertion 
that Marxism is necessarily reductionist in as much as it 
can never escape its economistic roots. This is the 
essence of the post-Marxist position; Marxism is undone by 
its reliance upon economics. But in adopting this 
position Laclau has conflated reductionism with 
determinism. Marxism does not lose any explanatory power 
because it is deterministic. There is a significant 
difference, between reduction and determination and the two 
terms should never be used interchangeably. 
Economic determination is part of Marxism's conceptual 
apparatus. Raymond Williams recognised this when he wrote 
" We have to revalue 'determination' towards the setting 
of limits and the exertion of pressure, and away from a 
predicted, prefigured and controlled content. " (Williams, 
1980, p. 34) It was for this reason that Williams valued 
the work of Gramsci, a thinker who through the concept of 
hegemony, viewed the base and superstructure as a 
structured, mutually implicated totality. 
The question of ideological elements has been discussed 
earlier in this chapter but there is one further aspect 
that should be considered. Ideological elements are a 
base/superstructure Marxist notion in which ideology and 
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subjectivity are inexorably linked. Mouffe's early work 
resolves to elucidate the link between class and 
ideological elements. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
any notion of subjectivity being linked to the economy in 
such an essentialist way is rejected. Therefore, a study 
of the development and utilisation of the idea of 
ideological elements, which comprises arguably the single 
most important facet of their theory of ideology, actually 
provides us with the moment of rupture between Marxism and 
post-Marxism. Ideological elements were designed to 
complement a non-necessitarian reading of ideology but 
were later seen by Laclau and Mouffe to undermine the 
whole project. Ideological elements are simply not 
consistent with a theoretical ensemble where contingency 
has replaced determinism. They belong in a Marxism that 
recognises relative autonomy, where the link between the 
economy and subjectivity has not been dissolved. If the 
one constant theme in Laclau and Mouffe's early work is to 
address the question, 'to what extent are ideologies class 
based? ' , We can say that ideological elements were 
introduced in order to answer this question. Once the 
question is abandoned as being no longer adequate, 
ideological elements no longer serve a useful purpose. 
It can be said that Laclau's project in his early essays 
is to explore that region of Gramscian Marxism denoted by 
the term national-popular collective will. In many ways 
the most challenging of Gramsci's contributions to the 
development of Marxist political analysis collective will 
moves Marxist politics onto the terrain of popular- 
democratic struggles. Moreover, it actually means that 
discussion of popular-democratic struggles can be 
understood within a Marxist framework in a way that makes 
them compatible, not antithetical to the class struggle. 
The popular-democratic therefore is no longer equated 
purely with bourgeois interests. 
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What should not be forgotten is that 'collective will' in 
the Gramscian idiom is meaningful only in as much as it is 
consonant with hegemony, base/superstructure and class 
struggle. Laclau endeavours to wrest popular-democratic 
politics, in the guise of 'collective will' away from its 
Marxist matrix. This is not finally achieved until 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy but the initial moves are 
made in the pages of Politics and Ideology in Marxist 
Theory. This attempt is exemplified by the move to 
replace collective will with 'the people'. Take for 
example the statement by Laclau that monopoly capitalism, 
in order to achieve hegemonic status, had to forge 
interpellations which would dissolve any link between 'the 
people' and the working class (Laclau, 1977, p. 119). 
Laclau is trying to establish that the radical political 
move on behalf of the working class would have been to 
'capture' those areas of the popular-democratic which 
would have resulted in working class hegemony and the 
defeat of the fascists. In fact the working class chose a 
rather more corporatist strategy, refused to have anything 
to do with 'bourgeois' politics and left way open for 
fascism to establish itself in Germany. The suggestion 
here then is that hegemony involves a process whereby the 
working class becomes 'the people'. 
However, there is another way of reading this which calls 
into question both Laclau's idea of what constitutes 
hegemony and the status of the term 'the people'. The 
term 'the working class' is meaningful within a Marxist 
context in a way that 'the people' is not: the working 
class do not become 'the people' upon achieving hegemonic 
status. To suggest they do constitutes a misunderstanding 
of Gramsci's national-popular collective will. In its 
original Gramscian usage the term collective will, while 
stressing that political subjects are no longer classes as 
such, does not play down the role of the hegemonic class, 
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on the contrary it implies the presence of classes, who 
necessarily act as the unifying principle. 
There is a strong sense in which Gramsci's notion of 
hegemony is bound-up with ideas of the nation and 
nationalism. For Gramsci the political project of 
hegemony is a nationalist project. A class becomes 
hegemonic in a given nation; the project of hegemony is to 
forge a national-popular collective will. Gramsci's view 
can be summarised thus; r 
"... a class becomes hegemonic in the extent 
to which it transcends its corporate phase 
and succeeds in combining the interests of 
other classes and social forces with its own 
interests, and in becoming the universal 
representative of the main social forces which 
make up the nation. " (Simon, p. 32) 
This is also Mouffe's interpretation of Gramsci in her 
early work. She writes, 
"A successful hegemony is one which manages 
to create a 'collective national-popular 
will', and for this to happen the dominant 
class must have been capable of articulating 
to its hegemonic principle all the national- 
popular ideological elements, since it is 
only if this happens that it (the class) 
appears as the representative of the general 
interest. This is why the ideological 
elements expressing the 'national-popular' 
are often at stake in the fierce struggle 
between classes fighting for hegemony. 
(Mouffe, 1979, p. 194) 
In addition to the point about the nationalist aspect of 
hegemony it is also worth noticing that both Simon and 
Mouffe highlight the importance of transcending the 
corporate. Thus Mouffe makes the key point about a class 
being 'representative of the general interest'; not a 
restricted or exclusive interest. 
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There is a strong association between transcending the 
corporate and embracing the national interest. Mouffe 
says, 
"... a class is hegemonic when it has 
managed to articulate to its discourse the 
overwhelming majority of ideological elements 
characteristic of a given social formation, 
in particular the national-popular elements 
which allow it to become the class expressin 
the national interest. " (Mouffe, 1979, p. 195ý 
Mouffe's interest in the politics of nation-building 
through 'expansive hegemony' is in marked contrast to her 
later work, characterised by the return of corporate, 
exclusive -'us and them'-political identities. Laclau and 
Mouffe both identify corporatism as a problem within 
Marxist thought. It is ironic that their later work on 
identity, resting on exclusion and the politics of 'us and 
them', advocates a kind of neo-corporatism. The politics 
of hegemony has undergone a radical transformation; where 
it previously worked to overcome corporate interests it 
now embraces them. 
This mutation is also evident in the case of the term 
Jacobinism. The political imaginary or democratic 
imaginary as it is sometimes referred to, is deliberately 
formulated as a concept antithetical to the Marxist 
tradition. Laclau and Mouffe draw a strict distinction 
between the democratic imaginary and the Jacobin 
imaginary, which is used to denote the revolutionary, 
epochal transition from one type of society to another. 
Gramsci's explanation for the 'late arrival' of the 
Italian nation is that the Italian bourgeoisie failed to 
transcend its economic-corporate phase. The force which 
is needed to make this transformation from corporate to 
hegemonic class is termed Jacobin. 
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"An effective Jacobin force was always missing, 
and could not be constituted; and it was 
precisely such a Jacobin force which in other 
nations awakened and organised the 
national-popular collective will, and founded 
the modern States. " (Gramsci, p. 131) 
Gramsci appropriates the term Jacobin from his 
interpretation of the history of the French Revolution 
where the Jacobins worked successfully to forge a bond 
between town and country. "They made the demands of the 
popular masses their own. They did not concern themselves 
solely with the immediate and narrow corporate interests 
of the bourgeoisie as the hegemonic group of all the 
popular forces. " (Simon, p. 33) In Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy Laclau and Mouffe talk of the Jacobin imaginary 
in very different terms (see following chapter for a full 
account), limiting it to the Marxist type revolutionary 
transition from one type of society to another. 
With an extension of the democratic imaginary to more and 
more areas of social life (one of Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy's central ideas), the idea of 'revolution' in the 
Marxist sense is no longer applicable. This 
interpretation of Jacobinism is somewhat confusing. There 
is evidence to suggest that Gramsci used it to indicate, 
"... a form of political domination based on 
the ability to overcome a narrow economic- 
corporate conception of a class or class- 
fraction and form expansive universalising 
alliances with other classes and class- 
fractions whose interests can be made to be 
seen as coinciding with those of the hegemonic 
class. " (Forgacs, p. 87) 
In this sense the term 'Jacobin imaginary' offers many 
possibilities for the politics of hegemony. There is a 
strong link between Jacobinism, hegemony and civil 
society. 
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"The function Gramsci assigns to hegemony in 
transcending mere domination forcefully 
reveals the pre-eminent position he 
attributes to civil society, which is the 
mediating factor between the base and 
secondary superstructural phenomena. 
Hegemony is the intermediary force which 
welds together determinate objective 
conditions and the actual domination of the 
ruling group: this conjunction 
p. 93) 
Gramscian notions are firmly linked to base/superstructure 
determination and other eco. nomistic Marxist ideas from 
which Laclau and Mouffe wish to distance themselves. So, 
in jettisoning their Marxist economistic baggage they lose 
one of the beneficial aspects of their early work; an 
approach to the formation of political identity which was 
not solely reliant upon political ideas. As we will see 
in the next chapter their work became increasingly centred 
on the politics of hegemony freed from any economic 
determination. 
In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate that when 
working within a (Gramscian) Marxist framework Laclau and 
Mouffe could draw upon a theorisation of identity which 
enabled them to view identity formation in relation to the 
nation-state. Hegemony, civil society, the state and the 
nation are closely linked in Gramsci's work, through the 
notion of national-popular collective will. In other 
words, through their critique of large portions of the 
Marxist canon which forms their background, Laclau and 
Mouffe moved on to theorise identity in a completely 
different way. Their early work can be viewed as the 
origin of the break with the idea that identity must be 
conceptualised in relation to the state. An appreciation 
of the Marxist traditions which have informed them in 
reaching this position becomes possible through an 
examination of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FROM MARXISM TO RADICAL DEMOCRACY 
-60- 
Introduction 
Responses to Hegemony and Socialist Strategy upon its 
publication in 1985 were varied. It was greeted with 
enthusiasm by some writers who welcomed Laclau and 
Mouffe's critique of essentialism and move towards post- 
Marxism, and denounced by Marxists who saw their work as a 
betrayal of historical materialism. The responses fall 
into three general categories; 
(i) Laclau and Mouffe's work is a development of the 
Gramscian notion of hegemony. Hegemony occupies central 
place in Laclau and Mouffe's post-Marxism and is a concept 
that has a definite Marxist lineage. It is questionable 
however if their usage of hegemony is actually a 
development of the (Marxist) concept. Rather, it is 
likely that it is a completely new formulation, in the 
sense that it is distinct from its Marxist ancestor as a 
result of its de-articulation from ideology and class. 
One commentator cited the work of Laclau and Mouffe as an 
example "... of the attempt to integrate post-structuralist 
treatments of discourse with a neo-Gramscian non- 
reductionist politics. " (Sarup, p. 164) It is in this way 
that Hegemony and Socialist Strategy as the 'development 
of the Gramscian notion of hegemony' should be understood. 
(ii) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is a contribution to 
the theorisation of the politics of postmodernism, or the 
development of a politics of postmodernism. Best and 
Kellner, in their discussion of various theorists of 
postmodernism say, 
"Only Laclau and Mouffe have attempted to 
critically reconstruct liberalism and to push 
the liberal democratic heritage to a higher level, though their efforts could have the 
effects of strengthening liberalism and 
undermining the radical democracy that they 
seek. " (Best and Kellner, p. 289) 
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This raises a further question; how radical is radical 
democracy?. There is the suspicion that what 
characterises the politics of postmodernism is a weakening 
of political agency. 
The most sympathetic treatments of Hegemony & Socialist 
Strategy tended to view it as the future for both Marxism 
and post-structuralism alike. Frequently, either the 
post-structuralist or the post-Marxist aspects are 
highlighted, but seldom both. For example, Rattansi falls 
into the former category; 
"Laclau and Mouffe's work represents an 
important advance in the construction of a 
decentered, de-essentialized conception of 
the social, extending in particular the work 
of Derrida... " (Rattansi, 1994, p. 31) 
Gross, on the other hand says that it "... maintains the 
strengths of the Marxist tradition while ridding it of all 
those features most often the object'of anti-Marxist 
attacks... "(Gross, p. 115) The work of Laclau and Mouffe 
thus takes on a crucial role not because it is a Marxist 
work, it almost certainly is not, but because it has 
headed Marxist theory in the quest to theorise the 
political spaces created by postmodernism. 
(iii) Laclau and Mouffe's work is the outcome of a 'crisis 
of Marxism'. The work of Laclau and Mouffe can be said to 
have emerged from a 'crisis within Marxism', displaying a 
definite and permanent relationship to the Marxism that 
preceded it. (Laclau and Mouffe emphasise that their work 
is post-Marxist as well as being post-Marxist). The 
following factors can legitimately claim to contribute to 
the 'crisis': the absence of theoretical direction in the 
post-Althusserian period, the challenge of feminism and 
new social movements, the widespread failure or 
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incorporation of working class movements, and the fall of 
Eastern European Communism. 
It is true to say that Laclau and Mouffe have begun to 
occupy the theoretical, intellectual and even political 
spaces vacated by Marxism during the period of post- 
Althusserian stagnation. The roots of this failure are to 
be found in the reluctance among Marxists to acknowledge 
the central problems in contemporary Marxism. It was for 
this reason that the idea of post-Marxism was received 
with enthusiasm in some quarters. O'Connor describes 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy "the most sophisticated 
post-Marxist text" (O'Connor, p. 33) 
The responses from the Marxist camp have been harsh and 
indignant, relying mainly on a trenchant re-statement of 
Marxist orthodoxy. The obvious examples are Geras, who 
debated at length with Laclau and Mouffe in the pages of 
New Left Review (Geras, 1987 and 1988), and Wood with her 
book Retreat from Class (Wood, 1986). Both responses 
raise important issues in relation to Laclau and Mouffe's 
work but neither are at all sympathetic to the project of 
post-Marxism. Mouzelis offers a rounded response by 
adopting a position that challenges the idea promulgated 
by Geras and Wood that Laclau and Mouffe have completely 
broken with Marxism, 
"... when obliged to refer to the broad 
features of capitalist formulations and 
their long term transformations, they revert 
... to such conventional Marxist concepts as 
exploitation, commodification, the labour 
process, civil society, capitalist periphery 
etc... How are the above concepts, which Laclau 
and Mouffe freely use, connected with discourse 
analysis 7 The connection is never made clear, 
and the gap between the two types of concepts 
creates a much more glaring dualism than that 
found in the Marxist texts they so vehemently 
criticise". (Mouzelis, p. 115) 
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It is important to investigate the role of the Marxist 
tradition in Laclau and Mouffe's post-Marxist work. To do 
this it is necessary to look at Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy in some detail. 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
We can say that the main project in Laclau and Mouffe's 
collaborative venture, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is 
to explore the possibility of a non-essentialist socialist 
strategy, to which they give the name 'hegemony'. Laclau 
and Mouffe's challenge to Marxist essentialism develops 
out of a critique of the ontological centrality of the 
working class in the Marxist tradition, a tradition that 
never manages to transcend its economistic, deterministic, 
and essentialist foundations. Even those Marxists such as 
Gramsci, who represent the highest, most sophisticated 
level of political analysis are guilty of class 
essentialism. For Laclau and Mouffe a true democratic 
politics cannot emerge while the primacy of the working 
class is supposed, hence the need for a thorough 
rethinking of essentialist categories. 
It should be noted however, that Laclau and Mouffe do not 
wish to reject Marxism in totality. They would like their 
work to be seen as a development of particular strands of 
thought within the Marxist tradition, in particular, what 
they would call 'the logic of contingency'. They would 
probably choose to be understood as political theorists 
who have recognised and come to terms with a fragmenting 
Marxism, utilised selected fragments (the 'best' ones), 
and as a result are in a position to provide what Marxism 
can no longer manage; a framework for political analysis 
in the postmodern world. We should understand the 
designation 'post-Marxism' in this light. 
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There is a tension resulting from the complex relationship 
between post-Marxism and the Marxist traditions it has in 
part rejected. Laclau and Mouffe acknowledge the 
plurality and diversity of positions within the Marxist 
corpus, but at the same time give what Geras has called an 
impoverishing view of Marxism, that is to say they reduce 
it to its irredeemably essentialist core. I would make 
two points here. Firstly, Laclau and Mouffe certainly 
appropriate the Marxist tradition very selectively, but 
their relation to, and appropriation of the Marxist 
tradition needs a much fuller investigation if it is to 
be understood properly. Secondly, it is interesting that 
Laclau and Mouffe can no longer work within a Marxist 
framework. Most of the Marxist strands they hold as good 
have emerged precisely because of the viability of the 
base/superstructure model, with its economistic and 
deterministic underpinnings. Their stance on 
essentialism, the cornerstone of their critique, has led 
them to this position but outright rejection of all 
Marxism on, these grounds sits uneasily with their previous 
sympathy to, and understanding of, historical materialism. 
For example, they no longer have use for the concept 'mode 
of production', it is simply far too economistic, but how 
is it possible to speak of capitalism without a notion of 
mode of production ? Although they make a point of 
highlighting the work of those Marxists whose ideas 
conflicted with the orthodoxy of historical necessity or 
economism, they play down the extent to which these same 
writers theorised the political as a relatively autonomous 
sphere freed from any simple economic determination. 
At the start of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau and 
Mouffe make an interesting statement that deserves 
attention. They describe "... an avalanche of historical 
mutations... ", such as "... the new feminism, the protest 
movements of ethnic, national and sexual minorities, the 
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anti-institutional ecology struggles waged by marginalised 
layers of the population, the anti-nuclear, the atypical 
forms of social struggle in countries on the capitalist 
periphery - all these imply an extension of social 
conflictuality to a wide range of areas, which creates the 
potential, but no more than the potential, for an advance 
towards more free, democratic and egalitarian societies. " 
(Laclau and Mouffe, p. 1) The task of Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy is to explain the political strategy 
which will turn this potential into actuality; namely, 
hegemony. This new political logic presents a direct 
challenge to, "... the theoretical and political bases on 
which the intellectual horizon of the left was 
traditionally constituted", in other words, Marxism. This 
was the main reason that the work of Laclau and Mouffe was 
thought at the time to be applicable to an understanding 
of the politics of Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition and 
emerging democracies within the former Eastern bloc, among 
other examples. 
The concept of hegemony developed in the pages of Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy is central to Laclau and Mouffe's 
thesis but very different from its Marxist predecessor. 
They state that rather than being complementary to the 
Marxist tradition, it in fact, "... introduces a logic of 
the social which is incompatible with those [Marxist] 
categories. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 3) One of the tasks 
of this paper is to give a full exegesis of hegemony, as 
developed by Laclau and Mouffe, a task which can only be 
completed by giving a detailed account of other, related 
concepts such as articulation, antagonism, equivalence and 
overdetermination. 
What factors can we identify which have led Laclau and 
Mouffe to adopt their post-Marxist position ? Their 
motivation is twofold; a growing disenchantment with all 
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forms of Marxism and a need to find a non-reductionist 
politics that can understand and embrace 'new social 
movements', two factors which are of course closely 
linked. Their book can be read on one level as a 
postmodernist critique of Marxism (see below). It is 
worth looking a little more closely at their 
dissatisfaction with the Marxist project. 
"What is now in crisis is a whole conception 
of socialism which rests upon the ontological 
centrality of the working class, upon the 
role of Revolution, with a capital 'r', as 
the founding moment in the transition from 
one type of society to another, and upon the 
illusory prospect of a perfectly unitary and 
homogeneous collective will that will render 
pointless the moment of politics. The plural 
and multifarious character of contemporary 
social struggles has finally dissolved the 
last foundation for that political imaginary. 
Peopled with 'universal' subjects and 
conceptually built around History in the 
singular, it has postulated 'society' as 
an intelligible structure that could be 
intellectually mastered on the basis of class 
positions and reconstituted, as a rational 
transparent order, through a founding act of 
a political character. Today the Left is 
witnessing the final act of the dissolution 
of that Jacobin imaginary. "(Laclau and Mouffe, p. 2) 
I would single out the following points for comment. 
Firstly, the 'collective will' referred to is class 
consciousness of the mechanistic Marxist variety (rather 
than the Gramscian type), where consciousness is 
expressive of a class formed at the economic level. Hence 
the reference to the 'moment of politics' being redundant. 
In this model class unity is not formed on the political 
stage, but rather class subjects are created a priori by 
their insertion into the relations of production. 
Secondly, for Laclau and Mouffe 'society' is no longer 
possible. Instead the social is open and contingent. 
They state that, "One of the central tasks of this book 
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[Hegemony and Socialist Strategy] will be to determine 
this specific logic of contingency. " (Laclau and Mouffe, 
p. 3) In order to do this they have to employ concepts 
bequeathed from the Marxist cannon. Their object of study 
will be, "... that infinite intertextuality of emancipatory 
discourses in which the plurality of the social takes 
shape". (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 3) 
As we shall see Laclau and Mouffe go to great lengths to 
emphasise the diversity and indeed plurality of positions 
within the Marxist tradition, some of which they wish to 
associate themselves with. They also firmly reject many 
other strands of Marxist thought, as evidenced by their 
rejection of economism. The logic behind what may seem at 
times to be a very selective appreciation of the Marxism 
is in fact a reading which views the degree of 
essentialism present in any text as the criterion of 
quality. Of course, for Laclau and Mouffe all Marxism is 
essentialist in the final instance and it is this reason, 
more than any other, why we should not be surprised that 
Laclau and Mouffe describe themselves as post-Marxists. 
The problem with Marxism, Laclau and Mouffe might say, is 
that it necessarily grants privilege to the working class 
as agents of political change, reducing politics to a mere 
reflection of an underlying economic order. Their post- 
Marxist work is therefore an attempt to break with 
economism, and at the same time, establish the presence of 
a 'lost' tradition of nascent contingency within 
mainstream Marxism. Although it may be tempting to see 
them as socialists who have rejected the essentialism 
inherent in Marxism, I would suggest that this is too 
simple a view, and only a partially accurate description 
of their position. Their relation to Marxism is a much 
more complex one. True, they challenge essentialism and 
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economic determinism, but they also seek to establish 
Marxist antecedents for their own position. 
In order for Laclau and Mouffe to carry out this project 
they need a guiding principle, which as we already know is 
their concept of hegemony. This choice serves two 
functions. Firstly, it allows them to re-read Marxist 
political theory in order to establish the presence of, or 
component pieces of, a political logic that would 
eventually be known as hegemony. Secondly, it allows them 
to situate themselves within the Marxist lineage, even if 
they now claim to have gone beyond it. 
"Faced with the rationalism of classical 
Marxism, which presented history and society 
as intelligible totalities constituted around 
conceptually explicable laws, the logic of 
hegemony presented itself from the outset 
as a complementary and contingent operation, 
required for conjunctural imbalances within 
an evolutionary paradigm whose essential or 'morphological' validity was not for a moment 
placed in question". (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 3) 
What should not be forgotten about Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy is that it can be read on one level as a 
postmodernist critique of Marxism. For example, Laclau 
and Mouffe can write that, 
"... there is not one discourse and one system 
of categories through which the 'real' might 
speak without mediations. In operating 
deconstructively within Marxist categories, 
we do not claim to be writing 'universal 
history', to be inscribing our discourse as 
a moment of a single, linear process of knowledge. Just as the era of normative 
epistemology has come to an end, so too has 
the era of universal discourses. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 3) 
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This is both an assertion of their postmodernist 
credentials and an acknowledgement of their debt to the 
post-structuralism of Foucault, Derrida and Lacan. 
This introduction has sought to situate Laclau and Mouffe 
in relation to the Marxism that their work is in part a 
critique of. I propose to allow their own distinction 
between Marxism and post-Marxism as a valid and useful, as 
long as it is understood that what lies behind this 
appellation is a complex, and sometimes fraught 
relationship which contains more than just a thorough 
rejection of essentialism. When they say; 
"We are now situated in a post-Marxist terrain. 
It is no longer possible to maintain the 
conception of subjectivity and classes 
elaborated by Marxism, nor its vision of the 
historical course of capitalist development, 
nor, of course, the conception of communism 
as a transparent society from which 
antagonisms have disappeared. " 
(Laclau and Mouffe, p. 4), 
we can clearly see the extent of their anti-essentialism. 
Obviously, the Marxist conception of classes depends upon 
an essentialist underpinning, but it does not necessarily 
follow that a mechanistic model of the unfolding of 
capitalist development is a feature of each and every 
strand of the Marxist tradition. Laclau and Mouffe 
underplay the extent to which those theorists who reveal 
an understanding of the contingent nature of politics, or 
a dissatisfaction with the 'iron law of capitalist 
development' thesis also allow for reciprocal 
determination between base and superstructure. What is 
required is a thorough examination of the origins of 
essentialism in Marxism, and its influence on specific 
historical and political writings. In the first and 
second chapters of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau 
and Mouffe set out to do this. 
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The Marxist tradition and historical necessity. 
It is clear that Laclau and Mouffe believe that they can 
not only establish that their own project has Marxist 
antecedents, but also that the historical development of 
Marxism contains evidence of a rich diversity of 
perspectives that cannot be reduced to classical 
orthodoxy. In order to establish the emergence of 
hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe study the political writings 
of Luxemburg, Bernstein, Kautsky and Sorel. In this way, 
they hope to show how Marxism has always had a need for 
the concept of hegemony, but how its full emergence was 
inhibited by structural problems within Marxism itself. 
There is a tension within their work arising from their 
interpretation of these various Marxists. On the one hand 
Marxism is irredeemably essentialist, economistic and 
reductionist and this is true irrespective of whichever 
Marxist we might care to mention. On the other hand, they 
give an account of Marxism which stresses the plurality of 
positions, political strategies and theoretical direction 
out of which they are able to construct the genealogy of 
the concept 'hegemony'. 
Their starting point is a critique of the idea of 
historical necessity. This is the somewhat crude, 
economistic Marxist notion that the laws of capitalist 
development will lead to the unity of working class 
consciousness, and ultimately the revolutionary overthrow 
of the capitalism. Laclau and Mouffe take as an example 
of a challenge to this position the work of Rosa 
Luxemburg, whose ideas of spontaneism broke with the 
notion that class unity is formed at the level of the 
economic base. She posits the unity of class as a 
symbolic unity, "... each struggle overflows its own 
literality and comes to represent, in the consciousness of 
the masses, a simple moment of a more global struggle 
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against the system. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 11) As such, 
she has rejected the logic of historical necessity and 
replaced it with a form of, "... symbolic overdetermination 
as a concrete mechanism for the unity of these [multiple] 
struggles... " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 11) 
This introduces the term 'overdetermination'. In Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy this has a specific meaning: that 
there is an absence of any simple determinations, by the 
economic, for example. In the case of Luxemburg she has 
suggested that class unity is not given by the subject's 
position in the relations of production. Rather, the 
creation of this class unity is a political act. In 
Laclau and Mouffe's terminology, the unity of the working 
class is constituted through a process of revolutionary 
overdetermination. 
Laclau and Mouffe believe that there is nothing in 
Luxemburg's theory of spontaneism to lead to the 
conclusion, that this process of overdetermination to lead 
to class unity as such. 
"On the contrary, the very logic of 
spontaneism seems to imply that the resulting 
type of unitary subject should remain largely 
indeterminate. In the case of the Tsarist 
state, if the condition of overdetermination 
of the points of antagonism and the diverse 
struggles is a repressive political context, 
why cannot the class limits be surpassed and 
lead to the construction of, for example, 
partially unified subjects whose fundamental 
determination is popular or democratic. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 11) 
This is a very important passage which contains several 
examples of terms developed by Laclau and Mouffe in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. As overdetermination is, 
"... a field of identities which can never manage to be 
fully fixed... " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 111), Laclau and 
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Mouffe talk in terms of 'partially unified subjects'. 
Antagonisms are overdetermined because in contrast to 
classical Marxism, antagonisms are not simply economic. 
When Laclau and Mouffe talk of overdetermination they are 
attempting to free the term from the (Althusserian) limits 
of 'relative autonomy', consequently there is now no 
determination in the last instance. 
However, there seems to be a problem with their 
understanding of Luxemburg, ' stemming in part from a poor 
historical analysis and importantly, also from their own 
admission that their theory is only applicable to post-war 
western societies. There was of course no civil society 
to speak of in Tsarist Russia, and no subsequent tradition 
of, or political space for the emergence of, popular or 
democratic movements. To use Laclau and Mouffe's own 
terminology, we can say that partially constructed 
democratic subjects would be at the horizon of the social. 
Tsarist Russia was pre-capitalist by and large and 
certainly. was not characterised by what Marxists (or 
Laclau and Mouffe for that matter), would call the 
capitalist mode of production. "The October Revolution 
[was] made against the husk of a feudal monarchy", and 
"... the Bolsheviks never had to confront... the contours of 
capitalist democracy" (Anderson, P. p. 79) The type of 
democratic politics that Laclau and Mouffe invoke seems to 
belong to a later historical period. In other words, it 
is unlikely that Tsarist Russia would provide the correct 
conditions for the possibility of the emergence of 
democratic subjects. However, this type of explanation, 
while permissible within a Marxist framework, is not 
available to Laclau and Mouffe. They would not concede 
that the emergence of political actors is in any way 
conditioned by the development of productive forces. 
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Laclau and Mouffe take every opportunity to attack the 
essentialism characteristic of Marxist theory. They are 
saying that if we take away the limitations imposed by 
historical necessity then the open and contingent nature 
of subjectivity would be allowed to emerge. They suggest 
that the construction of political identities should have 
little to do with strict class boundaries. In the 
advanced capitalist countries the last few decades has 
brought about, "... the constant emergence of new forms of 
political subjectivity cutting across the categories of 
the social and economic structure. " (Laclau and Mouffe, 
p. 13) This would seem to confirm the view expressed 
earlier that the example of Tsarist Russia does not fit 
inside their model. They submit that when Luxemburg 
resorts to class subject identities, she has run up 
against the most fundamental limitation within Marxist 
theorising: essentialism. Another, less aleatory, 
explanation could be that non-class subject identities 
simply were not available in Tsarist Russia. 
The study of Rosa Luxemburg serves more than one purpose. 
Laclau and Mouffe have found a theme within the Marxist 
tradition that they can identify with; namely, the non- 
necessary character of class formation (coupled with the 
importance of the moment of politics). They attribute to 
Luxemburg the realisation that the necessary logic of 
capitalist development was insufficient to effect a 
socialist revolution. The importance of this discovery is 
described thus: "The concept of hegemony did not emerge to 
define a new type of relation in its specific identity, 
but to fill a hiatus that had opened in the chain of 
historical necessity. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 11) 
One strong criticism of Marxism advanced by Laclau and 
Mouffe is the tendency to impose its categories on the 
social field and its worldview on any political situation, 
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often producing a distorted picture as a result. Kautsky 
is singled out for criticism both for this failing and for 
his reductionist methodology. Kautsky, "... simplified the 
meaning of every social antagonism or element by reducing 
it to a specific structural location, already fixed by the 
logic of the capitalist mode of production. " (Laclau and 
Mouffe, pp. 15-16) So not only is he guilty of determinism 
but also of reducing history to the unfolding of a grand 
teleological design. Their critique of Kautsky is 
therefore both an attack on' 'historical necessity', and 
the 'laws of capitalist development'. Laclau and Mouffe 
stress the failings of Kautsky's 'normative Marxism': 
"... in the Marxist Vulgate, history advanced 
towards an ever greater simplification of 
social antagonisms, the extreme isolation 
and confrontation course of the German 
workers movement would acquire the prestige 
of a paradigm towards which other national 
situations had to converge and in relation 
to which they were merely inadequate 
approximations. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 17) 
In other words, Kautsky is being criticised for not 
theorising the specificity of the German situation. Once 
it became clear that capitalism was advancing in a way 
that neither conformed to any Marxist model nor obeyed 
'iron laws of development', the theorists of historical 
necessity had to rethink their whole project. 
If the failure of the logic of historical necessity was 
the problem, then the solution, according to Laclau and 
Mouffe was threefold. The formation of Marxist orthodoxy, 
revisionism and revolutionary syndicalism all represent 
responses to the 'crisis' posed by the fragmentation of 
the working class and the resistance offered by organised 
capital. Laclau and Mouffe sum up the situation in the 
following terms. 
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"A proliferation of caesurae and 
discontinuities start to break down the 
unity of a discourse that considered itself 
profoundly monist. From then on, the problem 
of Marxism has been to think those 
discontinuities and, at the same time, to 
find forms of reconstituting the unity of 
scattered and heterogeneous elements. ' 
(Laclau and Mouffe, p. 18) 
Laclau and Mouffe discuss the three responses to the 
crisis in some detail. (i) The formation of Marxist 
Orthodoxy. If politics is a superstructure then, "... it 
is a terrain of struggle between agents whose identity, 
conceived under the form of 'interests', has set itself up 
at another level. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 20). This is 
developed in greater detail. 
"Diverse subject positions are reduced to 
manifestations of a single position; the 
plurality of differences is either reduced 
or rejected as contingent; the sense of the 
present is revealed through its location in 
an a priori succession of stages. It is 
precisely because the concrete is in this 
way reduced to the abstract, that history, 
society and social agents have, for orthodoxy, 
an essence which operates as their principle 
of unification. And as this essence is not 
immediately visible, it is necessary to 
distinguish between a surface or appearance 
of society and an underlying reality to which 
the ultimate sense of any concrete presence 
must necessarily be referred, whatever the level of complexity in the system of 
mediations. " (Laclau and Mouffe, pp. 21-22) 
This then is the Marxism that allows for no autonomy for 
the political, recognises no determination save for 
economic determination, and as such could not allow either 
overdetermination or non-class subjects. 
Laclau and Mouffe place a great value on contingency, open 
subject positions, overdetermination and the like but see 
the development of such concepts from within the Marxist 
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tradition virtually impossible due to the straitjacket of 
Orthodoxy. Laclau and Mouffe's work can be read as an 
archaeology (in the Foucauldian sense) of the suppressed 
traditions within Marxism. They seek to resurrect 
elements of these traditions which they can then use to 
deconstruct, (in the Derridean sense) a Marxism dominated 
by simple economic determinism. One neglected tradition 
is Austro-Marxism. 
"The moment of class unity is,... a political 
moment. The constitutive centre of what 
we might call a society's relational 
configuration or articulatory form is displaced 
towards the field of the superstructures, 
so that the very distinction between economic 
base and superstructures becomes blurred and 
problematic. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 28) 
We should note the emphasis on the challenge to 
'historical necessity', and the emergence of non-reductive 
subject positions. 
(ii) Revisionism. It is a mistake to equate reformism 
with revisionism. Reformism equals political quietism and 
the corporate confinement of the working class. A 
revisionist theory however, places emphasis on autonomous 
political action. (This is another part of Laclau and 
Mouffe's own lineage of course. ) "The autonomy of the 
political from the economic base is the true novelty of 
Bernstein's argument. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 30) For 
Bernstein, political mediation was constitutive of class 
unity. However, there is an ambiguity here; "... if the 
working class appears increasingly divided in the economic 
sphere, and if its unity is autonomously constructed at 
the political level, in what sense is this political unity 
a class unity? " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 32) Laclau and 
Mouffe see this dilemma as prefiguring a lot of their own 
work. Bernstein is important, as he demonstrates the 
emergence of anti-essentialism from within the Marxist 
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tradition itself. Their sympathies with his project are 
presented thus; 
"When Bernstein questions whether any general 
mechanism can validly explain the course of 
history... he does not question the type of 
historical causality proposed by orthodoxy, 
but attempts to create a space where the free 
play of subjectivity will be possible in 
history. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 33) 
The similarity between the two political projects can be 
demonstrated again; Bernstein argued that, "... Marxism had 
failed to show that socialism necessarily followed from 
capitalism's collapse. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 33) But 
Bernstein's solution brought with it a whole series of new 
problems. He introduced the notion of an ethical subject, 
aware of the progressive and ascending character of human 
history. Thus, he broke with mechanical determinism only 
to create a new transcendent subject, the ethical subject. 
According to Laclau and Mouffe this is a dead end as it 
prevents a, "... move towards a theory of articulation and 
hegemony. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 34) Bernstein's 
transcendent ethical subject can never be reconciled with 
Laclau and Mouffe's partially fixed subjects. 
What we are seeing, through Laclau and Mouffe's account of 
Marxism's struggle to re-establish its theoretical 
viability, is a group of responses to the problem of 
historical necessity which so far have all placed a 
premium on the non-correspondence between political 
subjects and the economic base. 
(iii) Revolutionary Syndicalism, then, goes a step 
further by dissolving 'totality' and replacing it with 
'melange'. Although Sorel breaks with historical 
necessity in favour of the, "syndicalist myth of the 
general strike. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 39), the purpose of 
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which is to unify the workers consciousness, the problem 
must again be posed; "Why does this politically or 
mythically reconstituted subject have to be a class 
subject? " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 41) 
To summarise then, what Laclau and Mouffe propose is that 
the work of those Marxists discussed above shows that the 
economic base is not able to ensure class unity. However, 
politics, while able to construct that unity, is not able 
to guarantee the class unity of subjects. In other words, 
the Marxist writers considered here were able to highlight 
the structural blockage but were not capable of going 
beyond it. 
The emergence of the concept of hegemony 
Laclau and Mouffe assert that the concept of hegemony, 
"... fills a space left vacant by a crisis of what... should 
have been a normal historical development. " (Laclau and 
Mouffe, p., 48) In other words, where the course of 
'normal' historical development has been interrupted, a 
concept is needed to account for this 'deviation from the 
norm'. This concept is hegemony and thus arises out of 
the failure of historical necessity. 
"The centrality attributed to the working 
class is not a practical but an ontological 
centrality, which is, at the same time, the 
seat of an epistemological privilege: as the 'universal' class, the proletariat - or rather its party - is the depository of science. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 57) 
Once the need for a politics of hegemony has been 
established the working class can be displaced and a range 
of non-economic subject positions become possible. Or to 
put it another way; "Without hegemony socialist practice 
can only focus on the demands and interests of the working 
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class. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 58) Mass democratic 
practice can only be achieved, Laclau and Mouffe say, if 
these tasks are seen as having no necessary class 
character. The identity of classes is transformed by 
hegemonic tasks. Hegemony supposes the political 
construction of social agents, as opposed to Marxism which 
assumes the non-political constitution of classes. 
In Laclau and Mouffe's model politics is no longer the 
representation of interests, and thereby offers a direct 
challenge to the validity of the base/superstructure 
metaphor. The identity of social agents is no longer 
thought to be constituted by their insertion in the 
relations of production. Thus, hegemony also poses a 
significant threat to the notion that there is an 
identification between social agents and classes. 
Moreover, it questions the Marxist reliance on the 
topography of the social, a metaphor that refers to the 
idea that there are different 'levels of society'. For 
instance, Marxism posits the economy, politics and 
ideology as different 'levels' within the totality of the 
social. More importantly perhaps, this Marxist mode of 
thinking treats the political as an epiphenomenon of the 
economy. Superstructures imply a topography of the 
social. For Laclau and Mouffe hegemony is conceived as a 
political relation not as a topographical concept. 
Laclau and Mouffe use the term equivalence to express the 
non-class basis of popular-democratic movements. For 
example, groupings within a broad oppositional movement 
will have differentiated, even antagonistic interests. 
However, their common opposition to what Laclau and Mouffe 
call the "dominant pole", constructs, "... a 'popular' 
discursive position that is irreducible to class 
positions. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 63) In Marxist 
orthodoxy the category of 'people' is untheorised, and as 
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a consequence, every position is reduced to a class 
position. 
Before going on to look at equivalence in detail there are 
two issues raised by the preceding quotation. Firstly, we 
have seen that Laclau and Mouffe argue that the most 
fundamental consequence of essentialism is the tendency to 
only think in terms of class subjects and consequently 
fail to adequately theorise the possibility of either non- 
class subjects or the categbry 'the people'. This view 
posits Marxism as pure class essentialism and suggests 
that it is devoid of any other categories. However, 
elsewhere in their book they take the trouble to point to 
the work of writers like Sorel, Gramsci and others who- are 
notable precisely because they are able succeed in 
producing non-reductionist political analyses. It is rash 
to criticise all Marxism for class essentialism when they 
themselves provide numerous examples of Marxists who have 
grappled with the problem of the relationship between 
political forms and the economic infrastructure which is 
supposed to underpin it. 
Secondly, Laclau and Mouffe do not say much about the 
dominant pole itself. All we are allowed is that the 
dominant pole is what chains of equivalence are 
constructed in opposition to. But this is far too vague 
to be of much use. Are they referring to the state, 
capitalism, the family, or perhaps all of these in 
combination, none of these, or a different amalgam for a 
specific historical conjuncture? Presumably the dominant 
pole in Tsarist Russia is not the same as that in post-war 
Britain. Given its importance in relation to 
'equivalence', the idea of the dominant pole remains 
poorly developed. Surely an understanding of the 
specificity of the constitution of the dominant pole at 
any given historical conjuncture is fundamental when 
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deciding on the type of political strategy to adopt. This 
would no doubt also have a bearing on the political 
configuration of the chains of equivalence that would 
ensue. However, Laclau and Mouffe do not accord any 
importance to this question; chains of equivalence simply 
form in opposition to the dominant pole. 
When considering equivalence then, two initial points are 
in order; it is best understood in the context of its 
relation to 'difference', and it should be distinguished 
from more general terms such as identity and equality. By 
subverting the differential logic of the social, 
equivalence makes hegemony possible. While the logic of 
difference serves to engender a complexity of the social 
space, the logic of equivalence is the simplification of 
the social, which ultimately leads to the creation of two 
antagonistic camps. For this to be possible difference 
has to be negated. These ideas, essential to an 
understanding of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy will be 
further developed in the rest of this chapter. 
The importance of equivalence is essentially symbolic, in 
fact individual elements can be substituted for each 
other. For example, elements in opposition to the 
dominant pole enter into equivalence by expressing their 
opposition not their particular political position as 
such. In other words, such elements are interchangeable 
on the basis of their symbolic role as oppositional 
groups. 
For Laclau and Mouffe the relation of equivalence outlined 
here splits the identity of classes, constitutes a new 
type of polarisation and paves the way for the emergence 
of the 'people'. Having its origins in Marxist notions of 
class alliance and refracted through Gramsci's notion of 
collective will hegemony has finally broken with its class 
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base; "... popular-democratic symbols emerge to constitute 
subject positions different from those of class... " 
(Laclau and Mouffe, p. 64) 
We can see that Laclau and Mouffe's use of hegemony is 
very different from Gramsci's, for whom class would still 
be central. The fact that they persist in using a Marxist 
concept long after it has had all its Marxist content 
removed could conceivably confuse or antagonise Laclau and 
Mouffe's political opponents. However, I would rather see 
it as an example of what they mean by post-Marxism: 
hegemony emerged from within Marxism but could only find 
its full expression in a political ensemble that seeks to 
go beyond class dominated categories. Post-Marxism 
implies a continuity with Marxism and therefore the 
continued use of the term hegemony is inescapable. If 
Marxism has fragmented as they claim, then hegemony is a 
fragment that still has some currency. They would argue 
that the hegemony that appears in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy is the culmination of a protracted struggle for 
the full recognition and expression of that concept. The 
political logic that we may call hegemony had a long and 
difficult gestation period. 
Gramsci's contribution to the development of hegemony was 
to introduce the idea of the materiality of ideology, that 
is, one embodied in institutions. He is also seen as 
significant because he acknowledged that ideology should 
not be simply reduced to the economic. Political subjects 
are not just classes but 'collective wills'; "... the 
collective will is a result of the politico-ideological 
articulation of dispersed and fragmented historical 
forces. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 67), all of which attracts 
high praise from Laclau and Mouffe. However, Gramsci had 
his limitations, which for Laclau and Mouffe, consists in 
his insistence that there must be a single unifying 
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principle in every hegemonic formation: a fundamental 
class. Therefore, class hegemony is not just the result 
of struggle but has, "an ultimate ontological foundation" 
(Laclau and Mouffe, p. 69). This is true, Gramsci is 
interested in constructing class hegemony, tnerefore class 
is central. 
However, if a class is to exercise hegemony, and by this I 
mean its ability to articulate the interests of other 
groups to its own, then this must be realised at the 
political level. Gramsci does not hold with a mechanistic 
view of the base/superstructure, that is to say, one which 
admits little autonomy for the superstructures. If Laclau 
and Mouffe have confirmed that Gramsci has an essentialist 
core, and that he sees, "... the economy as a homogeneous 
space unified by necessary laws... " (Laclau and Mouffe, 
p. 69), then they have neglected to note that he would 
advocate reciprocal determination between the economic and 
the political, and that his writing on the economy took 
into account the many changes that had occurred within the 
logic of capital accumulation since Marx's time. What 
Laclau and Mouffe can salvage from Gramsci however is of 
great importance. 
"The Gramscian theory of hegemony... accepts 
social complexity as the very condition of 
political struggle and... sets the basis for 
a democratic practice of politics, compatible 
with a plurality of historical subjects. " 
(Laclau and Mouffe, p. 71) 
Laclau and Mouffe discuss at length what they see as the 
major limitation of the Marxist view of the world; the 
primacy of the economic. 
"The economic level... must satisfy three 
very precise conditions in order to play 
this role of constituting the subjects of 
hegemonic practices. Firstly, its laws of 
motion must be strictly endogenous and 
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exclude all indeterminacy resulting from 
political or other external interventions - 
otherwise, the constitutive function could 
not refer exclusively to the economic. 
Secondly, the unity and homogeneity of social 
agents, constituted at the economic level, 
must result from the very laws of motion of 
this level (any fragmentation and dispersion 
of positions requiring an instance of 
recomposition external to the economy is 
excluded). Thirdly, the position of these 
agents in the relations of production must 
endow them with 'historical interests', so 
that the presence of, such agents at other 
social levels - through mechanisms of 
'representation' or 'articulation' - must 
ultimately be explained on the basis of 
economic interests. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 76) 
Laclau and Mouffe actually acknowledge that with Gramsci 
at least, Marxism attained the status of a non-mechanistic 
theory. Non-mechanistic perhaps, but still determinist 
and essentialist. In a very telling sentence Laclau and 
Mouffe say. "Even those Marxist tendencies which struggled 
hardest to overcome economism and reductionist maintained, 
in one way or another, that essentialist conception of the 
structuring of economic space... " (Laclau and Mouffe, 
p. 76) This is significant because I believe that it 
highlights a problem area in their work. Laclau and 
Mouffe cannot talk about capitalism except in Marxist 
terms. This means that they themselves retain the use of 
terms which refer to an essentialist conception of the 
economic. The comment made by Mouzelis illustrates this 
point perfectly; 
"... when obliged to refer to the broad 
features of capitalist formulations and their 
long term transformations they revert... to 
such conventional Marxist concepts as 
exploitation, commodification, the labour 
process, civil society, capitalist periphery 
etc... " (Mouzelis, p. 115) 
In order to escape this essentialist prison Laclau and 
Mouffe want to, "... demonstrate that the space of the 
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economy is itself structured as a political space, and 
that in it, as in any other 'level' of society, those 
practices we characterized as hegemonic are fully 
operative. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 77) There is perhaps 
less distance than Laclau and Mouffe think between their 
new position and 'economistic' Marxism. For example, 
Raymond Williams, on the subject of base/superstructure 
writes; 
"We have to revalue 'superstructure' towards 
a related range of cultural practices, and 
away from a reflected, reproduced or 
specifically dependent content. And, 
crucially, we have to revalue 'the base' 
away from the notion of a fixed economic or 
technological abstraction, and towards the 
specific activities of men in real social and 
economic relationships, containing fundamental 
contradictions and variations and therefore 
always in a state of dynamic process. " (Williams, p. 34) 
As in the other instances we have discussed, Laclau and 
Mouffe seem unwilling to give credit to the full range of 
theoretical positions that one can observe under the 
umbrella 'Marxism'. What is more serious however are 
their claims that for example, viewing the economy as 
structured as a political space, is a position that cannot 
be found within Marxism, and by implication that one has 
to look to their own formulation to find such a 
'sophisticated' position. Once the primacy of the 
economic has been shown to be false, Laclau and Mouffe can 
move against the political primacy of the working class. 
"In our view, in order to advance in the determination of social antagonisms, it is 
necessary to analyse the plurality of diverse 
and frequently contradictory positions, and to discard the idea of a perfectly unified and homogeneous agent, such as the 'working class' 
of classical discourse. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 84) 
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But was the working class, or any other class for that 
matter, ever viewed as homogenous? To give just one 
example, Lenin certainly believed that the differences 
within classes, whether the proletariat or the peasants, 
were just as significant as those between classes. It is 
certainly not difficult to find examples of attempts to 
theorise the extent to which classes are not unified, 
either economically or politically. 
Laclau and Mouffe outline the consequences of their 
critique and how it relates to their own political 
programme; radical democracy, an exposition of which will 
form the next section of the thesis. Once the link 
between the hegemonized task and class has been dissolved, 
unfixity is the condition of every social identity (there 
is no constitutive principle for social agents). 
Following Laclau and Mouffe we can identify three 
consequences of adopting this position: (i) The 
articulation between political agents and their objectives 
is a hegemonic relation. The era of privileged subjects 
is over. (ii) There are no privileged points for the 
unleashing of a socialist political practice (class 
positions are not the necessary location of historical 
interests). It hinges on a collective will that 
constructed from a number of dissimilar points. No 
movement is inherently progressive, its direction depends 
on a hegemonic articulation with other struggles. (iii) 
"... the radicalization of the concept of 
'overdetermination' will give us the key to the specific 
logic of social articulations. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 87) 
The political logic of hegemony 
So far we have followed Laclau and Mouffe's critique of 
Marxism to the point where they show the limitations of an 
essentialist, materialist conception of politics. What we 
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must now do is to examine the development of Laclau and 
Mouffe's own political framework. In order to do this the 
following section will be taken up with a critical 
exposition of their conceptual innovations. 
They state that "... the concept of hegemony supposes a 
theoretical field dominated by the category of 
articulation. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 93) The notion of 
articulation supposes the presence of separate elements 
that are recomposed through articulatory practice. This 
process is contingent and external to the elements 
themselves. Articulation establishes a relation among 
these elements and their identity is modified as a result. 
The result of such an articulatory practice, a structured 
totality, is called a discourse. Moments are differential 
positions articulated within discourse. An element, on 
the other hand, is difference that is not discursively 
articulated: "... no discursive formation is a sutured 
totality and the transformation of the elements into 
moments is never complete. " (Laclau and Mouffe, pp. 106- 
107) "The status of the 'elements' is that of floating 
signifiers, incapable of being wholly articulated to a 
discursive chain. The importance of articulation is that 
it allows for the partial construction of the social 
(remember that the social can only exist as a partially 
completed field). This construction, or fixing is always 
partial because the social is open and contingent. 
"In order to place ourselves firmly within 
the field of articulation we must begin by 
renouncing the concept of 'society' as founding totality of its partial processes. 
We must, therefore, consider the openness of 
the social as the constitutive ground or 'negative essence' of the existing, and the diverse 'social orders' as precarious and 
ultimately failed attempts to domesticate 
the field of differences. " 
(Laclau and Mouffe, pp. 95-96) 
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Society does not exist, because for Laclau and Mouffe the 
social is open and contingent. "There is no sutured space 
peculiar to 'society', since the social itself has no 
essence. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 96) 
"A conception which denies any essentialist 
approach to social relations, must also state 
the precarious character of every identity 
and the impossibility of fixing the sense 
of the 'elements' in any ultimate literality. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 96) 
What we are left with is a field of difference, a field 
that has no underlying principle of fixity. This field is 
the realm of overdetermination. Laclau and Mouffe make 
the point that with Althusser there was the potential , 
to 
elaborate a concept of articulation that would begin from 
the overdetermined character of social relations. But 
this did not develop, Althusser's inherent essentialism 
won out. However, his idea that the social constitutes 
itself as a symbolic order that lacks any ultimate 
literality is one that Laclau and Mouffe would endorse. 
Althussertried to combine two incompatible elements: a 
full blown notion of overdetermination and economic 
determination. Laclau and Mouffe are very clear on this 
point; there is no possibility of 'relative autonomy'. 
The political is either determined or it is contingent, 
there is no other possibility. 
"If the economy is an object which can determine any type of society in the last 
instance, this means that, at least with 
reference to that instance, we are faced 
with simple determination and not 
overdetermination. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 99) 
When Laclau and Mouffe use overdetermination they do so 
with the intention of freeing it completely from the 
limits of 'relative autonomy'. In their hands it 
signifies the absence of any simple determination, thus 
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they can say that it is a "... field of identities which 
never manage to be fully fixed... " (Laclau and Mouffe, 
p. 111) As this 'fully developed' overdetermination does 
not permit economic determination, the very notion of 
superstructures' is no longer permissible as it is loaded 
with the implication that, " they have a place assigned to 
them within the topography of the social. " (Laclau and 
Mouffe, p. 100) Having discarded the limitations imposed 
by essentialist categories, Laclau and Mouffe can conceive 
hegemony as a political relation not a topographical 
concept. 
Overdetermination then, points the way to a non- 
essentialist politics. It has been stressed that 
overdetermination focusses on the partial fixing of 
discursively constructed identities. In fact, Laclau and 
Mouffe develop this point in some depth; neither absolute 
fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possible. For this 
formulation they have drawn on the work of two major 
influences. Non-fixity; in Derrida the absence of the 
transcendental signified extends the domain and the play 
of signification infinitely. Partial fixity; Lacan refers 
to points de capiton - privileged signifiers that fix the 
meaning of a signifying chain. (Laclau and Mouffe use 
this idea as the basis for 'nodal points', see below). 
There is no possibility of suture between signifier and 
signified. Thus, Laclau and Mouffe provide us with 
further evidence for the demise of 'society'. 
"The incomplete character of every totality 
necessarily leads us to abandon, as a terrain 
of analysis, the premise of 'society' as a 
sutured and self defined totality. 'Society' 
is not a valid object of discourse. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 111) 
The practice of articulation, 
politics of hegemony, 
which is at the heart of the 
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"... consists in the construction of nodal 
points which partially fix meaning; and the 
partial character of this fixation proceeds 
from the openness of the social, a result, 
in its turn, of the constant overflowing of 
every discourse by the infinitude of the field 
of discursivity. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 113) 
All social practices are articulatory. "The social is 
articulation insofar as 'society' is impossible. " (Laclau 
and Mouffe, p. 114) 
We must move on to consider the significance of 
antagonisms in Laclau and Mouffe's work. Whereas in 
Marxism antagonisms are simply economic, a multiplication 
of antagonisms becomes possible when essentialist 
determination has been rejected. Where there are many 
points of antagonism, the development of democratic 
struggles becomes possible. However, contradiction does 
not necessarily lead to an antagonistic relationship. For 
example, Laclau and Mouffe are adamant that class 
opposition is unable to divide the social body into two 
antagonistic camps, because the relationship between 
worker/capitalist is merely a differential position and 
cannot be transformed into an antagonistic relation. 
Antagonisms can transform relations of subordination into 
relations of oppression. 
Associated with the concept of antagonism is the concept 
of equivalence. As mentioned earlier, equivalence can 
only be fully understood in the context of its relation to 
'difference'. By subverting the differential logic of the 
social, equivalence makes hegemony possible. While the 
logic of difference serves to engender a complexity of the 
social space, the logic of equivalence is the 
simplification of the social, which ultimately leads to 
the creation of two antagonistic camps. For this to be 
possible difference has to be negated. The democratic 
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imaginary (a concept similar to, but not identical with 
ideology, more of which below) prevents difference 
becoming established and thus, makes antagonisms possible. 
If difference were to become established then antagonism 
would be impossible. Here we see the disruptive influence 
of the political imaginary, it is the key to a democratic 
(hegemonic) politics. 
Within the logic of equivalence elements can be 
substituted for each other. ' The importance of equivalence 
is essentially symbolic. It allows for the expression of 
opposition to oppression, and thus the creation of 
antagonisms. "The equivalential displacement between 
distinct subject positions is a condition for the 
emergence of an antagonism... "(Laclau and Mouffe, p. 159) 
There are particularly close links between the logic of 
equivalence and the democratic imaginary. Each makes it 
possible to view various forms of inequality as, 
"... illegitimate and anti-natural, and thus make them 
equivalent as forms of oppression. " (Laclau and Mouffe, 
p. 155). 
As an example of the logic of equivalence at work Laclau 
and Mouffe talk about millennarian movements. In this 
scenario the world divides, through a system of what 
Laclau and Mouffe call paratactical equivalences into two 
camps, peasant culture versus urban (evil) culture. The 
second is the negative reverse of the first, "... no 
element in the system of equivalences enters into 
relations other than those of opposition to the elements 
of the other system. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 130) There 
are no discourses capable of establishing differences 
within an equivalential chain in which each all of the 
elements symbolize evil. "... the logic of equivalence is 
a logic of the simplification of political space, while 
the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and 
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increasing complexity. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 130)A 
proliferation of points of antagonism permit the 
multiplication of democratic struggles, but these do not 
tend to constitute 'a people', that is enter into 
equivalence with one another and divide the political 
space into two antagonistic fields. Where the political 
space is divided into two antagonistic camps we have what 
Laclau and Mouffe call popular subject positions. Where 
an antagonism does not divide society that way we have 
democratic subject positions. 
We have now introduced all the innovative concepts 
outlined by Laclau and Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy. As such we are able to move on to a discussion 
of hegemony itself. Hegemony emerges in a field dominated 
by articulatory practices and supposes the, "... incomplete 
and open character of the social... " (Laclau and Mouffe, 
p. 134) Furthermore, hegemony must emerge not only in a 
field dominated by antagonisms but where equivalence 
occurs. Antagonisms can occur without hegemony, for 
example, millennerianism. 
"Thus the two conditions of a hegemonic 
articulation are the presence of antagonistic forces and the instability of the frontiers 
which separate them. Only the presence of a 
vast area of floating elements and the 
possibility of their articulation to opposite 
camps... is what constitutes the terrain 
permitting us to define a practice as hegemonic. Without equivalence and without frontiers, it is impossible to speak strictly 
of hegemony. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 136) 
Translated into political strategy this would mean that 
the task of a truly democratic politics would be to 
overcome difference and attain a situation of equivalence. 
In other words, replace class struggle with radical 
democracy. 
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Towards Radical Democracy 
For Laclau and Mouffe an acceptance of the plurality and 
indeterminacy of the social, is a precondition for the 
construction of a new political imaginary. In other 
words, privileged points of rupture and the confluence of 
struggles into a unified political space (Marxism) has to 
be rejected. Once again they stress that class opposition 
is incapable of dividing the totality of the social body 
into two antagonistic camps, a task which is of course the 
remit of hegemony. 
There is nothing inevitable in struggles against power. 
Power is constructed internally to any hegemonic formation 
through the opposed logics of equivalence and difference. 
Power is never foundational. The struggle against 
subordination is not a result of the subordination itself. 
The political character of struggles is delineated by, 
"... a type of action whose objective is the transformation 
of a social relation which constructs a subject in a 
relationship of subordination. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 153) 
Or to put it another way, an antagonism transforms a 
relation of subordination into one of oppression. 
Relations of oppression then, are relations of 
subordination which have transformed themselves into sites 
of antagonisms. Relations of subordination cannot be 
antagonistic relations: a relation of subordination only 
establishes a set of differential positions between social 
agents, for example employer/employee. A system of such 
differences constructing each social identity as a 
positivity cannot be antagonistic, in fact it would 
eliminate all antagonisms, (and excludes equivalences). 
But how does a relation of subordination transform itself 
into an antagonism and become oppressive. Laclau and 
Mouffe provide us with the answer; "... there is no 
relation of oppression without the presence of a 
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discursive 'exterior' from which the discourse of 
subordination can be interrupted. 
" (Laclau and Mouffe, 
p. 154) 
Two points to note here. Firstly, Laclau and Mouffe's use 
of the term 'interrupted'. The task of a hegemonic 
politics is to transform subordination and prevent the 
fixing of difference. Difference, like subordination, 
requires the intervention of the democratic imaginary 
otherwise oppression and equivalence are simply not 
possible. Secondly, the 'discursive exterior' mentioned 
here needs some elaboration. By this Laclau and Mouffe 
are referring to the democratic imaginary. It is 
democratic discourse which articulates different forms"tof 
resistance to subordination, and it is democratic 
discourse which prevents the stabilization of 
subordination as difference. In Laclau and Mouffe's own 
terminology we can say that the democratic imaginary makes 
possible the resistance to subordination necessary for 
equivalence to take place, and as such it is the external 
discourse which makes all social struggles possible. 
"Our thesis is that it is only from the moment 
when the democratic discourse becomes 
available to articulate the different forms 
of resistance to subordination that the 
conditions will exist to make possible the 
struggle against different types of 
inequality. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 154) 
The democratic principle of liberty and equality 
constitutes the fundamental nodal point in the 
construction of the political. 
"This decisive mutation in the political 
imaginary of Western societies took place 
two hundred years ago and can be defined in 
these terms: the logic of equivalence was 
transformed into the fundamental instrument 
of production of the social. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 155) 
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This accounts for their proposition that the opposition 
people/ancien regime was the last moment in which the 
antagonism between two forms of society presented 
themselves as given. After this time there can be no 
politics without hegemony. 
As we have seen Laclau and Mouffe pose the relationship 
between workers and capitalists as purely one of 
subordination, as a relationship which precludes 
transformation by the political imaginary. Laclau and 
Mouffe reduce this relation to one of legitimate 
differential positions in a unified discursive space. 
Therefore, there is no potential for transformation by the 
political imaginary, and consequently no possibility of an 
antagonistic relationship. In other words, in this 
example difference has become fixed and chains of 
equivalence are not possible. However, they maintain that 
certain relations of subordination can be transformed into 
relations of oppression. The mechanism for this 
transformation is, as we already know, the presence of 
that discursive exterior, the democratic imaginary. The 
question of why the most fundamental relationship within 
capitalism, the point at which surplus value is created 
and appropriated by the capitalist, the moment when 
exploitation takes place, should not be considered as a 
relation of oppression will have to be examined in great 
detail. Of equal interest is the marginalisation of 
capitalism that this implies. 
The equivalential displacement between distinct subject 
positions is a condition for the emergence of an 
antagonism. Every antagonism implies an 'externality of 
power', that is to say, new forms of radical subjectivity 
that are capable of turning relations of subordination 
into relations of oppression. Laclau and Mouffe give an 
example of how the democratic imaginary can work. 
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Relations of subordination already in existence can, due 
to a displacement of the democratic imaginary, be re- 
articulated as relations of oppression. Here Laclau and 
Mouffe are thinking of feminism or ethnic minority civil 
rights. "But in every case what allows the forms of 
resistance to assume the character of collective struggles 
is the existence of an external discourse which impedes 
the stabilization of subordination as difference. " (Laclau 
and Mouffe, p. 159) Of course, if difference were to 
become established then antagonism would not be possible. 
Of the worker/capitalist relation then, the following 
features can be adduced; (i) as there is no antagonism, 
then difference has become established. (ii) the 
democratic imaginary was unable to interrupt the 
crystallisation of subordination as difference. Laclau 
and Mouffe also seem to imply that this process is 
irreversible. 
Part of Laclau and Mouffe's thesis is that after the 
Second World War a new hegemonic formation consolidated 
which involved the extension of capitalist relations of 
production to a wider range of social relations. Society 
was transformed into a vast market in which new needs were 
ceaselessly created, a consumer society which had at its 
core the commodification of social life. 
"Today it is not only as a seller of labour- 
power that the individual is subordinated to 
capital, but also through his or her 
incorporation into a multitude of other 
social relations: culture, free time, illness, 
education, sex and even death. There is 
practically no domain of individual or 
collective life which escapes capitalist 
relations. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 161) 
A number of points should be made here; (i) there are 
striking similarities between these ideas and the 
'Postmodernism' thesis advanced by Fredric Jameson. In 
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fact, there would be very little disagreement between 
Jameson and Laclau and Mouffe on the rise of 
postmodernism. (ii) the status of 'capitalism' in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy betrays a significant 
contradiction in their work. I have argued above that the 
capitalist relation is marginalised by their insistence 
that it only has the status of 'subordination as 
difference'. All politically important relations achieve 
the status of antagonisms through becoming relations of 
oppression and entering into equivalence. However, 
although it is clear that capitalist relations do not fall 
into this category, there is enough evidence to suggest 
that Laclau and Mouffe also attribute great significance 
to capitalist relations. How else can we explain 
statements such as, "There is practically no domain of 
individual or collective life which escapes capitalist 
relations. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 161), and the assertion 
that capitalist relations of production brought about the 
commodification of social life? According to Laclau and 
Mouffe new, struggles have developed to express resistance 
against new forms of subordination. 
"Hence the multiplicity of social relations 
from which antagonisms and struggles may 
originate: habitat, consumption, various 
services can all constitute terrains for the 
struggle against inequalities and the claiming 
of new rights. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 161) 
The origins of these new forms of subordination are 
explained by Laclau and Mouffe as follows; 
"... intervention by the state at ever broader levels of social reproduction has been 
accompanied by a growing bureaucratization 
of its practices which has come to constitute, 
along with commodification, one of the fundamental sources of inequalities and 
conflicts. In all of the domains in which 
the state has intervened, a politicization 
of social relations is at the base of numerous 
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new antagonisms. This double transformation 
of social relations, resulting from the 
expansion of capitalist relations of production 
and of the new bureaucratic state forms, is 
found in different combinations in all the 
advanced industrial countries. " 
(Laclau and Mouffe, p162) 
Once again the emphasis on the role of capitalist 
relations of production is very noticeable. One could 
almost say that they use it in a straightforwardly Marxist 
way, and indeed this is Mouzelis' point when he comments 
that when talking about developments in capitalism, Laclau 
and Mouffe revert to conventional Marxist concepts. 
We should not allow this to divert our attention from the 
main thrust of Laclau and Mouffe's argument. They have 
provided us with the context for understanding the 
emergence of new political subjects. The write, "... this 
proliferation of antagonisms and calling into question of 
relations of subordination should be considered as a 
moment of deepening of the democratic revolution. " (Laclau 
and Mouffe', p. 163) What Laclau and Mouffe term the 
'democratic consumer culture' has stimulated the emergence 
of new struggles. The democratic imaginary has intervened 
and various groups have rejected old forms of 
subordination. For example, youth culture. Young people 
constitute one new axis for the emergence of antagonisms. 
They are constructed as a specific type of consumer, (one 
who seeks financial autonomy, often denied or compounded 
by unemployment), and this coupled with social problems 
such as the disintegration of family and no alternative 
forms of social integration can lead to the rebellion of 
the young. 
"The central idea which we have defended thus 
far is that the new struggles - and the 
radicalization of older struggles such as 
those of women or ethnic minorities - should 
be understood from the double perspective of 
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the transformation of social relations 
characteristic of the new hegemonic formation 
of the post-war period, and of the effects 
of the displacement into new areas of social 
life of the egalitarian imaginary constituted 
around the liberal-democratic discourse. It 
is this which has provided the framework 
necessary for the questioning of the different 
relations of subordination and the demanding 
of new rights. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 165) 
We now need to look in some detail at Laclau and Mouffe's 
own political project. f 
"Renunciation of the category of subject as 
a unitary, transparent and sutured entity 
opens the way to the recognition of the 
specificity of the antagonisms constituted 
on the basis of different subject positions, 
and, hence, the possibility of the deepening 
of a pluralist and democratic conception. " 
(Laclau and Mouffe, p. 166) 
Radical democracy, they claim, can be both pluralist and 
radical, but only if the unitary subject is rejected. 
Also, the working class as universal class has to be 
rejected. ' The plurality of antagonisms which surround 
'workers struggles' must be recognised in order to deepen 
the democratic process. For example, ecological struggles 
may be anti-capitalist, anti-industrialist, authoritarian, 
libertarian, socialist, reactionary, and so on. The forms 
of articulation of an antagonism, therefore, far from 
being predetermined, are the result of a hegemonic 
struggle. 
"All struggles, whether those of workers or 
other political subjects... have a partial 
character, and can be articulated to very different discourses. It is this articulation 
which gives them their character, not the place from which they come. There is therefore no 
subject - nor, further, any 'necessity' - which is absolutely radical and irrecuperable by the dominant order, and which constitutes an 
absolutely guaranteed point of departure for a 
total transformation. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 169) 
-100- 
Ideas of class struggle, revolution and socialist 
transformation of society have given way to, 'the 
deepening of the democratic revolution'. 
"Every antagonism, left free to itself, is 
a floating signifier, a 'wild' antagonism 
which does not predetermine the form in which 
it can be articulated to to other elements in 
a social formation. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 171) 
This raises the question of political direction. If an 
antagonism does not have an inherent political content, in 
the sense that its political connotation is determined by 
the specific articulation that it enters into, in other 
words, is external to it, how can subject positions ever 
be 'progressive' or how would struggles for liberation 
achieve a political direction? 
Laclau and Mouffe answer this by asserting that the task 
of the left is to expand liberal-democracy in the 
direction of a radical and plural democracy. Up to this 
point clapsism has been the obstacle to determining the 
fundamental antagonisms. "The multiplication of political 
spaces and the preventing of the concentration of power in 
any one point are, then, preconditions of every truly 
democratic transformation of society. " (Laclau and Mouffe, 
p. 178) Thus the key to the politics of hegemony is not 
the antagonistic elements themselves but the way in which 
they are articulated. "There are not, for example, 
necessary links between anti-sexism and anti-capitalism, 
and a unity between the two can only be the result of a 
hegemonic articulation. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 178) 
By way of a summary it is necessary to say something about 
the relationship between democracy and hegemony. The 
logic of democracy by itself is not sufficient for the 
formulation of a hegemonic project. "... the logic of 
democracy is simply the equivalential displacement of the 
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egalitarian imaginary to ever more extensive social 
relations, and, as such, it is only a logic of the 
elimination of relations of subordination and 
inequalities. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 188) Hegemony 
describes the democratic practice of politics compatible 
with a plurality of historical subjects. The new logic of 
the social implied by hegemony is the central theme of 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Hegemony, in order to be 
possible requires both articulation between subject 
positions and the creation of chains of equivalence. The 
relationship between hegemony and articulation is a close 
one. Hegemony becomes possible only when there exists a 
field dominated by articulatory practices. It should be 
stressed that antagonisms can occur without hegemony, but 
unless an antagonism becomes articulated to a particular 
discourse it remains without political meaning. 
The availability of floating elements and the possibility 
that they can be articulated into antagonistic camps are 
prerequisi. tes for hegemony. "Without equivalence and 
without frontiers, it is impossible to speak strictly of 
hegemony. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 136) These frontiers are 
what separates antagonistic forces and they need to be 
unstable if hegemonic articulation is to take place. 
Stable frontiers would, of course only consolidate a 
system of difference. 
Conclusions 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is rightly considered as a 
critique of essentialism, but strictly speaking this 
statement is only true if we add the qualification that it 
is a critique of Marxist essentialism. Other forms of 
essentialism such as, liberalism, materialism or humanism 
are not considered at all. Laclau and Mouffe's work is 
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also very much an attempt to supersede Marxism, hence the 
term post-Marxism, but one which does not accord centrality 
to capitalism as an explanatory historical category. 
What exactly is the status of capitalism in Laclau and 
Mouffe's post-Marxism? Before further exploring this 
question it is necessary to identify what we mean 
by 
capitalism in the context of Marxism, as the term can 
be 
used in two different, but interrelated ways. Firstly, 
it 
is employed as an abstraction, to denote a particular mode 
of production (capitalism succeeds feudalism, 
for example). 
Secondly, the term capitalism can be used to refer to an 
actually existing social formation 
(for instance, we might 
say that contemporary Britain is a capitalist society, as 
opposed to a communist or traditional one). 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy the term capitalism only 
has an application in terms of an economic relation. That 
is to say it categorises that system of production which is 
based on wage labour. So for Laclau and Mouffe capitalism 
has a very narrow application. They have no room for the 
idea of a mode of production (too economistic), and no use 
for a categorisation of society derived from its dominant 
economic idiom. Having said this they are not particularly 
consistent in their application. We have already seen how 
capitalism is both marginalised (the worker/capitalist 
relation can never transcend the status as 'difference'), 
and yet central (the structuring power of post-war 
capitalism and the increasing commodification of everyday 
life). 
This contradiction surfaces once more when we come to 
consider the meaning of the term 'dominant pole'. I have 
already pointed to the exiguous theoretical development of 
what should be a vital component in the overall concept of 
hegemony, but this omission takes on a new significance 
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when the role of capitalism is considered. Even if we 
accept Laclau and Mouffe's premise that overdetermination 
is always complex, and the identity of the agents of 
political change cannot be derived from their location in 
the social structure, (thereby breaking the necessary link 
between economy and politics, class and agency) it would 
still be difficult to imagine that capitalism would not 
exert an influence, however small, over the anatomy of the 
dominant pole. If this criticism holds, then not only does 
the question of the actual cönfiguration of the dominant 
pole become a crucial political question, but the ambiguity 
that surrounds the status of capitalism within Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy assumes a greater theoretical 
significance. 
Laclau and Mouffe posit the logic of contingency to replace 
the more Marxist notion of relative autonomy. They not 
only refuse to credit Marxism with a well developed theory 
of relative autonomy but also consider that it is not even 
theoretically viable. There is either determinism or 
contingency, but nothing in between. For example, in Sorel 
and Gramsci the logic of necessity is replaced by the logic 
of contingency. However, this has to be a gross 
oversimplification as it is only possible to hold such a 
view if all the other elements of their work is 
disregarded. In common with most, if not all Marxists, 
they are neither totally contingent or totally necessistic. 
The role of 'relative autonomy', the genealogy of which can 
be traced in the same texts that Laclau and Mouffe are 
happy to utilise, is underplayed and undervalued by Laclau 
and Mouffe in their progression to post-Marxism. 
Laclau and Mouffe heavily criticise reductionist forms of 
Marxism, the ones that rely on necessity, teleology, 
economism and class essentialism, but despite their best 
efforts they themselves are reductionist for the simple 
-104- 
reason that they reduce Marxism to class essentialism. 
Even though they single out Gramsci or Sorel for attempting 
to break out of the essentialist straightjacket, they 
refuse to accept that the relative autonomy accorded to 
politics or ideology by the same writers has any 
significance (even though the ideas they like so much were 
generated by the belief in a political realm beyond any 
simple economic determinations). Ultimately, all such 
theorising counts for nought as it is always underpinned by 
the contaminating trait of economism. This is summed up by 
Geras, who says; 
"r1arxism is defined by Laclau and Mouffe in 
the most uncompromisingly necessitarian or 
deterministic, most rigidly economistic and 
... most simplifyingly essentialist' terms 
and then dismissed for beinfi deterministic, 
economistic, 'essentialist' (Geras, p. 48) 
What we are witnessing is an attempt by Laclau and Mouffe 
to define the problem in terms of the solution they offer. 
In the same way that it takes the law to define 'crime' and 
it takes medicine to define 'sickness', it takes 
contingency to define determinism, economism and 
essentialism. 
' Hegemony then, defines the problem it 
claims to solve. 
Note: 1 Paraphrased from Judith Williamson's article Three Kinds of Dirt in Consuming Passions (Williamson, 1986) 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE POLITICS OF ANTAGONISM 
-106- 
Introduction 
Laclau opens his essay New Reflections on the Revolution 
of Our Time with a clear statement of intent. When 
considering the 'crisis of reason' he contends, we should 
no longer need to try to defend 'reason' or re-launch 
'modernity'. This should be read in part as a statement 
of his own position; he does not favour the pursuit of the 
Enlightenment values of truth and reason, and, also as a 
political marker; one which distances him from 
contemporaries such as Habermas. This positioning is 
quite consistent with the development of Laclau and 
Mouffe's post-Marxism in their collaborative work 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, which of course was an 
attempt to forge a non-essentialist socialist politics- 
based on contingency rather than necessity. 
In the same vein Laclau now asserts that antagonism is 
intrinsically negative and this, "... prevents us from 
fixing it a priori in any positive theorization about the 
'objectivity' of social agents (such as the class 
struggle, for example)... " (Laclau, 1990, p. 4) In one 
sense this is little more than the reiteration of one of 
the central themes of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: 
that socialism is not the inherent expression of the 
working class merely because of its position in the 
relations of production. However, the more significant 
point to note is the stress on antagonism, and 
particularly, that negativity can be the basis for a 
radical and progressive politics. The legacy of Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy that Laclau introduces to this 
essay then, revolves around the assertion that we cannot 
speak of objectivity in relation to social agents, and as 
a consequence we must speak of the political construction 
of social identities. In other words, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy is the text that breaks the link 
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between subjectivity and class, and thereby 
breaks the 
necessistic bond between class and politics. 
Laclau draws our attention to Marx's Preface to the 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. 
This 
is a text in which the base/superstructure model 
is 
expressed in somewhat mechanistic terms; social 
being 
determines consciousness, in a particularly unreflective 
way. It is one of Marx's more deterministic offerings; 
reciprocal determination is-not included and one 
is left 
with the impression that politics, ideology, 
(the 
'superstructures' are totally determined, and wholly 
dependant. Laclau is correct to point out that class 
struggle is excluded from this model, in effect it is not 
even mentioned by Marx in this particular text. Laclau 
then asks us to compare The Communist Manifesto, which of 
course states that history is the history of class 
struggles, with the 'Preface' where class struggle is 
completely absent, (history is simply the result of a 
contradiction between the forces and relations of 
production). 
Laclau identifies the following problem in Marx's 
writings: "... the contradiction between productive forces 
and relations of production is a contradiction without 
antagonism, class struggle, for its part, is an antagonism 
without contradiction. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 7) Laclau's 
language, using terms originally developed in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, should be understood in the context of 
hiss attempt to develop a non-essentialist politics. In 
other words, Laclau is claiming that the two features of 
Marx's theory discussed here should not be seen as 
necessarily connected in a causal manner. Class struggle 
is the result of an antagonism, but that antagonism does 
not derive from a structural location in the productive 
process. Therefore, class struggle, in as much as it 
-108- 
exists, cannot be 'read off' from the economic formation 
but must be politically constructed. Similarly, the 
tension between the forces and relations of production has 
no special status in the work of Laclau (and Mouffe). 
Laclau's argument stems from his interpretation of the two 
texts mentioned above. However, it can be argued that 
neither of the texts referred to are as one-dimensional as 
Laclau believes. The Communist Manifesto is not totally 
devoid of economic determinism, and the 'Preface' contains 
a nascent conceptualisation of class struggle. There is 
another of Marx's texts that is worth examining in this 
context. The German Ideology (1844), according to David 
McLellan, "... sets out the materialist conception of 
history with a force and in a detail that Marx never 
afterwards surpassed. " (McLellan, p. 158) The German 
Ideology is a much less reductionist text than the 
'Preface', in the sense that Marx states that rather than 
consciousness being totally dependant on the economic 
base, it i. s infact the case that "Men are the producers of 
their conceptions, ideas etc - real active men, as they 
are conditioned by a definite development of the 
productive forces". (McLellan, p. 164) The key word here 
is conditioned. The determinism attributed to the 
economic in Marx is best understood as a form of 
conditioning, in the sense of 'setting of limits', or 
creating the boundaries of what is possible. 
The schematic base/superstructure model outlined in the 
'Preface' is no doubt chosen by Laclau because it 
reinforces the point he wishes to make, but the 
mechanistic relationship between class, politics and 
ideology is expressed somewhat differently elsewhere in 
Marx's writings. On the question of advanced capitalism 
automatically giving rise to a working class socialist 
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consciousness for example, we should consider the 
following; 
"In the first place, Marx acknowledged that 
capitalist economic development did not by 
itself give rise to socialist consciousness 
in the working class; as he said of the most 
advanced industrial proletariat of the day: 
'The English have all the material 
prerequisites for the social revolution. What 
they lack is a spirit for generalisation and 
revolutionary fervour"'. (Rattansi, p. 655) 
Laclau believes that by failing to integrate the two 
positions alluded to above, Marx also fails to show that 
the antagonism of the relations of production (conflict 
between wage labour and capital) is a contradiction, apd 
that the antagonism is inherent in the relations of 
production. "Antagonism does not necessarily mean 
contradiction" (Laclau, 1990, p. 8), and we might want to 
add that neither does a contradiction automatically lead 
to antagonism. The conclusion drawn by Laclau is that 
this reveals a tension in Marx's work; "For history to be 
grasped conceptually as a rational and coherent process, 
antagonism must be reduced to a contradiction. " (Laclau, 
1990, p. 8) The capitalist/worker relationship only 
becomes antagonistic if the worker resists the extraction 
of surplus value. Resistance is not a logical conclusion 
of the worker/capitalist relationship. Antagonisms do 
arise but not within the capitalist relations of 
production. Thus, the "... constitutive outside is 
inherent to any antagonistic relationship. " (Laclau, 1990, 
p. 9) 
This, then, is another rehearsal of the theoretical 
underpinning for Laclau's whole anti-essentialist 
enterprise. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy we found 
that socialism is not the necessary political expression 
of a social class unified at the economic level. Neither 
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class interests, nor even classes themselves have an a 
priori existence at the economic level. In New 
Reflections Laclau reveals a weakness in Marx's own model: 
the antagonism at the heart of the capitalist relationship 
is not in fact an antagonism which is inherent to that 
relationship. The relationship can become antagonistic, 
but this is contingent on an interruption from the 
democratic imaginary, otherwise known as the 'constitutive 
outside'. In other words, "... antagonism does not occur 
within the relations of production, but between the latter 
and the social agent's identity outside them. " (Laclau, 
1990, p. 15) Laclau sums up the position thus. "To 
repeat: antagonism is established between the relations of 
production and something external to them, not within the 
relations of production themselves. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 11) 
Laclau gives as an example of an antagonism the dual role 
(attributed to the contemporary industrial proletariat) of 
worker and consumer. The consequences of this are that; 
"A fall in a worker's wage, for example, denies his 
identity as a consumer. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 16) This is 
undoubtedly true but there are attendant problems with 
this position, not least the conceptualisation of 
capitalism that Laclau adopts. This is problematic on 
several fronts. At the most fundamental level it 
displaces capitalism from the heart of political struggle 
in the same way as Laclau and Mouffe did in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy. Also, it is apparent that when Laclau 
uses the term 'capitalism' he is using it to mean 
capitalism as it exists in the contemporary western world. 
Many of his examples both in this essay and Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy do not hold for capitalism per se. For 
example, it must be recognised that the worker as consumer 
only emerged with the advent of Fordism. Workers in 
Victorian factories earned an average of 5p per hour 
(Independent, 5 May 1991, p. 59), and many workers in the 
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third world still earn subsistence wages. Therefore, 
Laclau's model does not hold good for every historical 
period and each geographical location. This may have a 
special bearing on his commentary on Marx's economics, 
if 
only because the dual role of worker/consumer was not 
central to capitalism in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Althusserian influences 
Laclau is aiming to show the impossibility of establishing 
the social as an objective order, and to deny the 
privileging of positivity over negativity, a project that 
began in an interesting short essay entitled The 
Impossibility of Society, (originally published in 1983, 
and subsequently reprinted in the volume entitled New 
Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time), and of course 
continued in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. This 
earlier essay is worthy of attention because it focusses 
on the Marxist theory of ideology. Laclau identifies two 
different uses of the term ideology, both of them 
essentialist. First, there is the notion of ideology 
which posits it as a level of the social totality. This 
derives from the base/superstructure model in which 
structural totality has a positivity. "In this sense, 
this totality operated as an underlying principle of 
intelligibility of the social order. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 90) 
In other words, the social has an existence because the 
very notion of totality implies that the social can be 
bounded and delineated. Laclau has a very different view 
of the social, which he expounds in the following way. 
"Against this essentialist vision we tend 
nowadays to accept the infinitude of the 
social, that is, the fact that any structural 
system is limited, that it is always surrounded 
by an 'excess of meaning' which it is unable to 
master, and that, consequently, 'society' as a 
unitary and intelligible object which grounds 
its own partial process is an impossibility". (Laclau, 1990, p. 90) 
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He continues, "... the social must be identified with the 
infinite play of difference, that is, with what in the 
strictest sense of the term we can call 
'discourse'... " 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 90) Laclau subsequently qualifies this 
last statement because if society is never fully 
constituted, neither is it completely contingent. He 
introduces the ideas of 'relative fixation' and 'nodal 
points' to substantiate this argument. We know from 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy that there is no simple 
underlying principle which can fix the whole field of 
difference. From the same text: 
"Society never manages fully to be society, 
because everything in it is penetrated by 
its limits, which prevent it from constituting 
itself as an objective reality. " (Laclau and 
Mouffe, p. 127) 
This is a very good example of Laclau's argument to 
establish the priority of negativity in the constitution 
of the social. Attempting to move away from the 
base/superstructure model of the social Laclau advances 
the following, non-reductionist construct; 
"Each social formation has its own forms of 
determination and relative autonomy, which 
are always instituted through a complex 
process of oversteering and therefore 
cannot be established a priori. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 91) 
This formulation reveals Laclau's Althusserian influences. 
Laclau continues: "With this insight, the base- 
superstructure distinction falls and, along with it, the 
conception of ideology as a necessary level of every 
social formation. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 91) 
The passage quoted above mixes Althusserian Marxism 
(social formation, relative autonomy), with Laclau's own 
post-Marxist reformulations, (overdetermination is a term 
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used both by Althusser and Laclau, 
but in each case the 
meaning is different). The problem with 
Laclau's 
assertion stems from the view that the 
Althusserian 
'social formation' is one and the same as the more 
orthodox base/superstructure model, which 
it most 
certainly is not. Althusser did not hold with the 
base/superstructure metaphor; his concept of 
overdetermined social formation is precisely an attempt 
to 
supersede the more traditional model. 
"Against both the mechanistic interpretation 
of the "base-superstructure" metaphor, and 
the essentialist or Hegelian view of the 
social totality, Althusser proposes a quite 
distinct concept of the social whole (social 
formation). " (McLennan, p. 77) 
Althusser's formulations can be understood as a critique 
of reductionist Marxism. Laclau seems to have fully 
accepted the Althusserian contribution to the critique of 
orthodox Marxism: every social formation has a particular 
unity of instances and each instance differs in its 
capacity to determine the others. On this model the 
economic is overdetermined by each of the other instances. 
According to Laclau the second way in which ideology is 
used by Marxism is in the context of false consciousness. 
"The notion of false consciousness only makes sense if the 
identity of the social agent can be fixed. It is only on 
the basis of recognising its true identity that we can 
assert that the consciousness of the subject is 'false'. " 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 91) This understanding of ideology as 
false consciousness has in fact been challenged from 
within Marxism for being the root of class essentialism. 
As the result of the Althusserian critique false 
consciousness has largely been replaced by the more 
sophisticated notion of ideology as a representation of an 
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imaginary relation to real existence, which is constituent 
of subjectivity. 
"This thesis, which comes from For Marx implies 
a definite break with all conceptualisations 
of ideology as "false consciousness". In 
opposition to the current conception about 
ideology, for Althusser ideology is not a 
representation of reality. It is a very 
different thing: a representation of an 
(individual) relationship to reality. What 
is represented in ideology is men's lived 
relation with reality: a relation to real 
conditions of existence... " (McLennan, p. 95). 
This is one usage of the term ideology that Laclau does 
not explore, possibly because he wishes to move away from 
the idea of the subject as a unified identity. In fact he 
would probably subsume the Althusserian notion of ideology 
under the general heading of 'false consciousness', and 
thus not have to deal with the question of subjectivity. 
What he is able to say however, is that false 
consciousness must be abandoned if non-essentialist 
potentialities are to be explored. Thus, we can say that 
the relationship between ideology and subjectivity is a 
problem for Laclau, but it is important to recognise that 
he is not too restricted by not being able to untangle 
this particular Althusserian knot. For Laclau the 
identities of social agents are not homogenous, the 
subject is decentered to a degree not imagined by 
Althusser; "... identity is nothing but the unstable 
articulation of constantly changing positionalities. " 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 92) 
One of the central thrusts of Laclau's argument in New 
Reflections is that class struggle and the contradiction 
between productive forces and relations of production 
which is at the heart of all Marxist formulations, have no 
foundation when subjected to a thorough non-essentialist 
revision. This means that the type of teleological 
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'history by necessity' favoured by Marxist orthodoxy has 
lost its theoretical base. In other words, Laclau is 
"... questioning the ultimate coherence and rationality of 
history. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 17) 
Laclau suggests that rather than deny the constitutive 
nature of the negative as Marx did, we should study, 
"... the nature and depth of the changes in our social and 
historical outlook which stem from privileging the moment 
of negativity... " (Laclau, 1990, p. 17) To do this we have 
to engage with the notion of antagonism which, 
"... prevents the constitution of objectivity itself. " 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 17) The constitutive outside blocks the 
identity of the inside but is at the same time the 
prerequisite for its constitution. On this basis Laclau 
poses two alternative explanatory frameworks; 
"Either we can describe the development and 
outcome of an antagonistic process in terms 
of causal or dialectic 'transformation'. 
In that case the unity and positivity of the 
process must be assumed, thus requiring the 
negativity experienced by social agents to be 
reduced to the mere appearance of an 
'objective meaning' which escapes them. Or 
we can make negativity constitutive and 
foundational, with the result that the 
uniqueness and rationality of history must 
be abandoned. But in the second case it is 
easy to see, as objectivity presupposes the 
positivity of all its elements, that the 
presence of the inherent negativity of the 
constitutive outside' means that the social 
never manages to fully constitute itself as 
an objective order. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 18) 
What Laclau is offering us is a direct comparison between 
Marxism (the first case), and his own project (the second 
case). Antagonism reveals the contingent nature of all 
objectivity. 
-116- 
"Contingency does not therefore mean a set 
of merely external and alerter relations 
between identities, but the impossibility 
of fixing with any precision - 
that is, in 
terms of a necessary ground - either the 
relations or the identities... 
This link 
between the blocking and simultaneous 
affirmation of an identity is what we call 
'contingency', which introduces an element of 
radical undecidabilty into the structure of 
objectivity. " (Laclau, 1990, pp. 
20-21) 
In this way the priority of negativity is established. 
The concept of dislocation 
Any explanation of the term 'contingency' must include the 
statement that contingency is not simply the opposite of 
necessity. "In a universe from which necessity had 
evaporated, we would thus find nothing but indeterminacy 
and the impossibility of any coherent discourse. 
" (Laclau, 
1990, p. 26) Contingency is rather a subversion of 
necessity. Contingency prevents the full constitution of 
necessity. There are no strict boundaries between 
necessity and contingency. "... all objectivity 
necessarily presupposes the repression of that which is 
excluded by its establishment. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 31) 
For Laclau social relations are, a) contingent relations, 
and b) power relations. Laclau here clarifies what he 
means by power, initially by saying what it is not. It is 
incorrect to assert that power is an empirical reality 
which characterizes relations between social forces. On 
the contrary, "Our thesis is that the constitution of a 
social identity is an act of power and that identity as 
such is power. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 31) If objectivity 
manages to partially affirm itself it can only do so by 
repressing that which threatens it. Therefore, power 
mechanisms make social identity possible, in much the same 
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way as power is constitutive of the social in the work of 
Foucault. 
Without power there would be no objectivity. In 
developing this thesis Laclau also draws upon the work of 
Jacques Derrida to show how the constitution of identity 
is based on exclusion and the establishment of a violent 
hierarchy between opposites such as black/white and 
man/woman. Power is therefore necessary 
for identity, and 
as such the disappearance of power would equal the 
disintegration of the social fabric. 
"Destroying the hierarchies on which sexual 
or racial discrimination is based will, at 
some point, always require the construction 
of other exclusions for collective identities 
to be able to emerge. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 33) 
If this is the case then it is difficult to see why Laclau 
wishes to completely dispense with the idea of a hierarchy 
based on class. On the Marxist model the hierarchy is 
established in such a way that all other social identities 
are secondary to those of class, and from what Laclau is 
saying, he would have to agree that this hierarchy is as 
legitimate as any other. In his defence he would probably 
add that class is perfectly acceptable as a collective 
identity, but only as the result of a political 
articulation, not as a datum of the social formation. 
Social relations are also, c) characterised by, "... the 
primacy of the political over the social. " (Laclau, 1990, 
p. 33) The institution of the social is only possible 
through the repression of options that are equally open. 
The instituted tends to assume the form of mere objective 
presence and the original contingency fades, this process 
is termed 'sedimentation' by Laclau. 
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"The sedimented forms of 'objectivity' make 
up the field of what we will call the 
social'. The moment of antagonism where 
the undecidable nature of the alternatives 
and their resolution through power relations 
becomes fully visible constitutes the field 
of the 'political'. " (Laclau, 
1990, p. 35) 
Social relations are constituted by the distinction 
between the social and the political. The boundary 
between the social and political is constantly displaced. 
Social relations also, d) exhibit a radical historicity. 
By this Laclau means that objectivity is historical in 
that it is socially constructed and structured by systems 
of meaning. "To understand something historically is to 
refer it back to its contingent conditions of emergence. " 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 36) To summarise then, we can say that 
there are four interrelated characteristics of the social: 
contingency, power, primacy of politics and historicity. 
This is of course a development of Laclau's idea of a non- 
objectivist conception of the social. It therefore stands 
in stark contrast to a Marxism which for example, looks 
for reasons that prevent the establishment of working 
class identity. This could be explained by the thesis 
that the development of class consciousness is impeded by 
embourgeoisement, and assumes not only that full 
consciousness would be possible without such impediment, 
but that full consciousness is the 'natural' outcome of 
subjugation to capitalism. Such a view is essentialist; 
for Laclau class consciousness is one possible working 
class identity, depending on the precise historical 
conditions. On this basis, 'class struggle' can never be 
taken for granted, and if it exists at all it only does so 
as the outcome of political struggle. 
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Laclau introduces the concept of dislocation at this 
point, "... every identity is dislocated insofar as 
it 
depends on an outside which both denies that identity and 
provides its condition of possibility at the same 
time. " 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 39) Dislocation is a crucial concept in 
New Reflections and one that ties together contingency, 
negativity and anti-essentialism. As an example of 
how it 
operates, Laclau talks of the dislocatory effects of 
emerging capitalism on the lives of workers; the 
destruction of traditional communities, poor work and 
living conditions, and low wages. However, workers did 
not passively submit to this new regime. They organised 
trade unions, went on strike and as such their political 
identities were constructed in the process of struggle.. 
Thus the workers identities were simultaneously denied (by 
the precarious nature of low paid work), and made possible 
(by political resistance) 
For Laclau dislocation of the social is coterminous with 
the construction of power centres. This approach must be 
compared with that of the classical Marxist tradition. 
"For classical Marxism, the possibility of 
transcending capitalist society depended on 
the simplification of social structure and 
the emergence of a privileged agent of social 
change, while for us, the possibility of a 
democratic transformation of society depends 
on a proliferation of new subjects of change. " 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 41) 
This will only be possible if contemporary capitalism 
throws up multiple dislocations and creates a plurality of 
new antagonisms. 
Laclau states that there are three dimensions of the 
dislocation of the social: a) dislocation is the very form 
of temporality (temporality is the exact opposite of 
spatiality). This requires further explanation. In this 
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formulation Laclau equates space with repetition, and 
events of a cyclical or predetermined nature. 
This is an 
oblique attack on the perceived teleology of 
the Marxist 
canon. Teleology reduces time to space, whereas 
dislocation is pure temporality: dislocation therefore 
must be understood as an anti-teleological concept. 
However, there is most certainly a confusion in Laclau's 
writing on this topic. At one point he says that; 
"Any 
teleological conception of change is therefore also 
essentially spatialist", thereby equating space with 
teleology and time with dislocation, but goes on to say 
that "Through dislocation time is overcome by space. " 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 42) This is most likely a printing 
error: what it should say in order to make sense is that 
'through dislocation space is overcome by time. ' Laclau 
subsequently corrects himself by asserting that 
dislocation involves a temporalization of space. 
To move on to the second dimension of the dislocation of 
the social1; b) dislocation is the very form of 
possibility. "The dislocated structure thus opens 
possibilities of multiple and indeterminate 
rearticulations for those freed from its coercive force 
and who are consequently outside it. " (Laclau, 1990, 
pp. 42-43) The dislocation of a structure involves, "... a 
temporalization of spaces or a widening of the field of 
the possible, but this takes place in a determinate 
situation: that is, one in which there is always a 
relative structuration. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 43) This all 
refers to the assertion that the type of change inherent 
in a teleological model opens up no real possibilities as 
such, but merely identifies the already given and 
preordained. 
Thirdly; c) dislocation is the very form of freedom. The 
greater the degree of indetermination, the freer a society 
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will be, or to put it another way, 
"Freedom is the absence 
of determination. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 43) 
"To understand 
social reality, then, is not to understand what society 
is, but what prevents it from being. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 44) 
"Our basic thesis is that the possibility of a radical 
democracy is directly linked to the level and extension of 
structural dislocations operating in contemporary 
capitalism. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 45) 
Laclau reminds us that reflection on dislocation and its 
political potential does have a tradition within Marxism; 
the Trotskyist notions of 'uneven and combined 
development' and 'permanent revolution' in particular. 
Dislocation opens up different possibilities and expands 
the area of freedom of historical subjects. For Trotsky, 
the possibility of revolution depends on structural 
unevenness. Trotsky's analysis of the Russian situation 
led him to conclude that the 
"... possibility of revolution does not spring 
from underlying and positive structural laws 
dominating the whole of the historical 
process, but form the latter's dislocations 
which determine an unevenness that cannot be 
grasped by any structure. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 48) 
The dislocation thesis advanced by Laclau in New 
Reflections can be read as an extension of the logic of 
contingency tradition outlined in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy. Possibility implies a non-essentialist 
articulation rather than a necessistic unity, and the 
logic of contingency implies the that a structural 
articulation/rearticulation will be purely political. The 
political in this context literally means the realm of the 
non-necessistic, non-essentialist and non-teleological. 
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Laclau looks at the dislocation - possibility relationship 
in the context of commodification. 
"It is without doubt true that the phenomenon 
of commodification is at the heart of the 
multiple dislocations of traditional social 
relations... [this] dislocation of social 
relations... provokes acts of resistance which 
launch new social actors into the historical 
arena; and the new actors, precisely because 
they are moving on a dislocated terrain, must 
constantly reinvent their own social forms. " 
(Laclau, 1990, pp. 511-52) 
Similarly, the growth of bureaucratic control in 
contemporary societies can be explained in terms of 
dislocation. Bureaucratic rationalization dislocates 
existing power structures and a range of new alternative 
rationalizations are created. Laclau does acknowledge 
that the organization of the production process exhibits 
dislocatory features. Large-scale industry leads to 
alienation (the direct producer ceases to be the centre of 
reference and meaning of the production process). On the 
other hand, the organization of the production process is 
freed from any dependence on the direct producer. In is 
interesting to note in passing the rather surprising 
appearance of alienation in such an anti-humanist 
discourse. Laclau continues, 
Any transformation of capitalism opens up a range of possibilities that are not just determined by the endogenous logic of 
capitalist forms, but also by the latter's 
constitutive outside and by the whole historical situation in which those logics 
operate. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 56) 
Laclau acknowledges the 'disorganized capitalism' thesis 
described by Lasch and Urry. However, his uncritical 
acceptance of this theory is somewhat of a problem. The 
main features of the 'disorganized capitalism' thesis 
include; the internationalization of capital, a 
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deconcentration of capital/ decline in cartels, an 
increased separation between industrial and 
finance 
capital, the replacement of Taylorism with more 
flexible 
forms of organisation, and a growth in the service sector. 
David Harvey in his book The Condition of Postmodernity 
(Harvey, 1898) challenges the assumption that this is an 
adequate characterisation of contemporary capitalism, and 
prefers the term 'flexible accumulation' to describe the 
contemporary capitalist configuration. ' 
r 
"By the very use of the terms 'organized' and 
'disorganized' to characterize the transition, 
they emphasize more the disintegration than 
the coherence of contemporary capitalism, and 
therefore avoid confronting the possibility 
of a transition in the regime of accumulation. " (Harvey, pp. 174-176) 
What is called into question in this critique of Lash and 
Urry's work is their claim that somehow capitalism has 
lost its cohesion and structural effectivity. Harvey 
explores the evolving nature of capitalism in the 
following-way: 
"... the tension that has always prevailed 
within capitalism between monopoly and 
competition, between centralization and 
decentralization of economic power, is being 
worked out in fundamentally new ways. This does not necessarily imply, however, that 
capitalism is becoming more 'disorganized' 
as Offe (1985) and Lash and Urry (1987) 
suggest. For what is most interesting about 
the current situation is the way in which 
capitalism is becoming even more tightly 
organized through dispersal, geographical 
mobility, and flexible responses in labour 
markets, labour processes, and consumer 
markets, all accompanied by hefty doses of institutional, product, and technological 
innovation. " (Harvey, p. 159) 
Laclau's desire to utilise the 'disorganized capitalism' 
thesis underlines the ambivalence he continually exhibits 
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towards capitalism in general. The question; 'what 
structuring effectivity does the economic actually have? ', 
is never fully addressed. He gives differing, 
contradictory and partial answers throughout Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy and New Reflections. The most likely 
answer that Laclau would give to such a question is, 'the 
economy is one of a large number of potential sites for 
dislocation that has no privilege over any other'. Thus 
he is able to talk in terms of the displacement of the 
economic from any centre offdetermination in the following 
way; 
"The plurality of dislocations generates a 
plurality of centres of relative power, and 
the expansion of all social logic thus takes 
place on a terrain that is increasingly 
dominated by elements external to it. 
Accordingly, articulation is constitutive 
of all social practice. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 59) 
The thesis so far outlined by Laclau in New Reflections is 
that politics has its source in the field of negativity, 
and that this approach is the antithesis of Marxism and 
other variants of the Enlightenment project. Thus he is 
able to say; "Dislocation is the source of freedom" 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 60), and indeed the source of politics. 
On this view, identities are not positive (given, 
structural) but must be constructed, through acts of 
identification. Laclau states that in a dislocated 
structure identification never reaches full identity, and 
in doing so turns his attention to the problem of 
agency/structure. "'Politics' is an ontological category: 
there is politics because there is subversion and 
dislocation of the social. This means that any subject 
is, by definition, political. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 61) 
Laclau identifies the "... basic dimensions of this 
antithetical relationship between subject and structure. " 
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(Laclau, 1990, p. 61) "Any subject is a mythical subject. 
By myth we mean a space of representation which bears no 
relation of continuity with the dominant 'structural 
objectivity'. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 61) It is interesting to 
compare this formulation with Althusser's notion of 
ideology as a representation of a lived experience. 
Laclau's insistence that myth has no relation to 
structural objectivity, may be another symptom of his 
reluctance to engage with Althusserian concepts of 
subjectivity. 
Myths are forms of identifications that give the subject 
its discursive presence, "... myth functions as a surface 
on which dislocations and social demands can be 
inscribed. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 63) A surface of inscription 
is incomplete, that is to say the process of inscription 
is more important than what is inscribed (this can be 
related back to Laclau's comments on the politics and the 
social. Politics is analogous to the process of 
inscription, the social to what is inscribed). "In this 
sense, social myths are essentially incomplete: for 
content is constantly reconstituted and displaced. " 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 63) "The incomplete character of the 
mythical surfaces of inscription is the condition of 
possibility for the constitution of social imaginaries. " 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 63) 
If the moment of representation of fullness dominates it 
can become the unlimited horizon of inscription of any 
social demand and any possible dislocation. Myth is then 
transformed into an imaginary. Examples of imaginaries 
include communist society, the Enlightenment, and 
positivism's conception of progress, they are all modes of 
representation of the very form of fullness, and are 
located beyond the precariousness and dislocations typical 
of the world of objects. "The condition of emergence of 
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an imaginary is the metaphorization of the literal content 
of a particular social demand. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 64) In 
summary then, dislocations prompt social groups to 
formulate proposals to overcome them. This is the 
mythical space of a possible social order: the literal 
content of a social demand is transformed into a 
metaphorical representation of fullness and with the 
addition of other dislocations and demands the 
metaphorical moment can-achieve autonomy from the 
literality of original dislocation, thereby establishing 
the imaginary horizon. 
This process can be likened to the more Marxist notion of 
Gramsci's corporatist class becoming the hegemonic class 
by the universalization of its demands. Laclau's version 
'adds' to the Gramscian version because it recognises that 
mythical space is external to the dislocation, that is to 
say it cannot be deduced from the dislocation, and a group 
is exterior to its own demands. In other words, it is a 
non-essentialist conception. In Marxist theory the 
working class is not exterior to socialist ideology, on 
the contrary, its demands are given a priori. Socialism 
is not exterior to the dislocations caused by capitalism; 
socialism is created by those dislocations. 
There is another example given by Laclau. In pre-war 
Germany the rise of the Nazi's did not stem necessarily 
from the economic crises of the 1920's (dislocation); 
"... Nazi discourse was the only one in the 
circumstances that addressed the problems 
experienced by the middle class as a whole 
and offered a principle for their 
interpretation. Its victory was the result 
of its availability on a terrain and in a 
situation where no other discourse presented itself as a real he emonic alternative. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 66) 
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By way of a commentary on this section it will be useful 
to compare Laclau's ideas on myth with Althusser's work on 
ideology. Laclau says that any subject is a mythical 
subject and the subject is constitutively metaphor. 
Althusser posits an ideologically constituted subject 
whose subjectivity is constructed through an imaginary 
representation of their relationship to conditions of 
existence. For Laclau the subject's forms of 
identification function as surfaces of inscription, while 
Althusser talks of ideology interpellating individuals as 
subjects. The incomplete character of the mythical 
surfaces of inscription is the condition of possibility 
for the constitution of social imaginaries. "... all 
mythical space is external to the dislocation it purports 
to suture... " (Laclau, 1990, p. 65) By contrast, 
Althusser's ideology works through material practices 
inscribed within institutional apparatuses. Laclau writes 
that; 
"... myth is constitutive of any possible 
society. As we have seen, any space formed 
as a principle for the reordering of a 
dislocated structure's elements is mythical. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 67) 
It would be possible to repeat this sentence replacing 
'myth' and 'mythical' with 'ideology' and 'ideological' 
and the result would be consistent with an Althusserian 
outlook. Laclau continues with his argument; 
"The combined effects of commodification, of 
bureaucratic rationalization, and of the 
increasingly complex forms of division of 
labour - all require constant creativity and 
the continuous construction of spaces of 
collective operation that can rest less and less on inherited objective institutional 
forms. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 673 
Therefore, contemporary societies are likely to become 
increasingly mythical. 
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"... any space formed as a principle for the 
reordering of a dislocated structure's elements 
is mythical. Its mythical character is given 
by its radical discontinuity with the 
dislocations of the dominant structural 
forms. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 67) 
Laclau acknowledges the increase in dislocations peculiar 
to advanced capitalism, in his analysis brought about by 
the onset of disorganized capitalism. Thus 
commodification, bureaucratic rationalization and complex 
forms of the division of labour mean that contemporary 
society has become increasingly mythical. The mythical 
space of the subject increases at the expense of 
structural objectivity. 
The idea of reoccupations 
Laclau introduces the term 'reoccupations' (which is 
derived from the work of Hans Blumberg) to denote new 
ideas or visions which replace ancient notions formed on a 
basis of different set of issues. The latter impose their 
demands on the former and deform them. Modernist 
ideologies of radical social transformation 'reoccupy' a 
ground formed by medieval visions of millenialist 
apocalypse. God may have been superseded but we still 
have, 
"... the image of a necessary transition to 
the chiliastic world of homogenous, reconciled (and therefore non-dislocated) society... If 
everything that happens can be explained 
internally to this world, nothing can be a 
mere event... and everything acquires an 
absolute intelligibility... " (Laclau, 1990, p. 75) 
Dislocation, is mere event and is unrepresentable. The 
above quote is a critique of what Laclau would term the 
Hegelian - Marxist moment; the moment of meta-narrative 
and omnipotent reason. In other words, no dislocation 
can occur. This is what prompts Laclau to say that modern 
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rationalism has adapted badly to the ground of medieval 
eschatology in terms of its 'reoccupation' of the latter. 
Before moving on it is necessary to examine Laclau's 
assertion more closely, and in particular the comments on 
meta-narrative and intelligibility. Although it is 
undoubtedly true that Marxism consists of a meta-narrative 
(and doubtful that Laclau avoids this pitfall), the 
accusation of an insistence on ultimate intelligibility 
that Laclau levels at Marxism seems to fail by conflating 
intelligibility and interpretation. 
Laclau posits dislocation as mere event: that which cannot 
be represented in existing discourse. Only in this way 
can it produce dislocatory effects. There is a major 
problem with this formulation. Nothing is ever mere 
'event'. Every discourse provides the interpretative 
mechanisms that permit 'event' to be rendered to 
experience. Of course, different discourses would arrive 
at different conclusions; this is the nature of 
interpretation. The same event can therefore be variously 
expressed within different ideological frameworks because 
each uses a different system of interpretation and 
representation. Different categories of thought produce 
different identifications, different experiences and 
divergent political responses. However, there is no 
perspective, discourse, or ideological framework from 
which no interpretation results, because every perspective 
has a tradition of interpretation, a way of making sense 
of the world, an ability to categorize and classify 
'events'. 
This is what Raymond Williams very usefully designates as 
'structures of feeling'. Williams wants to conceptualise 
areas of human experience in terms of the process of 
experience. He is aware that there are social experiences 
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any thought of dislocation. It maintains the idea of the 
radical representability of the real, a notion which is 
inconsistent in combination with a quasi-eschatological 
reiteration of struggle against forces of evil. The age 
of democratic revolution, by contrast, explores the 
possibility of historical action opened up by dislocation 
of pure event (temporality) and representation becomes 
impossible. When new ideas, and new discourses adapt 
badly to the ground they reoccupy, historical analysis 
(not teleological explanation) can begin. 
It is interesting to compare Laclau's reading of 
'reoccupations' with Raymond Williams' idea of 'residual' 
and 'emergent' cultural forms, as both try to express the 
dynamic of cultural supersession. 
"The residual, by definition, has been 
effectively formed in the past, but it is 
still active in the cultural process, not 
only and often not at all as an element of 
the past, but as an effective element of 
the present. Thus certain experiences, 
meanings and values which cannot be expressed 
or substantially verified in terms of the 
dominant culture, are nevertheless lived and 
practised on the basis of the residue - 
cultural as well as social - of some previous 
social and cultural institution or formation. " (Williams, p. 122) 
Laclau's example of the continued effectivity of the 
religious ground that Marxism has 'reoccupied' would sit 
easily in Williams' model. Examples given by Williams 
himself include: organized religion; rural community (as 
an alternative to urban industrial capitalism but, largely 
incorporated as a leisure function of the dominant order); 
and the monarchy (not actively oppositional - incorporated 
as political and cultural function. ) 
-132- 
The residual can have an alternative or oppositional 
relation to the dominant culture, but some aspects of the 
residual can be incorporated into the dominant culture. 
"It is in the incorporation of the actively residual - by 
reinterpretation, dilution, projection, discriminating 
inclusion and exclusion - that the work of the selective 
tradition is especially evident. " (Williams, p. 123) For 
example, the literary tradition: "... selective versions of 
the character of literature to connecting and 
incorporating definitions of what literature now is and 
should be. " (Williams, p. 123) Actively residual meanings 
and values can be sustained against the pressures of 
incorporation by maintaining an alternative version of 
what literature is, or has been, and what literary 
experience is and must be. An analogy could be made with 
Laclau's notion of myth. In particular, the functioning 
of myth as a surface of inscriptions on which social 
demands can be inscribed. In Williams' version, the 
alternative experience of literature is the prerequisite 
for the cgnstruction of a social imaginary. 
For Williams the residual is coupled with the emergent, 
and both have to be understood in the context of a 
cultural dominant; a hegemonic form which in some sense is 
the (mediated) embodiment of the politically dominant 
class. "By 'emergent' I mean, first, that new meanings 
and values, new practices, new relationships and kinds of 
relationship are continually being created. " (Williams, 
p. 123) Definitions of the emergent (and the residual) can 
be made only in relation to a full sense of the dominant. 
The 'residual' relates to earlier social formations, and 
in particular meanings and values generated in the past 
which are significant because they represent areas of 
human experience which are neglected by dominant culture. 
Nevertheless, like Laclau's 'reoccupations' they exert a 
pressure on the dominant culture and are able to moderate 
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cultural forms. Cultural emergence is most likely to be 
observed in relation to the emergence of a class, for 
example that of the working class in nineteenth century 
England. Such new meanings and values are often 
incorporated by an alert dominant culture. 
"What has really to be said, as a way of 
defining important elements of both the 
residual and the emergent, and as a way of 
understanding the character of the dominant, 
is that no mode of production and therefore 
no dominant social order and therefore no 
dominant culture in reality includes or 
exhausts all human practice, human energy, 
and human intention. " (Williams, p. 125) 
Dominant forms select from and exclude the full range of 
human practice. What the dominant chooses to seize is the 
ruling definition of the social. On the political level 
"It is this seizure that has especially to be resisted. " 
(Williams, p. 125) In terms of political analysis, 
attention must be paid to the extent to which a dominant 
social order is able to reach into the whole range of 
practices and experiences and attempt to incorporate them; 
this functions as an index of that dominant social order. 
In advanced capitalism, argues Williams 
".. because of changes in the social character 
of labour, in the social character of 
communication and in the social character of 
decision making, the dominant culture reaches 
much further than ever before in capitalist 
society into hitherto 'reserved' or 'resigned' 
areas of experience and practice and meaning. 
The area of effective penetration of the 
dominant order into the whole social and 
cultural process is thus now significantly 
greater. " (Williams, pp. 125-6) 
and in doing so offers a reconceptualisation of the 
'disorganized capitalism' thesis. 
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Returning to Laclau's deployment of 'reoccupations' we 
need to focus on the example he gives of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, in which the universal nature of the 
history of the millenium resurfaces. This fails for 
Laclau, as the social imaginary is totally reduced to 
mythical space, which effectively means that myth loses 
its character as a limitless surface of inscription. 
Instead myth denies its own character (it is presented as 
a necessary social order) and there is no separation 
between dislocations of structure and the mythical surface 
on which they are inscribed. This results in the return 
of closure; the closed nature of a space denies its 
mythical character. 
The importance of this from the point of 'reoccupations' 
is that some basic dimensions of the medieval millenium 
have continued to determine fundamental structures of 
radical thought. For instance, the universal nature of 
the history of the millenium and the universality of both 
the actors and society in which the millenium is finally 
realised. Thus claims Laclau, the current crisis of 
socialism can be attributed to the long term effects of 
the 'reoccupation' by the socialist discourse of the 
ground of the universalist history of Christian 
apocalypse. 
One of Laclau's main criticisms of the Marxist path to 
socialism is that it advocates a form of social management 
which is based on empiricist, universalist and rationalist 
assumptions. In Laclau's opinion socialist demands need 
to be inscribed in a discourse different from that of 
'social management'; only in this way will socialism 
acquire new historical possibilities. 
Of course this vision of a socialism freed from the 
limitations of rationality, universalism, teleology and 
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the humanist, self-conscious, self-reflective subject is 
only feasible if the notion of dislocation is engaged. As 
we have already seen dislocation destroys all space and 
also the very possibility of representation. As an 
example of this, Laclau chooses the case of migrants from 
rural to urban areas. They bring with them their own 
values, own discourse, and own set of symbols. The new 
environment results in fresh dislocations and the need to 
reafirm traditional symbols in order to create a culture 
of resistance. 
"... those symbols and values operate as 
surfaces for the inscription of the new 
urban antagonisms and dislocations once the 
symbols' circulation has reached a certain 
level of generalisation in the representation 
of a vast range of antagonisms, they become 
the necessary surface for the inscription of 
any new demand. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 79) 
Thus, the symbols can be appropriated by other group, for 
example the middle class, because they are the only 
ideological raw material expressing anti-establishment 
protest. 'Emergent' cultural artefacts in Williams' 
terms. To draw upon the concepts elaborated in Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy, it is through this process that 
chains of equivalence start to emerge. 
Universality is built through the overdetermination of an 
open range of concrete demands. Hegemonic struggle can 
embody these 'relative universalities', this is in fact 
what politics consists of, 
"".. a 'collective will' will only consolidate its hegemony if it manages to appear to other 
groups as the force capable of providing the best social arrangement possible to secure and 
expand a universality that transcends it... In 
relatively stable societies there is no distancing between inscription surfaces and 
what is inscribed on them. (Laclau, 1990, p. 81) 
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Presumably, in such societies there is also little 
distance between the social and the political, the social 
being the sedimentation of politics. 
"The fragmentation and growing limitation of social actors 
is linked to the multiplication of the dislocations 
produced by 'disorganized capitalism'. " (Laclau, 1990, 
p. 81) The fragmentation of social actors is a reference 
to the demise of class politics, so it follows that we can 
no longer speak of a 'universal class'; post-Marxism 
celebrates this fact, rather than a cause for concern it 
is the basis for a new optimism. The fragmentation of 
issues allows for a greater autonomy, new social movements 
present the political system with an increasing list of 
demands which, because of their shear numbers and 
diversity, are difficult to manipulate and ignore. The 
greater the plurality of subject positions, the wider the 
field of possibilities for historical action. 
"The future is indeterminable and certainly 
not guaranteed for us; but that is precisely 
why it is not lost either. The current 
expansion of democratic struggles in the 
international arena gives cause for cautious 
optimism. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 83) 
Laclau ends New Reflections on this note of optimism. But 
is it an 'optimism of the will' as Gramsci would say, or, 
in the post-Marxist universe described by Laclau where the 
future of the 'subject' is in doubt, merely the complete 
free play of relativism disguised as 'radical democracy'? 
Does Laclau have a compelling argument to justify the 
survival of politics after the demise of the subject ? 
Conclusions 
New Reflections continues the 'logic of contingency' theme 
begun in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and introduces a 
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a major new concept in 'dislocation'. Dislocation can be 
compared to the Marxist notion of contradiction, but there 
is a crucial difference which can be expressed in the 
following way. Contradiction refers to an event internal 
to a given structure or formation, whereas dislocation is 
brought about by the constitutive outside. Thus, this new 
concept is designed to stand in opposition to the 
teleology perceived by Laclau as inherent to Marxism. 
When discussing capitalism for example, contradiction 
implies a necessary internal development, whereas 
dislocation implies radical contingency, a non-stagist 
conception of development, and a non-necessitarian 
theoretical underpinning. According to Laclau this opens 
up the true field of possibility and freedom. It 
We have seen that one main thrust of Laclau's argument is 
to establish that negativity is constitutive of the 
social, and that only by rejecting teleology and 
essentialism can we hope to create the ground for a true 
democratic. politics. 
By way of a conclusion I would like to evaluate Laclau's 
innovations in conceptualising political agency by 
considering his idea of 'reoccupations' and related 
concepts alongside the Gramscian notion of 'collective 
will'. Discussion of these areas will focus on the 
question of the role of the subject in Laclau's writing, 
especially in its relation to politics. Laclau contends 
that he has forged the ground for a radical democratic 
politics, but to what extent has this been done at the 
expense of political agency? 
Laclau characterises Marxism as continuing the tradition 
of apocalyptic universalism, as a result of its 
unsuccessful 'reoccupation' of the latter's ground. As an 
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alternative to the 'spent force' represented by Marxism we 
are invited to adopt Laclau's approach: 
"To reformulate the values of the Enlightenment 
in the direction of a radical historicism 
and to renounce its rationalistic 
epistemological and ontological foundations, 
then, is to expand the democratic 
potentialities of that tradition, while 
abandoning the totalitarian tendencies arising 
from its reoccupation of the ground of 
apocalyptic universalism" (Laclau, 1990, p. 83) 
There are two main comments to be made in relation to 
'reoccupations'. Firstly, it can be argued that Laclau's 
post-Marxist radical democracy is nothing more than a 
'reoccupation' of Marxism, in which Marxism still exerts a 
crucial influence. We have seen this particularly in the 
case of Althusser, and the same could be said of Gramsci. 
In fact, the analogy could be extended to the entire 
project of post-Marxism; that by definition post-Marxism 
reoccupies Marxism's traditional ground. 
Secondly, there is a feature of Laclau's work that he 
holds in common with some post-structuralist writers, 
namely the interest he shows in sedimentation and traces. 
Take the notion of 'suture' as developed by Laclau and 
Mouffe, for example. 
"Their application of the concept of suture 
to the field of politics carries with it an 
idea that Derrida's work on deconstruction 
has made influential: the traces of the old 
cannot be destroyed but remain as sedimentary 
deposits, even, and indeed especially, where 
the new is trying hardest to exclude the old. (Deconstruction being the method of uncovering 
these buried traces). " (Barrett, p. 67) 
This cluster of images: 'reoccupations' - the past 
continuing to exert an influence on the present; 
sedimentation; traces; suture, which all have an important 
-139- 
role in Laclau's work, prompt the image of the 
'palimpsest' as an attempt to characterize Laclau's 
approach. A palimpsest is a parchment where writing has 
been erased; a rewritten manuscript. 'All history was a 
palimpsest, scraped clean and re-inscribed exactly as 
often as was necessary' was written by Orwell 
(in 1984) 
but could equally apply to Laclau's appropriation of 
Marxism. Laclau's work is a therefore a manuscript in 
which later writing (post-Marxism) is imposed on an 
effaced earlier text (Marxism). Marxism has been partly 
erased and written over in Laclau's non-essentialist, non- 
reductionist hand. The image is enhanced by Laclau's 
point that 'politics is analogous to the process of 
inscription, the social to what is inscribed'. 
"It is only with the Gramscian notion of 'collective will' 
that the barrier of class essentialism begins to 
dissolve. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 51) If Laclau's political 
project is to expand the logic of the social that was 
first opened up with Gramsci's term 'collective will', 
then any gains that he may claim to have made must be 
offset by a corresponding diminution in the area of 
political subjectivity. If 'collective will' opened the 
door on a non-necessary politics of hegemony by 
decentering class, 'dislocation' has expanded the logic of 
the social but at the expense of the role of politics (or 
at least politics as understood by Marxism). This is 
because the democratic imaginary and plurality of 
antagonisms expand the realm of social practice but 
displace the political subject. 
The key to this problem is Laclau's concept of 
subjectivity. Anti-humanist discourses, of which Laclau's 
is one, are unable to generate a notion of subjectivity 
which entails consciousness, reflectivity and an ability 
to act on and change the world. In Laclau's case his 
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desire to eschew the traditional ground of subjectivity, 
ie. rationality, leaves whatever subject does emerge from 
his theorising in danger of being politically 
directionless and mired in relativism. 
Laclau avers that he wishes to break the link between 
rationality, the Enlightenment and politics and 
"... renounce its [the Enlightenment's] rationalistic 
epistemological and ontological foundations... " (Laclau, 
1990, p. 83). However, this'move has the effect of 
detaching the subject from morality, notions of what is 
progressive, and an ability to transform the world. In 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau and Mouffe removed 
hegemony from its tradition ground of class, politics hnd 
economic determinism. Subjectivity, however, is too deeply 
embedded in a rationality - politics - agency nexus to 
make such a transplant feasible. 
The notion of 'collective will' as developed by Gramsci 
does not suffer from an underlying lack of political 
agency because its rationalist baggage carries with it the 
requisite subjectivity. 'Dislocation' on the other hand 
precludes subjectivity. Laclau posits 'dislocation as 
pure event', and he says is non-representable. 
'Dislocation' and Laclau's notion of subjectivity are 
totally implicated and his theory implies a 'subject' that 
is unable to actively 'do the representing'. In a world 
where subjects are denied the ability to make sense of 
their experiences there is little possibility of political 
action, unless the political is radically redefined. 
Antagonism, with its assertion of non-essentialism and the 
constitutive nature of negativity, performs precisely this 
function. Laclau has taken up many of the central themes 
of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and continued to work 
them into a functioning model of politics which displaces 
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the working class ever further from centre stage. A 
radical and progressive politics by definition can no 
longer be founded on ttie Enlightenment platform of 
consciousness, subjectivity and agency. 
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CHAPTER S 
THE 'LATE' PERIOD 
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Introduction 
This chapter begins an examination of the applicability of 
Laclau and Mouffe's work to issues in contemporary 
European politics. I will also explore the 'idea of 
Europe' implicit in the work of Mouffe, and the 
implications of this for (Laclau and) Mouffe's work 
generally. Laclau and Mouffe demonstrate a highly 
developed notion of Europe, if not especially in Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy and other texts of the 'early' 
period, then certainly in their (less-collaborative) later 
work. This sense of Europe is characterised by the 
following feature; 
(i) Europe is defined by its democratic heritage. Mouffe 
demonstrates a belief in the idea that democracy is a 
European affair; democracy had its origins and was 
nurtured in Europe, and Europe became defined by this 
democratic heritage. 
(ii) In view of the above Europe achieved a sense of 
democratic identity in relation to 'the other', which 
lacked a democratic heritage. Mouffe's view is that 
inclusion in such traditions of liberal democracy is 
constitutive of 'us and them' in which the 'us' consists 
of Europe, or at least a Europe that is receptive to 
radical democracy. Mouffe writes that, 
"European citizenship cannot be understood 
solely in terms of a legal status and a set 
of rights, important as these are. It must 
mean identifying with a set of political 
values and principles which are constitutive 
of modern democracy. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 8) 
a succinct encapsulation of her view of the link between 
Europe and its constitutive traditions of democracy. 
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In order to explore these themes I will look at two 
essays from the volume Dimensions of Radical Democracy. 
Mouffe's essay Democratic Citizenship and the Political 
Community, and her short preface to the volume; Democratic 
Politics Today. Another essay from this volume Europe: A 
Political Community?, by Etienne Tassin, is discussed in 
the following chapter. 
Mouffe's book Dimensions of Radical Democracy, (Mouffe, 
1992) is the first publication of what I have earlier 
referred to as the 'later period' of Laclau and Mouffe's 
work. These essays represent the starting point for the 
'liberalisation' of radical democracy; the point at which 
Mouffe seeks to emphasise the importance of liberal 
democracy in the radical democratic tradition that she and 
Laclau have been constructing. These essays and us the 
ones that are written later place greater emphasis on the 
(liberal) democratic aspect of radical democracy, whereas 
the earlier work stressed the radical (Marxist and 
socialist) lineage of their work. 
The reliance upon the liberal tradition exhibited in 
Mouffe's later work is in part a corrective to the earlier 
emphasis on the Marxist legacy. Thus, we witness not just 
a liberalisation of radical democracy, but an all-round 
liberalisation of Mouffe's political position. Different 
aspects of democracy are brought to the foreground; 
citizenship and pluralism for example, and the more 
radical elements are subdued. It is my contention that 
this new emphasis leads to a conception of Europe couched 
in relation to these selective traditions of democracy. 
There is no doubt that Mouffe's work is pertinent to the 
political situation in Europe today, at a time when the 
post-War East-West division no longer exists, and the old 
Communist bloc and the countries of Western Europe all 
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inhabit, or strive to inhabit, the same democratic 
terrain. In this sense the meaning of democracy is a 
crucial issue to address at the present conjuncture; at a 
time when everyone is (or at least claims to be) a 
democrat, it is especially important to investigate what 
constraints act upon the construction of democratic 
identities. We also need to understand the intellectual 
forces that propagate ideas of democracy and it and its 
power as an ideology or doctrine, as well as its 
embodiment in institutions. ' In a world where everyone is 
a democrat democracy could easily lose its meaning. 
It is timely that Mouffe should locate radical democracy 
in the wider context of democratic traditions in the 
European 'political community'. This allows us to examine 
the extent to which the ideas of (Laclau and) Mouffe are 
applicable to the emergent democracies of Eastern and 
Central Europe where such long histories of Western-style 
democracy are largely absent. Put slightly differently, 
we could say that these Eastern countries do not 
necessarily share in full the same democratic traditions 
as Western Europe. What relevance has a term such as 'a 
deepening of democracy' (it strongly implies that a base- 
line of democracy already exists) to a former Communist 
state? 
As mentioned previously, the main concerns of this chapter 
are Mouffe's ideas on democracy and Europe, and how the 
two are mutually implicated in her work. Moreover, it is 
not Mouffe's ideas of democracy per se that are of primary 
interest, but the way in which discourses of citizenship 
and democracy are constitutive of political identities. 
Another central concern is the extent to which Mouffe's 
notion of democracy 'floats free' from institutions of 
democracy. 
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Terms such as 'citizenship' and 'community', which are 
emblematic of the new emphasis on the liberal traditions 
of radical democracy in Dimensions of Radical Democracy 
both, carry a heavy weight of conceptual baggage. They 
are deeply embedded in notions of the nation-state for 
example, as well as democracy. The term citizenship, in 
particular, resonates with ideas of the rule of law, 
rights and obligations, and private property which are 
closely associated with the modern nation-state. The 
nation-state is "... the entity to which, until now, the 
modern language of citizenship primarily referred. " (Hall 
and Held, p. 173) Citizens qua citizens do not exist. 
Citizenship is bestowed by a state on its subjects. 
5 
The European nation-state is itself in a state of flux 
(see Chapter 7). It is under attack from above (the 
growing influence of the supra-national EU, for example), 
and from below (the rise of regionalism and ethnic 
fragmentation); "Everywhere, the nation-state itself - the 
entity to which the language of political citizenship 
refers - is eroded and challenged. " (Hall and Held, p. 183) 
As such, the future of citizenship, in a Europe where the 
nation-state is in decline, is uncertain. 
Mouffe's interest in citizenship is indicative of a more 
general renewed interest on the left of what was hitherto 
thought of as a rather bourgeois interest in 'rights'. 
This re-evaluation of liberal democratic ideas is 
consistent with 'New Times' thinking and is generally 
concerned with a redefinition of citizenship and an 
attempt to free it from its association with the nation- 
state. This brings its own problems, summed up by Hall 
and Held. "Older European ideas of citizenship assumed a 
more culturally homogeneous population, within the 
framework of a strong unitary nation-state. " (Hall and 
Held, p. 187) This means that citizenship must- be 
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understood in a wider sense than abstract membership of a 
society and of reciprocal rights and duties; "It must 
address not only issues of class and inequality, but also 
questions of membership posed by feminism, the black and 
ethnic movements, ecology... and vulnerable minorities like 
children. " (Hall and Held, p. 176) 
Contemporary political commentary is dominated by the 
triumph of 'Western values' associated with the end of the 
Cold War and decline of the'Communist regimes. The 
exemplar of this view is Francis Fukuyama, whose book The 
End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama, 1992) has 
attracted much attention, not least because it propagates 
the triumphalist view that 'the West has won'. Fukuyafia 
sums up the position in the following way; 
"... a remarkable consensus concerning the 
legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system 
of government has emerged throughout the 
world over the past few years, as it conquered 
rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, 
fascism, and most recently communism. More 
than that, I argued [in his original essay 
The End of History? ] that liberal democracy 
may constitute the "end point of mankind's 
ideological evolution" and the "final form 
of human government", and as such constituted 
the "end of history". " (Fukuyama, p. xi) 
This then, is the spirit of the times, and although Mouffe 
and her colleagues would no doubt disagree with the 
Hegelian logic and the teleological nature of Fukuyama's 
argument, they both share the assumption that democracy is 
the sin qua non of contemporary politics. 
This is only one aspect of the contemporary political 
scene. European politics is also characterised by an 
increase in ethnic nationalism, the rise of the far right 
in many of the 'old' democracies of Western Europe, 
'Fortress Europe', and other examples of the politics of 
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exclusion, all of which have an implication for 
citizenship. An extension of democracy in Eastern Europe 
cannot be taken for granted. Democracy will come about 
through political struggle; it is not the guaranteed 
outcome of 'historical necessity'. Rather than see Europe 
simply as a nascent political community that can be 
constructed out of traditions of democracy and 
citizenship, as I believe Mouffe, Tassin and others do, it 
is important that Europe is also viewed as the site of 
fragmentation and conflict. ' 
Mouffe's essay marks the transition between the approach 
adopted in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy - which has an 
obvious applicability to the situation in the former s 
Communist states of Eastern Europe in that it insists upon 
(i) the absolute contingency of politics, and (ii) that 
democratic identities are not given but must be 
constructed - and the later work which relies more and 
more on exclusion and boundary regulation in the process 
of identity formation. We can say that a degree of 
tension emerges between the theoretical framework 
developed by Laclau and Mouffe in their 'early' period, 
and Mouffe's subsequent utilisation of it in this essay. 
Democratic traditions 
That liberal democracy should no longer be seen as the 
antithesis of socialist politics, is one of the main 
themes of Dimensions of Radical Democracy, and is an 
extension of Mouffe's political project which, as outlined 
in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, is to re-orientate the 
Left in the direction of radical democracy. Now, that 
project is associated equally with liberal as well as 
radical democracy. For example, Mouffe talks of "... a 
project of radical and plural democracy... "(Mouffe, 1992, 
p. 10) It constitutes a pivotal moment in the work of 
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Laclau and Mouffe, the point of transition between 'early' 
and 'late' periods. 
Mouffe states that "... the objective of the left should be 
the extension and deepening of the democratic revolution 
initiated two hundred years ago. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 1) 
This involves not the rejection of the liberal democratic 
tradition, but rather "... a radicalization of the modern 
democratic tradition. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 1) Mouffe is 
keen to distance herself from Fukuyama whose democratic 
project has some similarities with her own and centres on 
the complete "... implementation of the twin principles of 
liberty and equality on which modern democracy is founded" 
(Fukuyama, p. xi) as a way of 'solving' problems that still 
exist in stable democracies. It is his view that the 
ideal of liberal democracy cannot be improved on and as 
such our political tasks should be to do what is necessary 
in order that this ideal can be realised. Mouffe dissents 
saying "For those who refuse to see 'really existing' 
liberal democratic capitalism at the 'end of history', 
radical democracy is the only alternative. " (Mouffe, p. 1) 
Mouffe holds that the radical principles inherent in the 
idea of modern democracy are sufficient by themselves to 
bring about a deepening of democracy, provided that this 
latent radicalism can be liberated. This can be achieved 
through "... an immanent critique, by employing the 
symbolic resources of that very tradition. " (Mouffe, 1992, 
p. 1) What Mouffe has identified is again not so different 
from one of Fukuyama's formulations; the gap between the 
ideals of modern democracy and their implementation. One 
problem with this view of democracy is that ideas are 
viewed as being totally independent of institutions (of 
the state or of the economy etc. ), as if simply 
strengthening the idea of democracy will actually bring 
about a greater degree of democracy 'on the ground', so to 
I 
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speak. Modern democracy is not just a set of precepts 
that citizens chose to implement or ignore; democratic 
principles are one component in a system where ideas are 
embedded in institutions and practices that have their own 
efficacy. 
Mouffe says that the purpose of radical democracy is to 
take to task actual democratic societies for not living up 
to their promise, to force liberal democratic societies to 
be accountable for their pröfessed ideals. The future of 
the Left then, according to Mouffe, lies not in the 
reconstruction of its revolutionary tradition (what Laclau 
and Mouffe would call the 'Jacobin imaginary'), but the 
claiming of democratic rights for groups hitherto denibd 
them. Mouffe explains it thus; 
"Radical democracy must acknowledge that the 
articulation of the ideas of popular 
sovereignty and civic equality with the 
liberal themes of natural rights, 
constitutional government and separation 
of 'powers - an articulation that is 
constitutive of liberal democracy - has made 
it possible for new rights to be claimed, 
and new meanings, new uses and new fields 
of application to be created for the ideas 
of liberty and equality. It is within such 
a framework that the struggle for a free 
and equal society has to be waged. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 2) 
This quote is significant for its scope; it can be read as 
linking the struggles of the 'new social movements' with 
those of more traditional democratic politics; traditions 
of pre-capitalist democracy 'popular sovereignty and civic 
equality' with bourgeois liberalism, natural rights and 
constitutional government. It also forms a link between 
the radical democracy of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
with Mouffe's more recent interest in traditions of 
liberalism, and maps out a field for radical democratic 
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political action. What it also does, in a single move, is 
to both legitimate the tradition of liberal democracy as 
providing the 'right conditions' for the advance of 
radical democracy, and limit the application of radical 
democracy to societies where these conditions prevail. 
The implications of this line of thought will be drawn out 
later in this chapter, but it is sufficient at this stage 
to make the point that the countries of Eastern Europe, 
recently emerged from decades of Communism, do not yet 
possess the framework that Mouffe believes is essential 
for the struggle for a free and equal society. 
This problem can be approached from a slightly different 
angle. As I have already mentioned there is a heavy 
dependence on tradition in the work of (Laclau and) 
Mouffe, exemplified by their writings on the history of 
the concept of hegemony in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy. One problem that can follow from this approach 
is that everything outside of that tradition tends to be 
excluded, marginalised and invalidated; tradition works as 
a form of closure. As with the notions of citizenship, 
community, and nationality tradition can be invested with 
the quality of integrity, difference effaced, and 
diversity subordinated to similarity, in order to 
homogenise the 'us', or 'the elect' of the tradition, and 
internal antagonism and dissent are sacrificed for 
stability, coherence and continuity. 
Mouffe makes the important observation that liberalism is 
often identified with a defence of private property and 
capitalism, and "... that capitalist relations constitute 
an insuperable obstacle to the realization of democracy. " 
(Mouffe, 1992, p. 2) The link is not a necessary one she 
argues, and can be broken because it is the result of an 
articulatory practice. This requires a distinction 
between economic liberalism and political liberalism. 
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"Defending and valuing the political form of society 
specific to liberal democracy does not commit us to the 
capitalist economic system. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 2-3) 
Mouffe's statement is true in principle, but ignores the 
substantive observation that capitalism generally, but not 
exclusively, favours liberal democracy (at least in the 
long term) and, more importantly, any economic system 
exerts much pressure on the type of political formations 
that co-exist with it. The economy acts to shape, direct, 
or (for Marxists) even determine the political sphere. 
The standard Marxist view would be that the economic base 
determines the (political) superstructure, but even 
without resorting to such economism it is naive to down 
play the efficacy of capitalism on any social order. . 
The assertion that liberal democracy does not commit us to 
the capitalist economic system quoted above needs further 
discussion. Capitalism and democracy are commonly found 
together. The contemporary world is replete with examples 
of liberal, democracies that are founded on a capitalist 
underpinning; this is in fact the dominant model, 
certainly in Europe. Any political project embracing 
Mouffe's radical democracy would have to start deepening 
democracy in a society orientated around a market economy. 
One could argue that the economic liberalism - political 
liberalism nexus is too pervasive to be dismissed lightly 
as mere contingency, and that the very term liberal 
democracy implies a capitalist market economy. 
What is liberal democracy anyway? Actually existing 
democracies are incredibly diverse. Sweden is a democracy 
and so is Turkey, but this is merely a superficial 
observation which tells us very little about the type of 
economy or society in those countries. In their detail, 
these democracies, as represented by institutions, laws, 
traditions, how they actually exist for millions of 
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citizens who participate in them (and those who are 
marginalised from, or are denied access to, their 
workings) on a daily basis, have little or nothing in 
common. It is not really possible to talk of liberal 
democracy in general, only of specific historical 
instances of liberal-democratic states (which have a 
particular relation to an underlying capitalist, or other 
type of economic order). That liberal democracy is not 
necessarily linked to capitalism is not in doubt but 
Mouffe's unshakable belief iin its contingency is 
presumably the kind of thinking that led Terry Eagleton to 
comment that; "This means, presumably, that it is wholly 
coincidental that all capitalists are not also 
revolutionary socialists. " (Eagleton, p. 215) 
Citizenship and pluralism 
Mouffe wishes to subject the liberal tradition to 
examination in order that she might; 
"... identify the areas where it needs to be 
reformulated, so that the great contribution 
of political liberalism to modern democracy 
can be freed from the individualistic and 
rationalistic premises that have become 
fetters to democracy in its present form. 
The notions of citizenship and community 
have been stripped of much of their content 
by liberal individualism, and we need to 
recover the dimension of active participation 
that they hold in the classical republican 
tradition. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 3) 
Of course, a purely liberal conception would reduce 
citizenship to legal status but the aim here is to defend 
pluralism, as defined by political community, institutions 
and citizenship, without destroying democracy. On the 
contrary, the purpose is to enhance it. To this end the 
idea of citizenship is of central importance because, 
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"A citizen cannot properly be conceived 
independently of her insertion in a 
political community. In order to formulate 
a satisfactory concept of the political 
community, we must go beyond liberal 
individualism to questions of justice, 
equality and community. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 4) 
Thus, the concept of citizenship has to be extended so 
that we are able to go beyond the narrow limits of social 
democracy and embrace the 'new social movements'. A 
defence of pluralism entails a type of social justice that 
can regulate the diversity of demands within the political 
community. Thus, radical democracy seeks to overcome the 
traditional problem with democracy which is that it 
inevitably involves the denial of rights, benefits and 
status etc. to those not classified as citizens, whether 
they be within or without the jurisdiction of the state. 
This is where the idea of community is so important. 
Mouffe finds desirable "... a return to the civic 
republican tradition in order to restore the idea of 
politics as the realm where we can recognize ourselves as 
participants in a community. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 5) 
However, she is careful to avoid retreating into a pre- 
modern notion of the political "... we need to be alert to 
the dangers of nostalgia for the Greek polis and 
Gemeinschaft types of community. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 5) 
Individualism disrupts the constitution of such a 
community; it prevents the formation of the link between 
pluralism, liberalism and democracy which lies at the core 
of radical democracy. 
The essay by Etienne Tassin, Europe: A Political 
Community?, in Dimensions of Radical Democracy approaches 
these questions from the point of view of the possibility 
of the creation of a European identity and the break-up of 
nationalism that would be entailed in creating a truly 
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European political community. I will comment on this 
essay at some length later in the next chapter but it is 
important to raise several points at this stage. There is 
an assumption in all that Mouffe and Tassin and others 
write that Europe and European identity refer to a extant 
entity called Europe that is bound up with the traditions 
of liberalism, democracy and citizenship that they place 
such an emphasis on and wish to deepen and radicalize. 
Does this Europe exist? Ie is an extremely problematic 
aspect of Mouffe's work, not least because the use of the 
term Europe here is shorthand for Western Europe, perhaps 
even the European Union, but certainly not a Europe that 
extends to the Balkans, Carpathians or the Caucasus. The 
democratic tradition that is being referred to is quite 
specific in terms of geography, history, and probably 
ethnicity, although this is not acknowledged by Mouffe and 
her associates. 
This assumed association between Europe and democracy is 
expressed by Mouffe in several ways. There is an 
uncritical acceptance that Europe is the bearer of 
democratic traditions; in talking about civic 
republicanism, one of the two key traditions identified by 
Mouffe that she wishes to build upon (the other being the 
liberal tradition) she mentions that it is a tradition 
which has; 
"almost disappeared today because it has been 
displaced by Liberalism, though it has a long history. It received its full expression in 
the Italian republics at the end of the Middle Ages but its origins go back to Greek and Roman thought. (Mouffe, 1992, p. 226) 
The question of whether Europe has such a unbroken 
democratic lineage will be considered in the following 
chapter, but this quote is indicative of the association 
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between Europe and democracy that Mouffe places great 
emphasis on. The assumption that Europe and democracy are 
intimately linked is also expressed in terms of the 
uniqueness of European development. Mouffe says; 
"The defence of pluralism, the idea of indiv- 
idual liberty, the separation of church and 
state, the development of civil society, all 
these are constitutive of modern democratic 
politics. (Mouffe, 1992, p. 227) 
This type of thinking is part of a larger tradition that 
has sought to view the development of democracy as an 
exclusively Western phenomenon. This tradition, which 
views democracy as the outcome of European history, is 
evident in the above statement. Its representatives 
include Weber, who believed in the uniqueness of the West 
and for whom ideas of individual liberty were bound up 
with a conception of law in which private property was 
protected (in contrast to the despotic East where such law 
was absent); Montesquieu, for whom law, private property, 
and estates (civil society) were Western phenomenon 
(again, in contrast to the despotism of the East; Hegel, 
who saw the West as the realm of history proper, where 
change was possible (any change in the East being a result 
of Western influence); and Marx, who saw class antagonism 
being absent in the East, as opposed to the West where it 
was the motor of historical development. 
It is now necessary to examine the status of pluralism in 
Mouffe's current work. Pluralism can be thought of as the 
recognition of diverse and competing interest groups and 
the distribution of power across a range of centres, 
rather than concentration in few privileged points. 
Mouffe's use of pluralism must be viewed from the 
perspective of its non-essentialist formulation; 
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"Indeed, pluralism can only be formulated 
adequately within a problematic that 
conceives of the social agent not as the 
unitary subject but as the articulation of 
an ensemble of subject positions, constructed 
within specific discourses and always 
precariously and temporarily sutured at the 
intersection of those subject positions. 
This requires abandoning the reductionism and 
essentialism dominant in the liberal 
interpretations of pluralism, and acknowledging 
the contingency and ambiguity of every 
identity, as well as the constitutive character 
of social division and antagonism. " 
(Mouffe, 1992, p. 10)' 
Mouffe makes the point that there are limits to pluralism. 
It does not extend to a "... valorization of all 
differences... ", and "... criteria must exist to decide ti 
between what is admissible and what is not. " (Mouffe, 
1992, p. 13). This is because politics cannot be conceived 
without antagonism and division. In other words, 'us and 
them' exists in relation to conceptions of pluralism too. 
Pluralism involves rights for ethnic and other minorities 
but the notions of tradition and community that are at 
work here äct as barriers to the 'other' no less effective 
than for example, the policies of the Schengen Group who 
act to regulate the international borders of the fifteen 
member states of the European Union. 'Tradition' no less 
than 'community' is a powerful form of social closure. 
In order to look at the usefulness of Mouffe's concept of 
pluralism I will assess the extent to which Mouffe's ideas 
are applicable to the political and social transformations 
within the countries of what was Eastern Europe. In 
particular, what type of European identities can be formed 
under conditions where citizenship, pluralism and liberal 
democratic traditions are largely absent? Mouffe more or 
less answers this question with the following statement; 
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"In the end what is always necessary for a 
democratic society to function is a set of 
institutions and practices which constitute 
the framework of a consensus within which 
pluralism can exist. It is in such a way 
that a modern democratic political community 
should be conceived, as a discursive surface 
of inscription, not an empirical referent. 
Within such a framework there will always 
be competing interpretations of the shared 
principles of equality and liberty and 
therefore different views of citizenship. " 
(Mouffe, 1992, p. 14) 
This is of course a political concept framed within the 
logic of anti-essentialism and hegemony developed in the 
pages of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and is entirely 
consistent with those formulations. The key phrase in the 
above quote is surely, "what is always necessary for a 
democratic society to function. is a set of institutions 
and practices which constitute the framework of a 
consensus within which pluralism can exist. " We must 
conclude that in the absence of these institutions and 
practices, pluralism and hence democracy cannot exist. 
What the above formulation of Mouffe's signally fails to 
address is the question of the role of the state in the 
creation/denial of the type of citizenship that is 
necessary for radical democracy. Any theory of pluralism 
must have a developed notion of the interrelation between 
various social groups, possibilities for citizenship and 
the apparatus of the state. Her work does not take into 
account the presence of democratic traditions, equally 
deeply rooted, which would work to disrupt the creation of 
radical democracy. Nationalism is one such ideology, 
which can take ideological elements like citizenship and 
democracy and articulate them in such a way that 
pluralism, in the way that it is described by Mouffe, will 
not be possible. This in turn leads to the question of 
why radical democracy is better than other kinds of 
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democracy, and more to the point, why citizenship and 
democracy should be articulated in its favour, rather than 
that of, say, nationalism? The basis for and direction of 
political mobilization is not fixed, one might even say it 
is fickle, and there is no reason why radical democracy 
should not lose out to nationalism. This is a position 
compatible with Laclau and Mouffe's 'early period'. It is 
a question of looking at a concrete historical conjuncture 
for the 'democratic resources' that are available to a 
particular democratic struggle. In the Baltic States, ex- 
Yugoslavia or the Central Asian Republics of the former 
Soviet Union for example, we may well find that the 
conditions for democratic expression at the present time 
favours nationalism rather than radical democracy. Magas 
makes the useful point that nationalism in Eastern Europe 
"... takes the form of a political struggle 
for control of the existing local states, 
through which it is possible to command all 
other branches of 'civil society': economy, 
cultural institutions, media and so on. For 
simple acquisition of control over the existing 
state structure is a much more straightforward 
task than breathing new, democratic life into 
it, or creating a new one altogether. " (Magas, 1992) 
This is linked to the problem raised earlier of those 
societies for whom radical democracy is currently a 
structural impossibility. A deepening of democracy 
implies there is a democracy to begin with; many emerging 
democracies simply do not have the traditions, practices 
and institutions (the democratic resources) that provide 
the pre-requisites for radicalization. Of equal 
importance is that the model of democracy advanced by 
Mouffe pays insufficient attention to the influence of the 
economy and the state. Radical democracy must not only 
take account of the political traditions that it seeks to 
radicalize, but the economic and social context within 
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which they operate. 
From Hegemony and Socialist Strategy we know that 
democratic politics, once free from its class 
determinations, depends upon the hegemonic articulation of 
new forms of identification. As such the question of 
democratic political identity is crucial; "... to attempt 
to construct 'citizens'' identities should be one of the 
most important tasks of democratic politics. " (Mouffe, 
1992, p. 225) But as Mouffe, rightly points out there are 
many different varieties of citizenship and the struggle 
over their meaning is an important dimension of democratic 
politics. 
Mouffe holds that a citizenship compatible with the ideals 
of radical democracy requires "... the creation of-a chain 
of equivalence among democratic struggles, and therefore 
the creation of a common political identity among 
democratic subjects. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 235) Chain of 
equivalence is a term that Laclau and Mouffe introduce in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and should be understood 
as the simplification of the social, leading ultimately to 
the creation of two antagonistic camps. Within the logic 
of equivalence elements can be substituted for each other, 
thus permitting the expression of opposition to 
oppression. Mouffe is saying that for a chain of 
equivalence to be created it must be possible to 'see a 
little piece of your own struggle in that of other 
groups'. 
To further explore how the idea of equivalence works in 
practice we can take an example from recent history. The 
situation that recently occurred in the countries of the 
former Eastern bloc, where the dichotomy 'the people 
versus Communism' was briefly created and where every 
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oppositional grouping had at least one thing in common 
with other groups: their anti-communism. 
In the break-up of the Communist regimes diverse social 
and political groups had one overarching theme of common 
identification; opposition to the Communist regime. This 
was true whether they were nationalist or socialist, free- 
marketeers or environmentalists; they could all respond to 
the call for 'democracy'. This-democratic element was 
present in all of their struggles whether reformist, 
socialist, green or capitalist, and in keeping with 
Mouffe's theory their individual identities would have 
been modified as a result of their articulation into a 
chain of anti-Communist equivalence. It is not 
necessarily the case however that this democratic 
commonality can be equated with citizenship. 
More problematically for Mouffe, the phenomenon of the 
polarisation of the social also occurs at times of extreme 
ethnic conflict, for example in the process of nation 
formation and consolidation exemplified by the events in 
break up of the former Yugoslavia where there has been 
polarisation along ethnic lines between Croats and Serbs, 
Serbs and Albanians and Muslims and Serbs and Croats, for 
example. None of these polarisations has been created as 
a result of equivalence, and their existence is not 
connected with a deepening of democracy. 
Conceptions of citizenship 
Mouffe believes that it is necessary to go beyond the 
conceptions of citizenship found in both the liberal and 
the civic republican tradition (neither Rawls nor 
communitarianism are sufficient, she argues), in order to 
create a form of citizenship compatible with radical 
democracy. John Rawls favoured a view of citizenship that 
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prioritized the pursuit of an individually defined good. 
Citizens use their rights to promote their self interest. 
This notion of citizenship does not permit the citizen to 
join with others to pursue common action in view of the 
common good. Rawls thus holds to an instrumental 
community; individuals with previously defined interests 
wish to further those interests. A constitutive 
community, on the other hand, would constitute the very 
identity of the individuals. What Rawls represents in 
other words, is a justification of bourgeois right and the 
primacy of private (legal) ownership as the basis of 
democracy; citizenship equals the right to own property. 
The civic republican tradition is largely pre-modern and 
"... does not acknowledge the novelty of 
modern democracy and the crucial contribution 
of liberalism... a modern democratic political 
community cannot be organized around a single 
substantive idea of the common good. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 227) 
The political community is not compatible with modern 
democracy and liberal pluralism (it limits liberal 
pluralism). Liberalism, on the other hand, 
"... reduced citizenship to a mere legal status, 
setting out the rights that the individual 
holds against the state... Ideas of public- 
mindedness, civic activity and political 
participation in a community of equals are 
alien to most liberal thinkers. " 
(Mouffe, 1992, p. 227) 
As such, there are shortcomings with both the liberal and 
the civic republican conceptions of citizenship. The 
problem then resolves into the incompatibility and 
insufficiency of the two models of democracy, one ancient, 
the other modern. But as a way out of the impasse Mouffe 
refers to the work of Quentin Skinner 
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"... who shows that there is no basic 
incompatibility between the classical 
republican conception of citizenship and 
modern democracy. He finds in several forms 
of republican thought, particularly in 
Machiavelli, a way of conceiving liberty 
which though negative - and therefore 
modern - includes political participation 
and civic virtue. It is negative because 
liberty is conceived as the absence of 
impediments to the realization of our chosen 
ends. But it also asserts that it is only 
as citizens of a 'free state', of a community 
whose members participate actively in the 
government, that such individual liberty can 
be guaranteed... The idea of a common good 
above our private interest is a necessary 
condition for enjoying individual liberty. " 
(Mouffe, 1992, p. 228) 
What this formulation does of course is to introduce an 
understanding of the importance of the state and civil 
society to the idea of citizenship. But Mouffe does not 
really take up the important themes that she introduces by 
mentioning Skinner's work. What her thesis does not 
acknowledge sufficiently is that traditions of citizenship 
cannot be 'reduced to two models of democracy; republican 
and individualistic. Democracy has always been dependant 
upon the outcome of struggles centring on the control of 
various apparatuses of the state, and the legal ownership 
or effective control of the economy. In between these two 
extremes is located civil society, the realm of civic 
freedom, collective action and free association . 
I would criticise Mouffe for reducing democracy to forms 
of citizenship - forms which effectively limit democracy 
to an offshoot of bourgeois liberalism. As we will see 
later, constricting the origins of citizenship and 
democracy to a conflict between communitarianism and 
individualism, and denying the possibility of socialist 
democracy, has implications for Mouffe's understanding of 
the nature of democracy in the countries of Eastern 
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Europe, an understanding 
the development of forms 
the context of struggles 
between economic systems 
societies not just those 
development of bourgeois 
that would be enhanced by placing 
of democracy and civil society in 
between economic systems or 
and the state, in all types of 
that were subjected to the 
rights. 
We must return to Mouffe's main theme and consider the 
type of political community which would allow an 
articulation, as described above, between the rights of 
the individual and the political participation of the 
citizen. In the contemporary world individual freedom is 
valued above all else and has been gained at the expense 
of any notion of 'a common good'. For Mouffe civil 11. 
society has, in modern societies, replaced the rather pre- 
modern communitarianism. However, as I indicated above 
this is only the case if a narrow definition of modern 
societies is accepted. By modern societies Mouffe is 
alluding to those found in Western Europe, as it is 
debatable that the same process occurred in the Eastern 
Europe of the old Communist bloc. From what Mouffe has 
said so far it follows that the growth of individualism 
has resulted in the loss of an ethical dimension to 
politics, sacrificed for an instrumentalist rationality. 
"We do need to re-establish the lost connection between ethics and politics, but this cannot be done by sacrificing the gains of the democratic revolution. We should not accept 
a false dichotomy between individual liberty 
and rights on one side and civic activity and 
political community on the other. Our only 
choice is not one between an aggregate of individuals without common public concern 
and a pre-modern community organized around 
a single substantive idea of the common good. 
Envisaging the modern democratic political 
community outside of this dichotomy is the 
crucial challenge. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 231) 
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One might want to add that all that stops us envisaging 
such a society is the very political tradition that Mouffe 
insists we work within. Equally, it is not difficult to 
reject the 'false dichotomy between liberty and political 
community' if one takes the view that it was introduced by 
Mouffe in the first place. We need, Mouffe tells us, to 
view "... citizenship not as a legal status but as a form 
of identification, a type of political identity: something 
to be constructed, not empirically given. " (Mouffe, 1992, 
p. 231) Although the idea of the 'substantive common good' 
is rejected as being pre-modern, the need for a sense of 
commonality, "an ethico-political bond" is acknowledged. 
"In other words, what we are looking for is 
a way to accommodate the distinctions between 
public and private, morality and politics 
which have been the great contribution of 
liberalism to modern democracy, without 
renouncing the ethical nature of the political 
association. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 231) 
To pursue this idea Mouffe employs terms developed by the 
conservative political theorist Michael Oakeshott; 
universitas (pursuing a common substantive purpose or 
promoting a common interest) and societas (a formal 
relationship defined by rules, not a substantive relation 
in terms of common action). 
"It seems to me that Oakeshott's idea of the 
civil association as societas is adequate to 
define political association under modern 
democratic conditions. Indeed it is a mode 
of human association that recognizes the 
disappearance of a single substantive idea 
of the common good and makes room for 
individual liberty. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 232) 
However it is acknowledged that the bonds of association 
are political ones which have to be constantly negotiated 
and enacted. 
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"This modern form of political community is 
held together is held together not by a 
substantive idea of the common good but by 
a common bond, a public concern. It is 
therefore a community without a definite 
shape or a definite identity and in 
continuous re-enactment. " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 233) 
Thus, the type of civil association defined by societas 
prioritizes the right over the good, but does so in 
accordance with a set of principles (respublica). The 
advantage of this formulation is that societas does not 
relinquish a normative dimension but succeeds in releasing 
the free play of pluralism and individual liberty. The 
political community, the non-instrumental, ethical, civic 
bond has been severed from the substantive common good. 
The relevance of collective will 
It is interesting to compare this formulation with the 
Gramscian notion of 'collective will' that Mouffe utilised 
in the past and subsequently rejected, as it seems to have 
a relevance to the idea of the respublica. In Gramsci's 
work 'collective will' is a common world view which acts 
as the unifying principle that allows a hegemonic class 
and its allies to fuse. As such it is the culmination of 
the self-awareness of a fundamental class and the creation 
of a consensus. As a result of her critique of Gramsci 
'collective will' gave way to 'the people' in the work of 
Laclau and Mouffe. 
Mouffe recognises the conservative bias in Oakeshott's 
work and believes that this stems from the fact that his 
conception of politics lacks a notion of antagonism. The 
following quotations is worth quoting at length as it sums 
up this position and underlines the similarity with 
'collective will'. 
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"What is completely missing in Oakeshott is 
division and antagonism, that is, the aspect 
of the 'enemy'. It is an absence that must 
be remedied if we want to appropriate his 
notion of societas... it is necessary to 
realise that the respublica is the product 
of a given hegemony, the expression of power 
relations, and that it can be challenged. 
Politics is to a great extent about the rules 
of the respublica and its many possible 
interpretations, it is about the constitution 
of the political community... it aims at the 
construction of a 'we' in the context of 
diversity and conflict" (Mouffe, 1992, p. 234) 
To further this conception and underpin it with the non- 
essentialist language of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 
Mouffe reminds us that a political community can never be 
wholly realized as there will always be a 'constitutive 
outside', an exterior to the community that threatens to 
disrupt it but at the same time makes its existence 
possible. In other words, there will always be a 'them' 
by which the category 'us' acquires its meaning. 
Citizenship now can be understood as; 
"... the political identity that is created 
through identification with the respublica... 
it is a common political identity of persons 
who might be engaged in many different 
purposive enterprises and with differing 
conceptions of the good, but who accept 
submission to the rules prescribed by the 
respublica... " (Mouffe, 1992, p. 235). 
Although the language is different, the formulation itself 
is not dissimilar to the notion of 'national-popular' 
created by Gramsci's 'collective will': persons (no 
longer class subjects) bound together by a common 
recognition of a set of (hegemonic) ethico-political 
values. 
Mouffe's radical democratic application of this idea must 
emphasize the social relations which include relations of 
domination which act to block the establishment of liberty 
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and democracy. Thus, a common political identity will be 
forged; that of radical democratic citizens. The 
principles of liberal-democracy have been interpreted in a 
radical democratic way, in a manner which allows for the 
emergence of a multiplicity of subject positions. What is 
not clear however is how social identities become 
political identities, nor why identification as a citizen 
should lead to radical democracy. As I indicated earlier, 
a common political identity is just as likely to result in 
ethnic exclusivity or nationalism as it is in radical 
democracy (see for example the case of the Northern 
Leagues outlined in Chapter 7). Mouffe sums up her 
position in the following way; 
"The creation of political identities as 
radical democratic citizens depends therefore 
on a collective form of identification among 
the democratic demands found in a variety of 
movements: women, workers, black, gay, 
ecological, as well as in several other 'new social movements'. This is a conception 
of citizenship which through a common 
identification with a radical democratic 
interpretation of the principles of liberty 
and equality, aims at constructing a 'we', 
a chain of equivalence among their demands 
so as to articulate them through the principle 
of democratic equivalence. For it is not a 
matter of establishing a mere alliance between 
given interests but of actually modifying the 
very identity of these forces. ' (Mouffe, 1992, p. 236) 
We can see the continuities between this formulation and 
the politics of hegemony. A non-essentialist perspective 
permits the notion of a subject, not as a unitary subject, 
but as "the articulation of an ensemble of subject 
positions" (Mouffe, 1992, p. 237) In the same way 
respublica, societas and political community should be 
understood discursive surfaces, not empirical referents 
and the outcomes of political struggle can never be 
assumed in advance. The above formulation is in essence a 
-169- 
non-essentialist version of 'collective will', which 
although rejected as too deterministic by Mouffe some time 
ago, continues to inform her thinking. It is possible 
that the idea has not outlived its usefulness as it would 
at least have the advantage of enabling her to explain why 
political identities become nationalist rather than 
radical democratic in character. 
Conclusions ' 
Mouffe's work on democratic politics in Dimensions of 
Radical Democracy is a significant contribution to 
important debates on contemporary European politics and 
the politics of identity. However, the notion of Europe 
that exists in Mouffe's work stems from a heavy reliance 
on the twin (and mutually implicated) traditions'of 
European identity and Western democracy. 
In all of this the term democracy is key, because of its 
implication in the political project of hegemony. As I 
have indicated above the meaning of this term is not fixed 
or given and the particularity of its use in Mouffe's work 
must be examined. It should not be forgotten that 
democracy, and indeed liberalism, citizenship, community 
and all of Mouffe's other key terms, are contested 
terrain. 
If the emphasis is placed, as I suggest that it should be, 
on democracy in its concrete forms, an important question 
arises; how applicable are her ideas to the 'emerging 
democracies' of Eastern Europe? Do these countries share 
the democratic traditions on which Mouffe places so much 
emphasis? Mouffe acknowledges the important role of 
institutions and practices in order that democracy is able 
to function and prosper. What happens however, in the 
absence of these? 
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It is my contention that the answer to these questions is 
'no'; 'radical democracy' is applicable only to Western 
Europe. Mouffe's contention that radical democracy 
entails a 'deepening of democracy' needs particular 
scrutiny as the situation in the former Communist Eastern 
Europe would seem to exclude this possibility. This is 
the problem of closure alluded to earlier in this chapter. 
If liberal democratic traditions are expressive of 
'Europe', then European identity is only possible to those 
on the inside this identityrboundary. On this model the 
boundaries of Europe are coincidental with the existence 
of such traditions. The important question then becomes, 
what is the future for democracy in situations where a 
deepening is not possible? N 
Another term foregrounded by Mouffe is that of pluralism 
which, in the language of post-Marxism, allows for 
contingent, ambiguous subject positions and the 
constitutive character of social division and antagonism 
and recognises the diversity of demands produced by, 
amongst others, new social movements. Thus pluralism is 
privileged above citizenship. Citizenship implies a 
political community, but also denial of full democracy, in 
as much as there will always be a group of non-citizens to 
whom these rights are denied. 
What Mouffe seeks is a type of (modern) political 
community that would link liberalism, pluralism and 
democracy but encounters problems inasmuch that democracy, 
as conceived here in its liberal variant, is implicated 
with tradition, and tradition and pluralism work against 
each other. Pluralism extends rights (deepens democracy) 
while tradition (community, nationalism, ethnicity) seeks 
to bound and exclude. In other words, certain aspects of 
the democratic tradition that Mouffe is working with - 
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community, citizenship - lead to closure, and subvert the 
pluralistic aspects of that same democratic tradition. 
The main limitations of Mouffe's approach are; 
i) when Mouffe talks of democracy she is referring to 
democratic ideas. Democratic practices and institutions 
do not feature large and the role of the state is 
undertheorised. Social identity is forged as much by the 
state and the economy as it' is by democratic ideals and 
notions of citizenship. By only talking of democracy in 
abstraction Mouffe is unable to address the issue of 
democratic resources. A society will construct its 
democratic debates out of the raw material that is readily 
available; nationalism, Islam etc. It would be 
interesting to be able to investigate the nature and 
extent of democratic resources are present in the former 
Yugoslavia for example, in relation to this question. 
ii) democratic traditions can subvert 'radical democracy'. 
For example, nationalism can articulate notions of 
citizenship and community to produce an ideology that is 
not compatible with radical democracy. The fact is that 
the construction of chains of equivalence and the 
simplification of the social does not necessarily lead to 
a deepening of democracy. 
Another of Mouffe's central concerns is identifying the 
form of citizenship that is compatible with radical 
democracy. Mouffe artificially limits the field by 
claiming that the choice is between the liberal, property 
owning option and the communitarian, civic republican 
form. The problem can only be resolved if we look at the 
relationship of citizenship and democracy to the state and 
civil society. This enables us to conceive of democracy 
in a less Eurocentric way. The development of democracy 
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should be seen in the context of the struggle between 
social groups, the state and the economy. 
It is significant that Mouffe aligns herself with 
Oakeshott's societas as the best idea of the modern 
political community; bonds of association are political 
and have to be constantly negotiated, not unlike Renan's 
idea of the nation as a daily plebiscite. On this model 
'right' is privileged over common good in a way that 
allows for the full development of pluralism and the 
growth of a political community. What is not 
satisfactorily explained is the basis on which the 
political community is formed, the bond which creates what 
Gramsci would have called 'a collective will'. This is 
linked to the problem mentioned earlier - why should this 
form the basis for radical democracy rather than, say, 
nationalism. 
Mouffe stresses the need to constitute the political 
community through the construction of a 'we' in the 
context of disunity and conflict. Again we find parallels 
with the formation of the type of closure exemplified by 
nationalism, this time it is in the context of the role of 
the constitutive outside to form the exterior, the threat 
of disruption that makes identity possible. This is the 
realm of nationalism par excellence, what is not yet 
proven is the ability of radical democracy to forge other, 




THE QUESTION OF EUROPE 
-174- 
Chantal Mouffe, in her essay Democratic Citizenship and 
the Political Community, conceives of Europe as a 
political community that knows itself through traditions 
of democracy and citizenship. In order to understand more 
fully the way that this notion of Europe is constructed I 
will look at the essay Europe: A Political Community? by 
Etienne Tassin, included in Mouffe's volume Dimensions of 
Radical Democracy. Tassin's piece is instructive as it 
provides us with a detailed formulation of the idea of 
Europe which is consistent kith Mouffe's views. Moreover, 
Tassin develops Mouffe's theme of the need for a break in 
the link between citizenship and membership of a nation. 
The essay by Tassin deals with two main issues; (i) the 
conditions that would permit the creation of a European 
identity, and (ii) the conditions for creating a truly 
European political community (and the concomitant break-up 
of nationalism that would be entailed by this). In his 
discussion of these issues Tassin reveals an assumption 
that also underpins the work of Mouffe, namely that Europe 
is the bearer of traditions of liberalism, democracy and 
citizenship of which 'radical democracy' is the 
culmination. 
Do these traditions exist, and if so, are they European? 
There is no doubt that there are commonalities of history, 
culture and tradition shared by many European countries; 
feudal ancestry, linguistic roots, and liberal democracy, 
for example. But these only constitute common traditions 
at the most general level. The whole enterprise of 
identifying traditions that are peculiar to Europe and 
which provide a sense of shared history is problematic. 
As has been mentioned previously tradition acts as a form 
of closure, and forms the basis for an 'us and them' 
dichotomy. If Europe is equated with liberal democracy 
and citizenship then an absence of these traditions leads 
-175- 
to non-Europe. This is a problematic area because 
membership or non-membership of a European community is 
then dependent on shared history, rather than shared 
values and common aspirations. 
This is a concern because Mouffe and Tassin's concept of 
Europe is more applicable to Western Europe (perhaps even 
the European Union), but certainly not a Europe that 
extends from the Atlantic to the Balkans, the Carpathians 
or the Caucasus. The democratic traditions that are being 
alluded to are quite historically specific, and lead to a 
narrow conception of Europe, one which is exclusive rather 
than inclusive. However, this exclusivity is also part of 
the project. As Mouffe herself says of radical democracy; 
"What kind of political identity does it require?... what 
kind of political identity can contribute to the 
construction of the 'we' of radical democratic forces? " 
(Mouffe, p. 3) This search for a 'we' to which the project 
of radical democracy can apply is interwoven with this 
exclusive idea of Europe. 
One of the main problems with this approach to delineating 
Europe in terms of common democratic traditions is that 
its exclusivity can undermine the democratic and 
pluralistic project itself. For example, pluralism may 
extend democratic rights to ethnic and other minorities 
but the ideas of tradition and community which work to 
create this notion of Europe can also act as barriers to 
the 'other'. This is no less effective than the processes 
within the European Union that have led to 'Fortress 
Europe', a term that refers to the enforcement of tight 
controls on immigration and refugees imposed at the 
external borders of the European Union. Tradition, no 
less than community, is a powerful form of social closure. 
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Before examining Tassin's argument in detail it is 
necessary to consider the question of 'what is Europe? ', 
and address the problems of definition that are likely to 
be encountered when talking about Europe. The first 
problem to deal with is the conflation of terms such as 
Western Europe and the European Union with Europe itself. 
This is explained by one commentator in the following way: 
"Because the European Community emerged as the core 
regional organization, there is a tendency to regard the 
Community as synonymous with Western Europe and even with 
Europe as a whole. " (Laffan, p. 2) 
Defining Europe is very difficult. For example, 
geographically it may be possible to delineate: it extdnds 
from the Atlantic to the Urals and the Arctic Circle to 
the Mediterranean, but Europe cannot be understood purely 
as a geographical region. It is, and always has been, a 
political construct and as such the boundaries are a lot 
more elusive. The political boundaries to the east and 
south are not established by consensus, rather they are 
the product of on-going political debate; is Russia in 
Europe?, is Turkey? If the answer to these questions is 
'yes', what are the implications for Asia of extending 
Europe's borders further eastward? Does this not tend to 
displace Asia as a central historical and political region 
in its own right? The political boundaries of Europe are 
permanently in the process of being made and remade 
according to political and economic exigencies. 
So even in current political terms it is very difficult to 
give a satisfactory definition of Europe. This difficulty 
is summed up by Wallace who says that, "'Europe' is a 
geographical expression with political significance and 
immense symbolic weight, but without clear definition or 
agreed boundaries. " (Wallace, p. 7) To illustrate this it 
is useful to consider the case of Russia and ask the 
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question 'is Russia in Europe? ' Just a few years ago the 
consensus would have been that the countries in the Soviet 
sphere of influence in Eastern Europe would have been in 
Europe, but that the Soviet Union as a whole was 
geographically, politically and culturally beyond Europe 
(although historically speaking certain regions within the 
Soviet empire could be considered as European). Now 
however, with the break up of the Soviet Union it is more 
likely that the Ukraine and the Baltic states, say, can be 
considered as part of Europa, even if Russia is still 
beyond Europe's borders in our mental maps. 
It is also pertinent that these countries themselves feel 
more a part of Europe at the present time, thus the 1 
subjective dimension to the question of 'what is Europe? ' 
has to be acknowledged. 
"From time to time it appears that the Western 
appeal has faded, but then new Westernizers 
appear, reviving the fundamental paradox of 
the, Russian psyche, which is to be European 
by Asian standards and Asiatic by European 
standards... Russians will never be unequiv- 
ocally Asian or unequivocally European... a 
firmly rooted tradition has held that they 
have gained something by not being completely 
European. " (Konrad. p. 88) 
This view would also hold good for Turkey. It has to be 
acknowledged that countries such as Russia and Turkey have 
never been entirely European or Asian and continue to 
adopt this Janus like position in the contemporary 
context. This should be viewed as a positive attribute; 
who better to advise other Europeans on relationships with 
Asian countries than those countries who themselves have 
an Asian orientation? 
What we consider to constitute Europe today - and debates 
concerning its borders - will be different from what 
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constituted Europe at other times throughout history. 
This is true both in terms of politics and geography. 
Two thousand years ago the question, 'what is Europe? ' 
could not have been posed in the same terms. Europe as a 
geographical region did not have a meaning at a time when 
the Mediterranean would have been the focus of a political 
economic system taking in portions of present-day Europe, 
Asia and North Africa. "The Roman world was a 
Mediterranean world rather than a European world, in which 
Asia minor and North Africa, 'as well as parts of Europe, 
were integrated. " (Barraclough, p. 160) The idea that 
Scandinavia or Poland belonged to the same region would 
have had no meaning. 
It is not possible to talk of a unified European history 
over two millennia if only because of the domination of 
the Mediterranean as a regional economic system for much 
of this time (there are also other reasons for arguing 
against a unified and unbroken history centring around 
debates on. culture and religion for example, which will be 
dealt with later in this chapter). 
"Many consider that one can speak of European 
history as such from about 800, when the 
centre of historical development was shifted 
northwards to Europe by the Arab conquests, 
which robbed Graeco-Roman civilization of a 
southern swathe stretchinfi from Syria through 
North Africa to Hispania. (Szucs, p. 291) 
If the Mediterranean is again accorded the centrality that 
it would have enjoyed in Antiquity Europe, as we 
understand it today, would be no more that a sub-system of 
this at best, or in a more extreme view, a mere appendage 
of Western Asia or the Eastern Mediterranean. Another 
issue associated with defining Europe is the question of 
the internal division of Europe along East - West lines, 
and whether this is simply a product of the Cold War. We 
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also need to examine the continuing relevance of this 
terminology following the events of 1989. 
The 'return to Europe' 
We might begin by addressing why, in the aftermath of the 
fall of the Soviet bloc, politicians in the former 
communist bloc spoke of a 'return to Europe'. Vaclav 
Havel announced that he was determined to lead 
Czechoslovakia 'back to Europe'. I take this to mean that 
he was drawing a qualitative distinction between Western 
and Eastern Europe, and inferring that during the past 40 
years or so the Eastern portion of Europe had somehow been 
less European, or deprived of its European identity as; a 
result of the dominance of the Soviet empire. This 
accords with Kundera's view that Czechoslovakia and other 
countries in Central Europe had been 'kidnapped' by the 
East. 
There is no doubt that this East/West distinction has been 
a major division since the end of WWII and to a large 
extent the division is still a valid one, as the legacy of 
those years is still influential. However, it must be 
recognised that the division of Europe into East and West, 
symbolised by the Iron Curtain, was a political division 
arising out of Yalta, one of the consequences of which was 
to erase Central Europe from the political map of Europe. 
In acknowledging the existence of Central Europe as a 
region distinct from Eastern Europe we are participating 
in the 'long revolution against Yalta', as Ferenc Feher 
describes it. "Yalta created a geopolitical entity 
'Eastern Europe', which as a polity or a community had 
never before existed. " (Feher, P. 20) 
A consequence of asserting the existence of Central Europe 
is the renewed emphasis on the closeness of the historical 
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links between Western and Central Europe. Agnes Heller 
argues that Central Europe forms a zone of transition 
between East and West, and provides a middle route between 
western individualism and eastern collectivism. It is 
also a region that has stood between the state absolutism 
of the east and the autonomous civil society of the west; 
the autocracy of the east and the parliamentary 
democracies of the west. It is noticeable that the 
politicians of Central Europe in making such claims wish 
to break the links with thee East by asserting their 
Western credentials. 
"Central Europe is... a lost or broken-off part 
of Western Europe, struggling to regain its 
proper home. This is what is meant by the 
return to Europe... In the recoil from 'Eastern 
Europe', the most eloquent and enthusiastic 
partisans of the Central European idea have 
come to insist ever more strongly that Central 
Europe is essentially a part of Western Europe. 
Its incorporation in Eastern Europe... has been 
a grotesque and tragic error. Properly viewed 
it is at the eastern edge of Western Europe. 
As such, its true role is as the defender of 
western culture against the barbarism of the 
east. " (Kumar, p. 449) 
Such a view holds that Russian communism has succeeded 
Ottoman militarism in inheriting the mantle of oriental 
despotism, and further south in Serbia the issue of 
'Europeaness' is couched in even more familiar terms; that 
they are a bulwark against muslim fundamentalism 
encroaching from the east (they are European because they 
are not Muslim) Here claims to be European are justified 
by assuming the status of defenders of the faith' and by 
pointing out the weaker claims to 'Europeaness' of those 
standing further behind. This argument is summarised by 
Wallace in the following way. 
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"Each claimant to full European participation 
attempts to draw the boundaries of Europe 
around and behind it; to include all the 
countries of the Western tradition, of 
Catholicism and the Enlightenment, for 
Austria, Hungary and Poland; of the broader 
Christian tradition, for the southern republics 
of Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Russia; 
of the secularising and modernising tradition, 
for Turkey... Each group of claimants except 
Turkey and Russia, it should be noted, is as 
concerned to exclude those beyond it as to 
include themselves within the community of 
Europe: Hungarians,, Czechs and Poles to shut 
out Russia; Serbs and Bulgarians to emphasize 
their distinctiveness from their Islamic 
neighbours; Israel to stress the divide between 
'Judaeo-Christian civilization' and Islam. " 
(Wallace, pp. 18-19) 
The anxiety of Central Europe to be considered part of, 
Western Europe is due, in no small part, to the hegemony 
of the West over the rest of Europe. 
"If Europe is not just the west, if there are 
other traditions that go into its making, 
then Central Europe may not feel so constrained 
to follow the single and rather narrow path of 'westernization'. It can acknowledge the 
various strands and influences that make up 
the European mosaic. " (Kumar, pp. 453-454) 
Kumar also makes the important point that if Central 
Europe as part of Eastern Europe was an artificial 
creation then Central Europe as part of western Europe 
would be equally artificial. 
In writing about Europe in the post 1989 period it is 
still valid, from the point of view of the continuing 
legacy of the divide, to talk of Western and Eastern 
Europe. It is also legitimate to assert the existence of 
Central Europe as a distinct geo-political entity. 
However, the division of Europe into Western and Eastern 
portions is not entirely satisfactory for the following 
reasons. Firstly, this division is (and always was) too 
-182- 
simplistic. Europe, even during the period 1945 - 1989, 
was never split entirely along these Cold War lines. 
Several European countries have a tradition of neutrality 
or independence (Switzerland, Austria, Turkey, and the 
Republic of Ireland, in their different ways, have tended 
to remain largely outside this dichotomy). Secondly, 
concentration on an East - West split tends to displace 
the equally important North - South divide (the idea that 
the northern countries tend to be wealthier than their 
southern neighbours), which is a more compelling division. 
Thirdly, dividing Europe according to the West - East 
principle gives the false impression that the two blocs 
were unified or homogeneous. It masks the fact that the 
Communist Eastern bloc was replete with political 
divisions, and the countries of Western Europe had no 
common organising principle, save for their common (and US 
led) antipathy to communism. 
The idea of common European traditions 
Tassin's essay Europe: A Political Community? begins by 
questioning the type of political community that is at 
stake in the development of the European Community (EC) 
(now known as the European Union (EU)) towards a Single 
Market, and to what extent the EC can in fact be 
considered a political community when it is so obviously 
aimed at rationalizing the capitalist system of production 
and exchange. 
"In this regard, we have to ask to what extent 
Europe can be something other than a market, 
whether common or single. To what kind of 
community can Europe lay claim? ... What are the cultural and historical foundations of 
Europe? " (Tassin, p. 170) 
Tassin has raised two very important issues. Firstly, in 
the period of rapid change and great instability resulting 
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from the fall of the Communist bloc, there is a distinct 
danger that the EU will become hegemonic, not just amongst 
its traditional constituency of western European nations, 
but also in the developing markets of eastern and east- 
central Europe. It is already clear that the EU is in a 
position to dictate the terms of trade with the countries 
of eastern Europe and make economic and other aid 
conditional on the institution of a market orientated 
legal and economic infrastructure. For example, the PHARE 
project (Poland and Hungary'Assistance for Economic 
Restructuring Programme) was not designed to give 
assistance to the Polish and Hungarian economies as a 
whole, but rather the private sector in particular. When 
other Eastern European countries put in bids for PHAREsaid 
it was made clear that they had to be committed to 
"... economic liberalization with a view to introducing 
market economies. " (Commission of the European Communities 
communication 1/2/90). 
As such the likelihood is that the idea of Europe 
engendered by market values (the common market) will 
extend to all regions of Europe, east and west. But 
Tassin realises that the unity of Europe (if such a thing 
is ever possible) must exist at another, more profound 
level if Europe is ever to become a true political 
community. Hence his concern to identify the cultural and 
historical foundations of Europe which could provide 
alternative loci around which a modern political community 
could be united. 
However, it is by no means certain that such foundations 
exist, and if they do whether they can in fact provide the 
basis for future European stability. There is, I 
acknowledge, widespread support for the view that the 
principle of European unity inheres in common history and 
ancestry but in opposition to this position I believe that 
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only a principle of political unity grounded in a common 
European political agenda for the future - which addresses 
the needs and aspirations of all European peoples - is 
capable of acting as a principle of unification. 
It is possible to share the concern that in the near 
future (if not already) the notion of the common market 
will be the most compelling theme of European unity, and 
at the same time have major reservations regarding 
attempts to fuse an alternative European unity out of 
shared notions of culture and tradition. The ideas of a 
shared culture and common traditions are powerful unitary 
themes, not especially when considering European identity, 
but more generally as components of nationalist 
, 
ideologies, or in constituting ethnic identity. In fact, 
whilst they may be suitable raw material for the 
construction of national identity they would actively 
hamper efforts to build a democratic political community 
of the kind envisaged by Mouffe in which the importance of 
active citizenship, minority representation and deep 
democracy are paramount. Concerns over the suitability of 
shared culture and common traditions, as outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter, arise from the fact that 
they are exclusive and self-selecting, leading to the 
formation of closure, hierarchical communities and 
marginalisation. In other words, that they will increase 
divisions within Europe along nationalist or ethnic lines, 
which is in fact what seems to be happening in large 
portions of the former Soviet bloc. 
The argument put forward in this chapter is that political 
unity in Europe is by no means guaranteed but is only 
possible through an identification with a series of common 
concerns and political issues thrown up by the 
contemporary situation in Europe; in other words, it is 
more about the future than the past. However, it is 
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essential to explore in more depth the contrary view; the 
question of whether the organising principle of European 
political unity can be found in the archaeology of common 
historical traditions. In order to do this is is necessary 
to follow the line of Tassin's argument. 
The Single European Act, ratified in February 1986, seeks 
to create a form of European union, primarily of an 
economic, free-market nature, within the framework of the 
EU. This economic union, and the creation of a single 
market, has evolved independently of political union, 
which was identified as the ultimate goal by the Paris 
Summit in 1972, but has been perpetually postponed as a 
result of its dependence on other, largely economic 
concerns. Tassin argues that the, 
".. goal of political union has been developing 
independently of the tradition of cultural 
unity which initially brought it forth... it 
is clear that the idea of Europe has denoted, 
and continues to denote, a common tradition 
of thought and culture rooted in that constant 
interchange over two millennia which has given 
this part of the world a certain unity of the 
mind. ' (Tassin, p. 171) 
It is necessary to dispute this idea of Europe as a 
cultural community, with an unbroken historical lineage. 
Tassin notes the post-War division of Europe into East and 
West, dividing Europe according to its democratic 
principle (democratic or socialist), as the crucial event 
that ruptured the unity of Europe as a cultural entity 
(which presumes of course, that prior to this rupture a 
unified, cultural entity did exist). This leads him to 
the observation that when we talk of Europe we must not 
forget Eastern Europe; "If there is to be a political 
community, presumably it should be rooted in a common 
experience and a tradition of thought and history that 
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reside equally in all the peoples of Europe. " (Tassin, 
p. 171) One can agree with Tassin on at least one aspect 
of this issue: the importance of bridging the East - West 
divide to forge a common outlook. But how does this fit 
with for instance, what Tassin calls common cultural 
experiences and traditions that are shared by all the 
peoples of Europe? And more pertinently, what experiences 
and traditions of democracy are shared by the people of 
Europe? 
I 
Tassin's reasoning is that, "In short, political Europe 
saw the light of day as the Europe of the mind was 
collapsing. " (Tassin, p. 172) This is a reference to both 
the formation of the EU ('political Europe'), and the ti 
crisis in thought dating from around the end of the Second 
World War that so afflicted Western intellectuals. 
Western Europe was shaken by the depradations of Nazism 
and Stalinism, and existentialism, structuralism and the 
like undermined the rationalist, essentialist, 
metaphysical subject. Tassin is quite right in asserting 
that "a convergence of economic interests cannot alone 
make a political community" (Tassin, p172), but posing the 
idea of 'a Europe of the mind', especially when this 
refers to a notion that is said to derive from the Greeks 
("... the Greek city as the birthplace of the European 
mind... " (Tassin, p. 173)) as an antedote is equally 
problematic. Tassin is looking to 
"... a common life which sustains itself not 
just on interests and cultural references 
but also, and above all, on a real postulated identity: real, through being woven into a 
history that is also a history of the mind; 
and postulated, since this never consummated 
identity is constantly changing as it projects 
a horizon of principles or values on which 
the community maintains itself without ever 
exhausting it. " (Tassin, p. 172-173) 
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This is a particularly striking passage, written in a 
style heavy in the language and imagery of Laclau and 
Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, which expounds 
the ideas of non-fixity of identity that are fundamental 
to the politics of anti-essentialism. It is also a 
reiteration of her position, that the key to European 
unity is to be found in the past, the mind that 'raised 
humanity to a new level of reflexive consciousness and 
which was identified with humanity as a whole' (Patocka, 
quoted by Tassin, p. 171). 
Tassin makes the observation that the idea of modern (ie. 
post-war) Europe was founded not on a philosophical 
foundation (' a Europe of the mind') but instead on the 
political experience of resistance to Nazism; the EU is 
the culmination of a process set in motion by resistance 
to Nazism during the Second World War, and the result of a 
political will born out of that experience. "The idea of 
a federal Europe, of a union of European peoples, was 
grounded upon the resistance to Nazi and then Stalinist 
totalitarianism. " (Tassin, p. 183) Tassin makes strong 
claims for this position. 
"The Declaration of European Resistance 
Movements (July 1944), drawn up at secret 
meetings by representatives from nine European 
countries, proclaimed the 'necessity of 
rebuilding Europe on a federal basis'. This 
presupposed that 'the various countries of 
the world agree to go beyond the dogma of 
absolute state sovereignty and integrate 
themselves into a federal organization"' (Tassin, p. 182) 
It should be noted that the EU is not a federal 
organisation, although in recent years it has showed signs 
of moving closer to becoming one. 
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The idea that the EU was created as a response to 
totalitarianism and forged by the same political will and 
strength of purpose which characterised the war-time 
resistance movements (which in any case were mainly 
Communist led) is pure romanticism. The genesis of the EU 
is far more prosaic; a US led, post-war rebuilding 
exercise that was undoubtedly infused with a certain 
amount of idealism, but more importantly necessitated by 
the economic demands of the post-war crisis and spurred on 
by the perceived threat of the economic and political 
might of the Soviet Union. But it is interesting that 
Tassin highlights the federalist origins of the idea of 
the EU, which I believe strengthens the case for being 
more closely associated with the United States. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the Western powers were 
worried that portions of Western Europe would fall under 
Soviet control under the conditions of depravation and 
social unrest of the time, and looked for a way to bind 
Western Europe together (safety in numbers), and harness 
the industrial capacity of Germany in a way that would 
benefit a large part of Europe, particularly those 
countries such as France, and the Low countries who had 
suffered greatly from occupation. 
At the end of WWII it was the intention of the US to 
establish a system of international management based on a 
multilateral system of free trade. The IMF, World Bank 
and GATT provided the global institutions for the post-war 
capitalist economic system. Fear of communism led the US 
to conclude a series of multilateral defence arrangements, 
a 'Pax Americana', with states throughout the world, but 
the 'drive for growth' was the prime concern in the 
European sphere. According to Ellwood (1992) the United 
States identified the following political and economic 
goals for Europe; 
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- economic unification 
-a federation on the US model 
- the re-development of Germany 
- creation of a market large enough to justify modern 
methods of cheap production for mass consumption 
- political resistance to Soviet expansionism 
The over-emphasis of the role of the resistance in forging 
Europe in the post-war period tends to detract from the 
rest of Tassin's argument. 'It is therefore necessary to 
return to her attempts to construct a line of reasoning 
to account for the claims to 'an unbroken line of 
intellectual heritage stretching back to the Greeks'. 
The idea of European history 
Tassin states that, "The political concept of Europe has a 
long history. " (Tassin, p. 178) For a unifying principle 
of this history he relies on Christianity, whose religious 
bonds replaced the juridical bonds of the Roman empire. 
This then is what he means when he talks of the 'history 
of Europe that goes back two thousand years'. This is a 
difficult argument to sustain however, and is what Samir 
Amin would describe as the product of a Eurocentric 
vision; 'Western' history as a progression from Ancient 
Greece and Rome, via feudal Christian Europe to capitalist 
Europe. This is perhaps one of the most problematic 
themes in Tassin's essay and it is necessary to take issue 
with many of these ideas, especially the claim that the 
political concept of Europe has a long history, and that 
Europe was united by Christendom. 
Firstly, the idea that European history has an unbroken 
lineage going back two millennia is an example of what 
Hall (in another context) refers to as the construction of 
"... an unbroken continuity towards pure, mythical time. " 
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(Hall, 1992) European history cannot, contrary to 
Tassin's claims, demonstrate such linearity. The reason 
for this is that knowledge of Greek culture and democracy 
was lost in the Middle Ages until it was revitalised by 
medieval Islamic and Jewish scholars who inspired the 
rebirth of Christian scholasticism in the West. 
"In the West, semi-barbaric until the eleventh 
century and, for this reason, incapable of 
assimilating Hellenistic and Eastern Christian 
scholasticism (which disappeared as a result 
of Islamization)... Hellenistic thought was thus 
discovered by the West through the mediation of 
the Islamic metaphysical construct. It is only 
later, with the exile of the Greeks of 
Constantinople to Rome after their city's fall 
in 1453, that the West begins to learn that 
Hellenistic thought was preceded by that of 
Classical Greece, whose very existence was 
unknown until that time. " (Amin, p. 54) 
In other words, the line connecting Classical Greek 
thought to modern European philosophy was ruptured in the 
Middle Ages and not reconstructed for several centuries. 
Secondly, the conflation of Christendom with Europe is 
deeply problematic, not least because Christianity 
originated in Asia: "Christianity, by which Europe defines 
itself, is like Hellenism and Islam, Oriental in origin. " 
(Amin, p. 100) However, this is not to deny that the 
identification of Christendom with Europe is a recurring 
and persuasive image in the literature. Hay acknowledges 
as much, "... Christendom was virtually interchangeable 
with Europe for all of the sixteenth century and much of 
the seventeenth" (Hay, p. 115), and perhaps this historical 
context helps to explain the deeply rooted nature of the 
belief. What is often effaced in the commonly held view 
that Europe is synonymous with Christianity is that 
Christianity had a very long history in other regions of 
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the world prior to becoming (slowly) established in 
Europe. 
"The places that really mattered in the early 
Christian centuries were not in Europe at all, 
but were cities like Alexandria and Carthage 
in Africa, or Nicaea and Cappadocia in Asia 
Minor... " (Barraclough, quoted in Kumar, p. 456) 
Tassin's strategy in this interpretation of Christianity - 
annexed arbitrarily to Europe - is to provide himself 
with the most important underlying explanation for the 
maintenance of European cultural unity. This view fails 
to account not only for Christianity's extra-European 
origins but also for the very long period it took for 
Europe to become Christian. As Hay explains "... the 
spreading of Christianity was uneven ... it radiated out 
from its east Mediterranean birthplace, covering the 
Hellenistic east and Romanized North Africa and Europe" 
(Hay, p. 27), and it had little scope for proselytisation 
beyond the boundaries of the Roman Empire in this period. 
The diffusion of Christianity further north was even 
slower - Germany and Scandinavia did not become totally 
Christian until ClOth or later: 
"... the conversion of Scandinavia was not 
accomplished until the eleventh or twelfth 
centuries... Even as late as the thirteenth 
century large areas of northern Europe were 
overtly pagan and in the Wendish areas of 
Northern Germany and Pomeramia it was 
settlement by Germans which made Christianity 
something more than a superficial conversion. " (Hay, p. 19) 
It would also possible to construct a plausible argument 
to support the view that Europe never became fully 
Christian. The following reasons are central to this 
argument. Stated briefly: (i) other religious groups have 
always been strongly represented, and have played an 
important part in the history of the continent, 
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particularly the Jews and Muslims. The role of medieval 
Jewish and Muslim scholasticism has already been 
mentioned. (ii) religion as a fundamental organising 
agent of social life declined strongly from the fifteenth 
century onwards.; the rise of scientism, the demise of 
feudal and absolutist regimes (and their concomitant 
cosmologies), and the related social and political changes 
spreading through Europe at this time. (iii) Christianity 
was always subject to schism and internal conflict. The 
disunity within the Christian world - the Orthodox and 
Catholic churches, not to mention the ruptures caused by 
the rise of Protestantism - can hardly constitute one 
seamless, harmonious religious movement. 
Thirdly, the role of Ancient Greece is pivotal in this 
construction of European ancestry, the origins of 'Europe 
of the mind'. On Tassin's model Greece's location in the 
Orient is effaced in order to annex Hellenism to Europe. 
The myth of Greek ancestory maintains the idea that Greek 
heritage predisposed Europe to rationality, and enabled it 
to 'raise humanity to new levels' in Patocka's memorable 
phrase (quoted above, p. 188), while the rest of the world 
was condemned to superstition and irrationality. 
Barraclough supports the view that the identification of 
Greece and Europe is a disputed one by raising the 
"... problem [of] whether ancient civilization 
should be termed 'European' at all... there are 
reasons for questioning such an identification. 
Greek history, in its Hellenistic phase, had 
seen a fusion of Greece with the Orient; 
civilization became Hellenistic Oriental 
instead of Hellenistic and western. " (Barraclough, p. 160) 
In addition, Tassin signally fails to acknowledge is the 
influence of Egypt on Greece. Martin Bernal in his book 
Black Athena (Bernal, 1987) attempts to redresses this 
balance and informs us that it was the Egyptians who were 
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the first to introduce the concept of eternal life and 
immanent moral justice - which opened the way for humanist 
universalism (universal morality; rewards and punishments) 
- the basis of Christian morality. 
Tassin's search for a contemporary European identity via 
history, tradition, culture and religion is compromised by 
the fragmented nature of these histories, cultures and 
religions that one discovers on closer inspection, and any 
project to build a European identity out of a common 
heritage in this way is deeply flawed. There are two 
reasons for this. Firstly, Europe does not need a long 
shared history to forge a common identity: our history 
starts now, and our common identity (or more 
realistically, compatible different identities) can better 
be forged out of shared aims and objectives and a common 
vision of the future. 
Secondly, it is clear that Christianity cannot achieve 
this goal.. Furthermore, there must be no religious 
barrier to an identification with Europe, or the 
assumption of European identity. This holds true both for 
religious minorities dispersed throughout Europe and for 
the claims of non-Christian countries (Bosnia, Turkey) to 
be European. 
Citizenship and the nation-state 
Tassin has sympathy with the view that totalitarianism, as 
exemplified by Nazism and Stalinism, was an expression of 
the dogma of absolute state sovereignty, and that the 
nation-state is inevitably totalitarian. Support for this 
assertion comes from de Rougement, "The nation-state was 
one of Europe's creations and must inevitably, by its 
inner logic become totalitarian. " (de Rougement, quoted by 
Tassin, p. 183) On this argument Europe cannot become a 
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community until the nation-state has ceased to be the 
primary unit of sovereignty. What is needed to break the 
hegemony of the nation-state is a federation based on 
regions not states, 
"... because only the region, in reproducing 
the human scale of the ancient Greek cities, 
offered a community framework favourable to 
the exercise of genuine citizenship within 
elective rather than natural or native, 
communities. " (Tassin, p. 184S 
This argument is significant for three reasons. Firstly, 
the political community to be constructed again has its 
blueprint in the past (ancient Greek cities) showing once 
again Tassin's reliance on both the mythical lineage of 
European history and the deployment of tradition and 
history as the*key to European unity. Secondly, the 
conflation of the nation-state with the totalitarian state 
is problematic. There are many examples of nation-states 
that are not totalitarian. Nor can it be accepted that 
Nazism and Stalinism, as political doctrines, had 
anything more than a few superficial similarities. 
Thirdly, Europe as a federation of regions, necessitating 
the displacement of the nation-state as the primary 
political unit is a valid political objective which does 
not have to be arrived at via points one and two. 
Tassin continues thus; Europe needs human communities not 
defined, as the nation is, by "... frontiers, physical 
contours or civil status, but rather in terms of social, 
cultural or spiritual goals... " (Tassin, p. 184), an 
elective, not natural entity whose basis rests upon the 
principle of chosen citizenship. Tassin poses an active 
citizenship, one that is rendered obsolete by the size and 
complexity of the modern state. The basic political unit 
has to be redefined, Europe has to be built from the 
'bottom up' in order to redistribute the state, and the 
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region must be acknowledged as the 'true socio-economic 
unit of present day Europe'. 
It is not clear however how this community actually 
differs from the nation, the political community par 
excellence. Rather than a 'natural entity' as Tassin 
would have it the nation is a purely political construct, 
which may employ rhetorical ethnic or religious 
justifications for its existence, but in actuality there 
is no sociological justification for the 'nation', either 
as a concept, or in any of its historical manifestations. 
The central theme of Tassin's argument is that the nation- 
state is not a suitable political framework within which 
to build 'the new Europe' or create a more democratic type 
of citizenship. It is true that both the EU as a supra- 
national entity and individual nations carry with them 
limitations as far as democracy is concerned. However, it 
is a large step to move from this position to the 
statement fade by Tassin that, "the failure of the 
immediate post-war attempt to build Europe should be 
attributed to the fact that Europe was to be unified on 
the basis of nation-states. " (Tassin, p. 186) 
For one thing post-war Europe was divided not simply along 
national lines but also to a certain extent into 
ideological blocs. This was not simply a result of the 
Yalta carve-up but also a direct product of the US-led 
rebuilding process after 1945. Central to this project 
was an emphasis on the importance of the integrity of 
nation-states as a bulwark against perceived threats of 
Soviet expansionism. Thus, contrary to Tassin's belief 
that the choice was between competing nation-states or a 
new supra-national state - unionist versus federalist - it 
is possible to argue that the range of choices was 
perceived by European governments as much more restricted; 
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integral nation-states or the possibility of a Soviet 
take-over. By such ideological means was the survival of 
the Western European nation-state ensured. 
In his concluding section Tassin continues the theme that 
a European community cannot be based on the conception of 
the state, or the general, national will. What is needed 
is a public space, which will produce a community of a 
plurality of political initiatives. 
"The political institutions cutting across 
states actually mark out a public space which 
does not have to express a supposedly common 
identity or will. Far from being created by a 
general will and becoming its expression, they 
give birth to a public space of plural 
judgements, decisions and actions in which 
not only states or ad hoc commissions but all 
citizens, by virtue of common citizenship, 
are called upon to participate. " (Tassin, pp. 188-9) 
What this conception lacks is what Mouffe would term the 
'constitutive outside'. Mouffe has made it clear in 
Dimensions of Radical Democracy that a political community 
can only be established through the constitution of a 'we' 
in the context of diversity and conflict. Who threatens 
to disrupt the political community of Europe envisaged by 
Tassin and what is its exterior that makes its existence 
possible? 
The answer to this of course lies in Tassin's construction 
of Europe; if Europe has a shared history, a common 
culture and other principles of unity then there must also 
exist non-Europe, those who do not share this history or 
these traditions. Tassin's novel move is to deny the 
importance of the arbitrary and mythical political 
community of the nation while promoting the importance of 
the equally arbitrary and mythical community of Europe. 
The following passage is worth quoting at length. 
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"The republican (nation-state) principle of 
citizenship is based on a deliberate conflation 
of general will and national will or, in other 
words, on an amalgamation of nationality and 
citizenship. The prospect of a Europe of 
fellow-citizens is shattering this dogma of 
nation-states. It requires citizenship to 
be broken away from nationality. The right 
of foreign residents (including non-Europeans) 
to vote in local elections is, for example, 
an essential and obligatory step in the 
formulation of this new community citizenship. 
It indicates that participation in the life of 
public institutions takes precedence over 
nationality; that, whatever the citizen's 
cultural or national identity, his or her 
insertion in public political space is 
elective and not 'native'; that it derives 
from a political choice and not from birth (natio) or an identity passed on by history; 
that the idea of a European fatherland has to 
be replaced by that of a public space of 
disparate communities. " (Tassin, p. 189) 
But what are the nature of the communities that are 
envisaged here? Tassin's vision contains a contradiction; 
the type of communities that he sees as being the 
foundation of 'the new Europe' have their basis in the 
dual notion of a Europe freed from the nation-state, and a 
Europe created out of a sense of shared history and 
culture. However, it is by no means certain that in the 
absence of the nation-state the resulting political 
communities would be united around the area of common 
(non-national) citizenship. In the Europe of nation- 
states nationality itself has never been the only, or even 
the strongest collective identity. It could be argued 
that the strongest, most enduring collectivities are 
regional in nature, often ethnic in complexion, which have 
coexisted with, or have been denied full expression by 
nations for centuries. Present day Europe is witnessing 
the renewed assertion of these regional identities, both 
within the framework of the European Union and the break- 
up of the Soviet sphere of influence. 
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Catalans in Spain have maintained their regional identity 
in adversity over a long period of time to the extent that 
for many it rivals their Spanish identity. Serb and Croat 
ethnic identities have not been diminished but enhanced by 
their experience of seventy or so years of Yugoslavia's 
existence. Likewise, Flemish and Walloon identity in 
Belgium is still distinct despite the longevity of the 
Belgian state and stand ready to resume their independent 
existence should the European Community move further 
towards embracing the ideaseof a federal Europe of 
regions. It must be stressed that this move to regional 
autonomy was already in progress, in a 'bottom-up' 
fashion, before receiving the official sanction or 
encouragement of the European Union in the form of a mgve 
to federalism within the framework of an increased supra- 
national role for the Community; 
"... there are unmistakable and synergetic 
trends to both greater regional self- 
government and greater European Union. Belgium 
may break up into two self-governing regional 
mini-states before long and Italy seems headed 
in the same direction... the political bonds between the regions and the future European 
union will be as important as those between 
the EC and the existing nation states at 
present. " (Palmer, 1992) 
This rise of regionalism has corresponded to a decline in 
big-state nationalism and internationalism. Globalism - 
the growth of a single world market - has led not to 
uniformity, but a proliferation of ethno-social cultures. 
In Europe there does appear to be a decline in the 
fortunes of the nation-state, under attack from both below 
and above. Alter views the rise of regionalism in the 
following way. Nationalism is often conceptualised as 
being tied to economic development and modernization 
(Gellner is the exemplar of this position). This era, he 
argues, is now at an end and the nation is not such an 
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important vehicle for collective identity. What emerges 
with the break-down of big-state nationalism are regional 
tensions, periphery versus centre for example, which were 
previously over-ridden by the unifying political power of 
the nation-state. 
"Like the idea of European unity, regionalism 
seems to signal the end of the age of 
homogeneous and independent nation-states. 
On the one hand, nation-states have come under 
external pressure to delegate some major areas 
of economic and socio-political responsibility 
to over-arching supra-national institutions 
such as the EC; on the other, they have run 
up against demands at home for the decentral- 
ization of political and economic power. " (Alter, p. 136) 
Within the boundaries of every nation-state there exists 
economic disadvantage and unequal distribution of wealth. 
Economic heterogeneity and cultural and linguistic 
disparity make these regional tensions manifest. "The 
breading ground for regionalism in centralist nation- 
states is. provided by the continuing presence of both 
economic heterogeneity and cultural and linguistic 
disparity. " (Alter, p. 136) This is underpinned by the 
uneven development of the economy - which Alter terms 
'internal colonialism' - which disadvantages peripheral 
groups and may generate tensions between the centre and 
the margins. Social underprivilege gives a decisive boost 
to regionalist tendencies. So as we have seen the 
prevalent view is that, 
"... authority is being decentered from 
previous national states, simultaneously 
upwards to Euro-institutions and downwards 
to this range of new and more local powers. " (Nairn, p. 31) 
However, there is no reason to suppose that communities 
based on regions would be less exclusionary, less 'native' 
than nation-states. In fact, it is more likely the case 
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that identities based more rigorously on ethnic, 
linguistic or religious criteria would be more so. There 
is the case of the break-up of the Soviet Union where new 
political identities in the Baltic Sates, for example have 
been =created out of the widespread opposition to the 
previous political regime not in terms of citizenship, but 
in terms of local and regional identities where ethnicity 
has replaced citizenship as the dominant identity, and 
where public space for the non-dominant groups and respect 
for disparate communities has proved to be strictly 
limited. One development has been to tie citizenship to 
ethnicity in such a way as to discriminate against the 
minority (formerly politically dominant) Russian 
population. 1 
Tassin seems not to recognise the efficacy of other, non- 
national forms of political identity. He acknowledges 
that the new kind of European political community that he 
advocates will involve the break down of nation-states but 
fails to take into account that the supra-national 
community which he advocates can only be created by 
relying on the same kinds of myths and legends that are 
typically used to create, what Benedict Anderson would 
call the 'imagined community' of the nation. It is 
difficult to see how this will result in 'a new type of 
political community'. Once again we are witnessing the 
invention of tradition, with Mouffe it is the tradition of 
democracy, with Tassin it is the common experience of 
Europeans. Stuart Hall, writing about nationalism said; 
"It has been the main function of national 
cultures... to represent what is in fact the 
ethnic hotch-potch of modern nationality as 
the primordial unit of 'one people'; and their invented traditions to project the ruptures 
and conquests, which are their real history, backwards in an apparently seamless and 
unbroken continuity towards pure, mythic 
time" (Hall, 1992, p. 6), 
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and his ideas are equally relevant in the context of 
Tassin's version of Europe. 
Tassin's claim that the region is the prime socio-economic 
unit of present-day Europe, or at least is moving in this 
direction, is supported by other commentators. However, 
the nation-state is far from dead. Indeed the same period 
that has witnessed the growth of regionalism has seen a 
revitalisation of the nationalist phenomenon, particularly 
in the republics of the former Soviet Union. What we are 
not witnessing is the emergence of a 'community of 
plurality' or a 'Euro-space' so desired by Tassin. There 
has been a growth in the importance of the region as a 
socio-economic unit from within the boundaries of former 
nation-states (Czechoslovakia, Spain, Yugoslavia, for 
example), but not the development of the region across 
national boundaries. 
The move towards regionalism in Western Europe has been 
very much pne of nations splitting into component regions. 
This process is facilitated by the revitalised supra- 
national agency of the European Union. As such, this 
development is one that is occurring under the aegis of 
the same regional organisation that promoted the nation- 
state as an effective bulwark against Communism. The 
rhetoric of the inviolability of the borders of the nation 
may have given way to a sympathy with regional units but 
the economic imperatives of the European Union towards its 
members have not changed to any large degree. It is 
rather a case of economic re-organization and an evolving 
strategy for achieving economic objectives rather than the 
genesis of a new form of European community. 
The argument advanced in this chapter in opposition to 
Tassin is that the unifying principle for European unity 
cannot be found in Europe's history or a search for a 
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shared past, common customs and traditions. As an 
alternative to the search for a European community rooted 
in the past it would be more appropriate to argue for a 
Europe that is based on shared political and social 
objectives which will form the basis for a future 
community. Before outlining this approach in detail there 
are two further points that need to be made regarding 
Tassin's thesis. 
There is of course already ä strong cluster of principles 
at work in present day Europe that will also most probably 
serve to unify Europe to a greater degree in the future. 
This cluster of principles is economic in orientation and 
revolves around the development of capitalistic relatidns 
of production and exchange on a massive scale throughout 
the Eastern portion of Europe. With the fall of the 
Communist bloc the West has already begun to expand 
eastwards and influence the outcome of the emergent 
democratic and market reforms. Support for the 
increasingly autocratic but pro-Western and pro-market 
Yeltsin in Russia is one example, the radical free market 
"... shock therapy of... the Balcerowcz plan in Poland 
[which] would allow Western firms to move into East 
European markets with generous tax breaks and the ability 
to repatriate profits", (Glenny, p. 240) is another. The 
outcome of this process is likely to be a greater degree 
of economic unity in Europe than at any time since the 
second World War. 
The second point to be raised is the question of the 
extent to which it is possible to delineate Europe as a 
geographical region. Whether Europe is defined in terms 
of economic orientation, history, culture or religion 
there are many other regions of the world that share these 
attributes to a greater or lesser extent. One only has to 
think of the relatively common mix of ethnicity, 
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intertwined cultures, and interdependent economies of 
Europe, North America and Australasia to see that a notion 
of Europe as a distinct and unique region is flawed. 
Critics of the idea of an expanded Europe extended to the 
Balkans and beyond might argue that Europe was 'closer' to 
the United Sates than to Turkey, Albania and the Ukraine. 
These points must be borne in mind when addressing the 
question, 'what is Europe? ' In order to formulate a 
satisfactory answer the following must be considered. 
(i) Europe is a political construct. Its boundaries are 
never fixed but such boundaries that it does have are not 
to be conceptualised in geographical terms that can be 
represented by lines on a map. It has to be acknowledged 
that the boundary between Europe and Asia for example, is 
neither clearly defined nor agreed by consensus. It is 
rather to be understood as existing in a state of flux, 
its boundaries shifting according to political 
imperatives, "Europe is present everywhere and yet 
invisible; the circumference is everywhere and the centre 
nowhere. " (Petrie, p. 1) 
(ii) The idea of Europe is subjective. Where or who you 
are will have a bearing on your conceptualisation of 
Europe. Being European means different things to 
different countries, and even within national boundaries 
different groups (ethnic, political, gendered etc) will 
have different perceptions. The uneven nature of this 
subjective element of identity can be summarised as 
follows; 
"... becoming European is a process of endless 
becomings and divisions;... it is a process 
marked by a multitude of histories of uneven 
development, defined by difference and by 
quite difficult instability at both the 
personal and the collective level... " 
(Caughie, p35) 
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(iii) The meaning of Europe is not to be found in the 
past. Europe cannot be defined solely by a shared history 
and common traditions which act as a unifying principle. 
Tassin's model relies too heavily on history. It is the 
product of the invention of tradition, especially the myth 
of Christian consanguinity. It is a solipsistic, 
idealised and romanticised history which is at odds with a 
professed postmodern political analysis. More importantly 
Europe also consists in its future and the common 
political and social goals that can create a true 
'European community'. 
(iv) European identity does not depend on ethnicity. 
Europe cannot be defined in terms of dominant ethnicities. 
There is a need to go beyond nationalist and ethnic 
perspectives and challenge the 'tragic popularity' of 
ideas about the integrity and purity of the ethnic nation. 
This holds true both in the case of Germany where ethnic 
Germans have prior rights to citizenship over guest 
workers, as well as ex-Yugoslavia which has disintegrated 
along ethnic lines. 
(v) Europe cannot be defined in the language of the 
nation-state. It must be acknowledged that "... neither 
political or economic structures of domination are still 
simply coextensive with national borders. " (Gilroy, p. 7) 
As such, adherence to political nationalism hinders the 
construction of a European identity. While this is true 
the regionalist impulses that have been identified in 
recent years have not disturbed the overall domination of 
the nation-state. Nor are they always a progressive 
force; the Northern Leagues in Italy are an example of a 
reactionary regionalist movement. 
(vi) Europe has an international context. It is 
impossible to study Europe in isolation from the 
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international economic and political networks in which it 
is inserted This has the following consequences. 
Firstly, an assertion that in the contemporary world 
characterised by a global economy the full nature of 
Europe's inter-relationships with the rest of the world 
can not be over-emphasised. Secondly, Europe's history of 
colonialism must not be forgotten. The inter-related 
nature of the contemporary world is in part a result of 
this legacy. 
f 
(vii) The European Union. Europe must not be seen as 
synonymous with the European Union, or Western Europe etc. 
However, the hegemonic position of the Union must be 
acknowledged in order to understand the relationship of 
the Union with other European countries. 
What Europe is however is still not easy to define. 
Europe is a political construct and as such will always 
mean different things at different times to different 
peoples. For this reason it is not profitable to view 
Europe as a nascent community. It is more productive to 
view Europe as a network of overlapping and compatible 
identities, none of which are dominant. This once again 
draws our attention to the distance between the Laclau and 
Mouffe of the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy period, and 
the 'later' (Phronesis) period. Laclau and Mouffe's 
'early' work was very much concerned with the question of 
the construction of identity. They would not hold to a 
view of identity which privileges exclusion, boundary and 
history - all markers of 'community' - to conceptualise 
contemporary Europe. Europe, like 'society', is better 
conceived of as an open and contingent space rather than a 
'sutured totality'. Laclau and Mouffe's notion of an 
overdetermined field of difference without any one simple 
underlying principle of unification could apply equally to 
Europe as to 'society'. 
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CHAPTER 7 
POLITICAL IDENTITY AND THE NATION STATE 
-207- 
Introduction 
At first sight the complex political nature of post- 
Communist Europe leads us to identify the following 
paradox: nationalism can be said to be on the rise in what 
was Eastern Europe (particularly in the Baltic states and 
the Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union), 
while at the same time being in decline in Western Europe 
(the growth of regionalism and supra-nationalism in the 
form of European Union federalism, for example). An 
examination of this apparent paradox forms one of the main 
themes of this chapter. The European nation-state has 
undergone many changes since WWII. The general trends can 
be summarised in the following way; 
- the European nation-state is the product of C19th 
politics. The history of the European nation-state, in 
particular the legacy of C19th and C20th nationalism and 
nation-building in Europe, is profoundly important in 
understanding the present condition of nationalism and the 
nation-state. The political project of modern nation 
building, creating sovereign national units out of 
disparate ethnic raw material, has been a signal failure. 
Italy and Yugoslavia represent this failure most fully but 
most, if not all, European nations have arbitrary 
boundaries and a heterogeneous ethnic base (the one often 
being a product of the other). We are now witnessing the 
end point of this trend towards the 'inclusive' nation, or 
'civic nation as Ignatieff describes it: 
"... civic nationalism, maintains that the 
nation should be composed of all those 
- regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity - who subscribe to the 
nation s political creed. This nationalism is called civic because it envisages the 
nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing 
citizens... " (Ignatieff, p. 3) 
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The evidence of recent European history suggests that the 
creation of a democratic state populated by citizens, 
irrespective of ethnicity, is no longer considered a 
viable nationalist project. 
- the internal coherence of the nation-state has been 
weakened by the rise of particularisms, partly as a result 
of globalisation (which has rendered the political 
projects of the C19th period irrelevant in a world 
dominated by global markets and multi-national 
enterprises), and partly a product of the recent emphasis 
on the 'other' internal to the nation-state (immigrants 
and ethnic minorities, for example) rather than the 
'other' expressed in terms of an outside threat. These 
factors have also contributed to the rise of regionalism 
and ethnic particularism. 
- linked to this is the fall of Communism, whose threat 
provided the nation-states of Western Europe with their 
raison d'exre. So strong was this perceived threat that 
it was felt necessary to create various supra-national 
organisations (culminating in the European Union) in 
addition to forging strong nation-states. The end of the 
Cold War and the demise of the Yalta division of Europe 
that followed, facilitated the emergence of the phenomena 
variously known as 'regionalism', 'particular 
nationalism', 'separatism', or 'ethnic nationalism' in 
both East and West. The demise of the Yalta-created 
Eastern bloc/Western bloc mentality has brought about two 
major changes by removing the 'necessity of nationalism' 
from the European political field. Firstly, it has aided 
and consolidated expressions of nationalism from within 
the Soviet Union fuelled by the perceived exploitation by 
the Russian Empire. Secondly, it has acted to encourage a 
proliferation of sub-national regional identities 
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coinciding with the development of the supra-national 
European Union (EU) in the West. 
The importance of the ideology of nationalism and the role 
of the nation-state as a bulwark against Communism in 
Western Europe immediately after the second World War 
cannot be underestimated. Roughly speaking this period of 
nation strengthening in Western Europe corresponded to the 
spread of nationalist ideologies, 'nativization' and 
ethnic revitalization in non-Russian regions of the Soviet 
Union (although it has to be acknowledged that this 
process had been in progress since 1917). 
- the creation of the European Union has further 
undermined the rationale for the nation-state both by 
binding nations closer in economic and social union and by 
taking on many of the roles formerly undertaken by the 
state at national level. The role of the state and the 
changing relationship between the state and civil society 
throughout Europe consequent upon these changes has made 
possible forms of political organisation which would not 
previously have been possible or not have been tolerated. 
This is true of both East and West. The rise of the 
Northern Leagues in Italy are one example, the 
nationalist-protest movements in the Central Asian 
Republics are another. These changes have also 
contributed to the success of nationalist movements 
couched in ethnic terms. 
The role of the state (as an instrument of coercion and 
consent) in forging the nation has to be acknowledged. In 
several cases a strong state actually held nations 
together, Yugoslavia for example, which otherwise would 
not have survived. In general it is true to say that the 
state serves two prime functions with regard to 
maintenance of the nation; it exercises power or coercion 
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to maintain the integrity of the physical boundaries of 
the nation, and it also has an active role in reproducing 
the ideology of nationalism through which the nation 
coheres. To illustrate these points it will be useful to 
look briefly at the examples of Yugoslavia and Italy. 
Yugoslavia existed for around seventy years because of a 
strong centralised (Communist) state which under Tito was 
dependent on a balance of power and influence between the 
various Republics. These Republics retained a large 
degree of autonomy and their ethnic complexion was an 
integral part of that balance. Yugoslavia was a nation 
which was never composed of Yugoslavs, its federal nature 
and ethnic heterogeneity, coupled with its short history 
did not lend itself to the production of a Yugoslav 
identity. The case of Italy is similar. After the 
unification of Italy Massimo D'Azeglio (Prime Minister in 
the 1850s) said "Italy is made, now it is necessary to 
make the Italians. " (quoted in Miglio, p. 24). The north- 
south division within the country, an enduring feature of 
Italian political history, could bring about its 
dissolution in the near future. 
- the economy has always played an important role in the 
fortunes of the nation-state. In many ways - including 
its primary function (sovereign administrative control 
over a bounded territory), and also post-war 
reconstruction and the impulse to separatism in 
contemporary Europe - the existence of the nation-state 
has always been economically conditioned. In order to 
explain the role of the economic in the break up of the 
nation-state in contemporary Europe it is instructive to 
look at the ideas of writers such as Alter and Hechter 
with their theories of internal colonialism and regional 
tensions within the nation-state, Suny who demonstrates 
that Russian imperialism created a centre/periphery 
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hierarchy in the Soviet Union, and Gellner who posits that 
social inequalities can form the core of separatist 
ideologies. 
- ethnic identity is becoming the sine qua non of 
collective identity (ethnic identity is constitutive of 
particularism). This feature of contemporary Europe is 
present in both East and West. The disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and Italy has proceeded along ethnic lines. 
The nationalism associated with C19th nation building, 
called 'civic' nationalism by Ignatieff, or Risorgimento 
nationalism, as Alter would term it, has been replaced by 
'ethnic nationalism'. In order to contextualise this it 
is important to remember that the process of ethnic 
identity formation (under which I would subsume regional 
identity) has been facilitated by the failure of the 
traditional nation building project. 
This view of the construction of ethnicity is opposed to 
the 'sleeping beauty' approach to explaining the rise of 
ethnic antagonisms. The latter holds that the reason 
Yugoslavia fractured along ethnic lines was that the 
conflicts between for example, the Serbs and the Croats 
unresolved at the end of the second World War, were merely 
suppressed or frozen under the Communism regime and 
resurfaced undiminished after forty years. The same 
explanation would be used to explain the ethnic 
polarisation in, say, Georgia. However, I believe that 
this explanation is inadequate. Ethnicity is not 
primordial or pre-given; ethnicity is constructed in much 
the same way as nationalism. The ethnicities that have 
played such an important role in re-shaping Europe have 
been formed in the process of the failure of the nation- 
state. They are contemporary phenomena, no doubt drawing 
on the 'myth-symbol complex' (Smith, 1986) of previous 
ethnic communities, but activated and articulated in 
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response to particular contemporary problems. Nationalism 
is a very flexible political ideology. It never appears 
in a 'pure' form as it is always wedded to other political 
ideologies, and in this sense should be understood as a 
political resource capable of being mobilised to a variety 
of political ends. 
Consequent upon these changes has been a change in the 
role of the political project of nation-building. 
Nationalism is no longer concerned with the creation of 
nation-states on the C19th model but the creation of other 
collectivities, in particular the region and the ethnic 
nation, which are both significantly different from their 
C19th ancestor. Such transformations have not resulted in 
a diminution of the importance of nationalism, merely a 
redefinition of its "objectives. At the same time there 
has been a valorisation of ethnicity as a 
cultural/national marker; a move from an elective to an 
ascriptive identity. Ethnic nationalism is exclusive, for 
example in ex-Yugoslavia where ethnicity has become 
polarised änd one must be either a Serb, a Croat or a 
Muslim and where mixed or dual identities are not 
possible. C19th nationalism on the other hand, was more 
inclusive (in theory at least) and membership of a nation, 
conceived in terms of citizenship, was not solely based on 
ethnicity, although most nations were constructed around a 
dominant ethnicity. 
Rather than conceive of the changing face of nationalism 
as being the result of. separate and distinct processes in 
Eastern and Western Europe, I wish to develop the idea 
that the same general processes with regard to nationalism 
and nation-states, have been at work in both halves of 
Europe throughout the twentieth century, even during the 
period of heightened division between East and West 
arising from the formation and consolidation of the 
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Communist bloc. I believe that the phenomena alluded to 
in the above 'paradox' are actually part of the same 
overall process. The nationalist fragmentation of the 
former Soviet bloc and the rise of regionalism in the West 
are processes that share many common features. 
The creation of national identity relies on processes of 
identification that are required to form any collective 
identity. As such nationalism becomes associated with 
diverse movements, which may or may not have anything in 
common. What do contemporary Kurdish nationalism, Basque 
separatism, Latvian ethnic revitalization or Czech 
Republicanism have in common, which allows them all to be 
subsumed under the heading 'nationalism'? 
What justifies the continued use of such a generalised 
term in all these cases is that all social movements 
formed on the basis of large-scale collective identities 
mobilise through the medium of nationalism; their 
objectives. may be different but the language, symbolism 
and imagery are that of nationalism. As Sami Zubaida says 
"It should be emphasised that this idea of the 
conception or imagination of the nation does 
not necessarily entail political commitment 
to this entity: pan-Arab, pan-Islamic as well 
as narrow ethnic commitments are clearly 
beyond that of the nation state, but the 
conception of the nation becomes the field 
and the model in terms of which to think of 
these other commitments and loyalties. " (Zubaida, 1993, pp. 148-149) 
Nationalism (mainly in the form derived from its C19th 
manifestations) is the archetypal collective political 
identity. 
To return again to the paradox alluded to in the opening 
paragraph - that nationalism in Europe is simultaneously 
-214- 
on the rise and in decline - not only is this not the case 
for the reasons outlined above, but it can be also shown 
to be a false paradox once it is understood that there is 
a major distinction to be made between nationalism as a 
set of beliefs (Smith's 'myth-symbol complex') on the one 
hand, and as a political project leading to the 
construction of viable democratic nation-states on the 
other. In other words, it is quite possible to talk of 
the success of nationalism as an ideology, its power to 
mobilise and inspire people towards a common goal, while 
at the same time to conclude that the idea of the nation- 
state as a democratic political project is currently under 
threat. 
5 
It is clear from this introduction that there is a need to 
clearly define the usage of terms such as nationalism, 
nation-state, ideology, and regionalism, especially so as 
they are used differently by various commentators in the 
literature on the subject. 
Nationalism. The ideology of nation-building consisting 
of a set of beliefs, symbols and associations expressing 
identification with a given (national) community. 
Nationalism can take many forms and varies in its concrete 
manifestations. Alter makes the point that, 
"nationalism does not exist as such, but a 
multitude of manifestations of nationalism do. 
In other words, it is more appropriate to 
speak of nationalisms in the plural than of 
nationalism in the singular. " (Alter, p. 5) 
Ideology. The use of the term ideology in relation to 
nationalism generally refers to a set of ideas espousing 
the primacy of the nation. However, in the context of a 
study of the work of Laclau and Mouffe a more rigorous 
formulation is required. Rather than employing a 
(Althusserian) Marxist concept of ideology (a practice 
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producing subjects) which would be dissonant with post- 
Marxism, I favour the definition advanced by Barrett; 
"discursive and significatory mechanisms that may occlude, 
legitimate, naturalise or universalise in a variety of 
different ways but can all be said to mystify. " (Barrett, 
p. 167) 
Nation-state. A state, characteristic of the modern 
world, in which a government has sovereignty over a 
delineated territory, where the inhabitants are citizens 
and know themselves to be members of that (national) 
community. 
Regionalism. The ideology that prioritizes the regions 
over other units of socio-political organisation, for 
example the nation. 
Ethnic group. A body of people marked off by common 
descent, language, culture and traditions. Ethnicity is 
wholly constructed: it works to divide peoples into 
different collectivities. 
There is one issue on which all writers on nationalism are 
in agreement. All nationalist ideologies share a common 
problem: the designation of the national unit and its 
boundaries in terms of territory, ethnicity, culture and 
language. A nation may contain diverse ethnic/linguistic 
groups, and the territory they occupy may vary over time. 
Nationalism must justify its claim on territory and 
emphasize the ethnic, cultural and linguistic community of 
the nation. It must forge homogeneity from disparate 
social groups or explain why heterogeneity can be 
overridden, by religion for example. As such a 
constructed unity is of more fundamental importance than 
natural unity. It has to delineate itself by drawing 
distinctions from and maintaining borders against other 
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nationalities via ethnicity, territory or culture. 
However, as we shall see later the real question for 
theorists of nationalism is whether they consider the 
nationalist project to be the territorial assertion of a 
state sponsored ideology or the creation of the idea of 
'national belonging' in the minds of the populace. 
Nationalist ideologies have to specify a national essence 
which underlies and guarantees the unity of the nation. 
For this nation to have a plausible existence and 
boundaries in the present, its essence has to be 
demonstrated in its history. This is equally true of 
ethnic and regional mobilisations; the justification for 
the exclusivity of the nation, ethnic group or region ' 
includes the positing of an underlying historical essence. 
The delineation of 'us' from 'them' gains its legitimacy 
from having its origins in antiquity. 
To better explore contemporary formulations of collective 
identity in Europe it will be useful to review various 
theories of nationalism and assess what they can 
contribute to an understanding of the present situation. 
I have selected the following writers for this purpose. 
Ernest Gellner, whose ideas on nationalism as outlined in 
Thought and Change, (Gellner, 1964) and Nations and 
Nationalism (Gellner, 1986) are often thought of as being 
linked to theories of modernisation and economic 
development in a rather functionalist way. However, his 
contribution to the debate on the origins of nations and 
nationalism deserves re-examination in the light of the 
changes in Eastern Europe, and indeed he has recently 
written on this topic. 
Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities (Anderson, 1983) 
demonstrates how the modern nation superseded pre-modern 
dynastic realms and religious communities and how mass 
-217- 
culture - particularly through print - enabled people to 
imagine a community of citizens belonging within a 
delineated territory. Both Anderson and Gellner are 
examples of what Anthony Smith would call 'modernists'. 
That is they conceive of the nation as being totally 
distinct from the communities that came before them in 
terms of principles of legitimacy and economic and 
political systems. While acknowledging the merits of this 
position Smith, in his works The Ethnic Origins of Nations 
(Smith, 1986) and National Identity (Smith, 1991), favours 
the view that nations developed from the ethnic 
communities that preceded them. 
All three of these writers provide accounts of the rise of 
nationalism in the C18th and C19th. As they were written 
for the most part in the 1980s they are not able to 
examine the challenges to the nationalist project 
witnessed over the past few years, nor do they deal 
directly with the rise in importance of regionalism or 
ethnic nationalism. However, this is not to say that they 
are unable to provide us with insights into recent 
developments. As I will show later they offer much that 
is of use in attempting an analysis of post-89 nationalism 
and regionalism. 
The work of Hroch and Suny is more directly related to the 
changing political and social situation in the former 
Eastern bloc. Hroch provides a general schema of nation- 
building that is particularly pertinent to the emerging 
'ethnic nations' of Eastern Europe, while Suny outlines 
the 'creation of nations' thesis which accounts for the 
rise of nationalism in the non-Russian regions of the 
former Soviet Union. 
The rise of regionalism in Western Europe has implications 
for nationalism and the nation-state. The example of the 
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Italian Northern League (Lega Nord) will be employed to 
demonstrate the contemporary importance of ethnicity and 
ethnic revitalisation, and their articulation with 
traditional nationalist themes. The contribution of 
Laclau and Mouffe to an understanding of the construction 
of collective identities will also be assessed in 
connection with this analysis of the rise of the Northern 
League. Their work on the construction of political 
identities is particularly relevant to the rise of ethnic 
nationalism and regionalism'in the post-89 world. 
Nationalism and modernity 
Ernest Gellner's work on nationalism is characterised by 
the idea that the creation of nations is inexorably linked 
to modernisation and economic development. He outlines 
his theory of nationalism in Nations and Nationalism, 
(Gellner, 1986) which is a fuller development of the 
position outlined in his much earlier work Thought and 
, 
Change (Gellner, 1964) 
Gellner provides us with an account of the economic 
processes that give rise to the cultural conditions that 
underscore nationalism and the nation-state. At it 
simplest level his account describes an economic drive 
toward the production of the necessary social, political 
and cultural phenomena which complement and, at the same 
time consolidate that drive. In other words, the road to 
nationalism is economically driven but requires continuous 
loops of cultural feedback in order to be self-sustaining. 
However, the economic conditions that determine this 
process are not generated from within; pre-national 
societies are overtaken by a 'tidal wave' of 
modernisation, on a global scale; 
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"... as the wave of industrialisation and modern- 
isation moves outwards, it disrupts the previous 
political units. These are generally small and 
intimate (village, tribe, feudal unit), or large 
but loose and ill-centralised... It disrupts them 
both directly and by undermining the faiths and 
practices which sustained them. This by itself 
would already lead to the formation of political 
units. But, more specifically, the wave creates 
acute cleavages of interest between sets of people 
hit by it at differing times - in other words the 
more and the less advanced. " (Gellner, 1964, p. 171) 
Thus, for Gellner nationalism is a product of modernity. 
There is a common socio-historical context that underlies 
the spread of nationalism; this context is that of 
modernisation and industrialisation. The process works as 
follows; traditional societies are hit by modernisation 
(most commonly in the form of industrialisation) which 
results in a breakdown of traditional social life (of 
village, kin or religious fraternity, for example), 
particular social groups (the intelligentsia, proletariat 
or peasants) engage in a fight against tradition, 
oppositional groups within their society, or external 
enemies such as colonialists, and in doing so become 
nationalists. 
Gellner allows that nationalist movements are very varied 
and the social composition of nationalist groups varies 
enormously too. It is possible to tie nationalism to the 
aspirations of any social group (the intelligentsia, 
workers, bureaucrats), and this is what is referred to 
when we talk of nationalism as a political resource, 
although it is true that the intelligentsia (an imprecise 
term admittedly) are often involved. 
One major problem with this formulation is the emphasis on 
modernisation as a unitary, homogenous phenomenon. 
Gellner does not acknowledge that modernisation consists 
of a variety of processes, for example education and mass 
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communication, in addition to industrialisation and 
capitalist development. He also neglects the differential 
rates at which these processes penetrate societies, their 
uneven effects on different sectors, and their variable 
distribution across societies. In other words, 
modernisation is too general a concept with which to 
adequately theorise such diverse processes. Likewise 
industrialisation means different things in different 
contexts. Consider for example the process of 
industrialisation in Eastern Europe and its development in 
the absence of capitalist economic relations. 
Gellner's account is rather functionalist and the economic 
dynamic at the heart of his industrialising process 
remains under-theorised. He posits a modernizing dynamic 
of industrialisation which demands a centralised state, an 
increasingly diverse and perpetually changing division of 
labour, a homogenous culture, along with nationalism as 
the consciously held recognition of external social and 
political differentiation and internal identity. He 
therefore posits a bounded, self-maintaining system whose 
structured processes are organized to secure society's 
survival whilst maximizing the potential for internal 
change, in the form of economic development. 
The state for Gellner (as for others) is the specialized 
concentration of institutions and agents for the 
maintenance of order. It is seen as the instrument of 
supervision and control, and as such, would seem to be the 
product of the social division of production. The complex 
division of labour necessary for industrialisation 
requires perpetual change. It is constantly shifting in 
its complexity. This provides the linkage for relating 
culture and education to the economy. Given the need for 
mobilizing individuals within this division of labour and 
its corollary of a citizenry responsive to their placement 
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and redeployment in that system, a homogenous (state 
sponsored) culture is required which must be accessible to 
all individuals equally. Since vertical and horizontal 
mobility is crucial to this division of labour, culture is 
defined solely as that which is functional for work and 
vocation. Consequently, education as the vehicle of mass 
socialization is subordinated to the necessity of 
reproducing that culture. 
Thus, Gellner stands accused of functionalism on two 
counts; in the context of the effects of the 'tidal wave' 
of (undifferentiated) modernisation and again with respect 
to the role of culture in the formation of a nationalist 
ideology. His views are encapsulated in the statement-, 
"The appeal of the nationalist principle - One culture, 
One state - seems to me an inescapable corollary of the 
new socio-economic order, carried along by 
industrialism... " (Gellner, 1991, p. 129) It has to be 
said that industrialism or any other harbinger of 
nationalism, did not always lead to one nation/one state 
(for example, Britain, Belgium, and Switzerland), and a 
weakness of Gellner's argument is that he is unable to 
account for this within his model. 
The role of state sponsored mass culture is not simply to 
create nationalism - it also has to sustain and reproduce 
it. If nationalism is seen as the fusion of culture and 
politics, the nation-state can only come into being when 
the nation's culture becomes that of the state. 
Consequently, culture comes to mean 'official' or 'high' 
culture and folk culture or the different cultures of 
classes or regions are effaced, replaced by the homogenous 
'top-down' culture of the nation-state. This is made 
possible through the rationalisation of industrial 
organisation allied with state-sponsored education. Thus 
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the process of socialisation into national identity is 
completed. 
Gellner states that "Polities... extend their boundaries to 
the limits of their cultures and protect and impose their 
culture with the boundaries of their power" (Gellner, 
1986, p. 55). The nation state is the resulting 
construction of these converging factors; whilst 
nationalism, becomes an impulse for internal social 
solidarity and the demarcation of that community over and 
against an outside world. As such, the nation-state is 
the product of several factors which occur whenever 
industrialisation develops. Thus, Gellner premises the 
conception of the nation-state firmly within a theory of 
industrialisation and given the development of this 
process alongside the universal accompaniment of the 
state, division of labour, homogenous culture and bounded 
territory; he produces the idea of the 'community', 
national consciousness, the nation and nationalism as 
necessary and integral features of the production of the 
nation-state. 
The discussion so far has viewed Gellner's theory as a 
rather simple model based on a determining economic 
dynamic. This simplicity is fractured however as he 
attempts to account for nationalisms that aim to break 
away from that of other nations. Separatist nationalisms 
can occur where there is a coincidence of severe social 
inequalities in conjunction with ethnic, cultural or 
linguistic factors within an overall industrialising 
process. Groups can coalesce in the lower strata of 
society through articulating a fusion of these ethnic, 
cultural or linguistic differences which contrast them to 
the main body, and produce a common notion of community in 
opposition to that of the dominant group. Nation-ness can 
create an ideology of separation in immediate reaction to 
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structures of national incorporation. In such cases the 
loops of cultural feedback sustaining the modernisation- 
led drive to nationalism have failed, the state-sponsored 
culture providing instead a nucleus for political 
discontent. 
Gellner's ideas on the creation of separatist nationalisms 
arising from a breakdown of the 'one-culture/one-nation' 
project - it is the disfunction of the nation-state in 
failing to complete its project which provides the 
separatist impulse - while having a potential relevance to 
dissolution of the Soviet empire or the challenge to the 
nation-state in contemporary Italy, are limited by their 
functionalism. 11 
The idea of an historical community, whose culture 
displays the legacy of a common experience, and whose 
origins provide an ancestry and destiny to a mass 
community, are for Gellner pure invention. He sees the 
consciousness instilled in nationalism as part of the 
imposition of one elevated culture onto another. The 
correspondence between a unified community, territory and 
its 'history' is but part of the deception required to 
order a society integrally in relation to its industrial 
base. Hence, "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations 
to self-consciousness: it invents traditions where they do 
not exist. " (Gellner, 1964, p. 169). However, although 
this observation is accurate enough at a general level, 
its precise formulation in these terms is problematic. As 
Anderson comments, 
"... Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism 
masquerades under false pretences that he 
assimilates 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 
creation . In this way he implies that 'true' 
communities exist which can be advantageously 
juxtaposed to nations. " (Anderson, p. 15) 
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The nation as an imagined community 
If Gellner's approach to nation building is centred on the 
necessity for modern societies to impose cultural 
homogeneity in order to function, Benedict Anderson on the 
other hand, while concurring that nations are modern 
phenomena linked to the rise of capitalism, stresses the 
role of popular culture in the formation of 'imagined 
communities'. 
Anderson introduces Imagined Communities (Anderson, 1983) 
by reminding us of the universality of nationalism in the 
contemporary political world. He makes the point that 
since WWII every successful revolution has defined itself 
in national terms, and even Marxist movements have tended 
to become nationalist (as opposed to internationalist). 
His aim in the book is to suggest interpretations of this 
phenomenon. 
Anderson's argument can be summarised as follows; 
nationalism is a particular kind of cultural artefact - 
the creation of these artefacts towards the end of C18th 
was the result of a convergence of discrete historical 
forces - but once created these became 'modular' that is 
to say capable of being transplanted to a variety of 
social formations and could be amalgamated with a wide 
variety of political and ideological constellations. 
He identifies three paradoxes of nationalism, and an 
investigation of these constitutes the sub-text of the 
book. They are; (i) the objective modernity of nations 
versus their subjective antiquity in the eyes of 
nationalists; (ii) the universality of nationalism in the 
modern world versus the particularity of its concrete 
manifestations; (iii) the political power of nationalisms 
versus their philosophical poverty and incoherence. 
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He then defines some key terms that he uses in the book. 
The nation - is an imagined political community; imagined 
as both inherently limited and sovereign. 
Imagined - because the members will never know most of 
their fellow members. 
Limited - because it has finite, if elastic boundaries 
beyond which lie other nations. 
Sovereign - nations view themselves as being free (or 
dream of it). 
Community - the nation is conceived as a horizontal 
comradeship. 
The first stage of Anderson's investigation is to examine 
the cultural roots of nationalism. He states that broadly 
speaking, pationalism historically supersedes religion. 
He is not saying however that the imagined communities of 
nations simply grew out of or replaced religious 
communities, but that these communities were important, in 
the sense that in a religious community believers were 
part of an 'imagined community' that could extend over 
large geographical areas. Such communities were made 
possible to a great extent by sacred languages. 
The break up of these communities and of dynastic realms 
such as the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, which Anderson 
identifies as another important cultural system, were the 
prerequisites for the development of nationalism. 
Religious communities waned in importance primarily 
because the sacred languages which constituted their 
unifying principle were gradually fragmented and 
pluralised. The dynastic realms on the other hand, 
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despite being in decline still held onto power by 
appropriating nationalism as their old principle of 
legitimacy withered away. 
The nation is a different type of imagined community from 
those that preceded it. What is 'imagined' in the case of 
the nation is a horizontal solidarity and comradeship of 
citizens. "It is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow 
members, meet them, or even'hear of them, yet in the mind 
of each lives the image of their communion. " (Anderson, 
p. 15) 
The growth of capitalism is a major factor in Anderson`s 
explanation of the spread of nationalism. Print 
capitalism especially so as it engendered the 
vernacularization of language and provided the technical 
means for representing the kind of imagined community that 
is the nation. It connected fellow readers through this 
language, gave a fixity to language and created languages 
of power, for administrative and legal use. He sums these 
developments up by stressing that the imagined community 
was made possible by an interaction between; (i) a system 
of production (capitalism), (ii) a technology of 
communications (print), (iii) the fatality of linguistic 
diversity. 
Anderson makes the point that language, as such, should 
not be treated as an emblem of nation-ness in the same way 
as flags, costumes and folk dances. The important aspect 
of language is its capacity for generating imagined 
communities. He says, "Print language is what invents 
nationalism, not a particular language per se" (Anderson, 
p. 122). 
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Anderson asks; in the cases of Venezuela, Mexico and Peru 
why was it creole communities that developed so early 
conceptions of their nation-ness - well before most of 
Europe? It is interesting that Anderson, alone amongst 
the theorists of nationalism, does not place Europe at the 
centre of this development. He is interested in how it 
was possible for colonial provinces with large, oppressed 
non-Spanish speaking populations, to produce creoles who 
consciously redefined these populations as fellow- 
nationals? This is where his analysis differs markedly 
from Gellner's. For Gellner the process of nation 
formation is not complete until a national culture has 
been imposed in a top-down fashion on the various groups 
that compose society. Anderson's model, in contrast, , 
stresses the role of culture in forging a common identity, 
not by the creole magnates and functionaries imposing it 
on the native population, but by including them in the 
definition of the nation. 
Two important reasons why these American nations were 
'imagined' in this way were the tightening of Madrid's 
control (increased taxes) and the spread of liberalizing 
Enlightenment ideas in the latter half of C18th (shared 
language meant easy transmission of new economic and 
political doctrines being produced in Europe). Another 
important reason was that each South American republic had 
been a self-contained administrative unit from C16th to 
C18th. Also Madrid forbad trade between individual parts 
of the continent, in other words, Spain had a monopoly on 
trade with each of the colonies. 
Anderson says that neither economic interest, Liberalism, 
nor Enlightenment could, or did, create in themselves the 
kind, or shape of the imagined community to be defended 
from those regimes' depredations. In accomplishing this 
specific task, pilgrim creole functionaries and provincial 
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creole printmen played the decisive historic role. So, 
the tension between colonial officials and creole 
magnates: resistance to metropolitan influence (conceived 
in nationalistic terms) and above all the spread of print 
provided a framework for a new consciousness and shaped 
the imagined community to be defended. By the end of the 
C19th a 'model' of the independent nation state was 
available for pirating. The development of print meant 
that the French revolution, once it had been written 
about, then became this model. 
Anderson differentiates between popular nationalism, such 
as the French Revolution, and what he calls 'official 
nationalism', which developed after, and in reaction to, 
the popular national movements proliferating in Europe 
after the 1820's. Nationalism was utilized by dynastic 
powers in order to retain their position and legitimacy. 
This in turn became a model for states in which the ruling 
class felt threatened by the spread of the nationally- 
imagined community. For example, Hungarian nationalism 
developed along these lines from within the Austro- 
Hungarian empire. 
Anderson also accounts for the emergence of 'colonial 
nationalism'. In the colonies of Africa and Asia, 
economic power was monopolised by the European colonials. 
The natives were excluded from the realm of capitalist 
activity to a large degree but substantial numbers of them 
were educated. Many were bi-lingual and they had access 
to western culture and its models of nationalism. He 
stresses that in the colonial context the role of the 
intelligentsia was central to the rise of nationalism. 
Because they were by and large, excluded from capitalist 
activity they tended to be involved in the bureaucracy and 
in education. Quite often they would have been educated 
or trained abroad, and this is important from the point of 
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view of them being able to view themselves as 'nationals'. 
Therefore the early colonial nationalists were bi-lingual 
intelligentsia not linked to the bourgeoisie. Their 
struggles were a response to imperialism and were 
facilitated by developments in industrial capital, and as 
we have seen before, the advent of print-language. 
The importance of Anderson's work is that he presents us 
with a view of nationalism that prioritises the role of 
culture in the formation of'the 'imagined community' that 
is the nation. Furthermore, his work provides the key to 
an understanding of various collective representations; 
"... there is no inherent difference (although 
sometimes there is a difference of scale) 
between ethnic and national collectivities: 
they are both the Andersonian 'imagined 
communities"' (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, p. 25) 
This goes a long way to answering Anderson's original 
question; why every successful revolution (even Marxist 
movements), has defined itself in national terms and brings 
us back to the point that nationalism is a political 
resource. This also explains why nationalism can be both 
an emanation of the state, serving the interests of the 
state whatever its particular form, and a rallying call 
for movements in opposition to the state. 
The ethnic foundation of nations 
Anthony Smith agrees with Anderson that in the 
contemporary world national identity is the main form of 
collective identification and that the appeal of the 
nation and nationalism is global. His thesis in National 
Identity (Smith, 1991) is that the origins of this all- 
embracing form of identification with the nation can be 
found rooted in a history of ethnic ties that pre-date the 
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modern world, but which have been powerfully revitalized 
by modern bureaucratic state systems. 
"Through the rediscovery of an ethnic past and the 
promise of collective restoration of the former 
golden age, national identity and nationalism 
have succeeded in arousing and inspiring ethnic 
communities and populations of all classes, 
regions, genders and religions, to claim their 
rights as 'nations', territorial communities of 
culturally and historically cognate citizens, in a 
world of free and equal nations. " (Smith, 1991, p. 170) 
Smith states that he is interested in the differences 
between ethnic communities and nations, and the role of 
ethnic ties and sentiments on the formation of nations, 
"an enquiry into the similarities and 
differences between ethnic. communities and 
nations, and into the ways in which ethnicity 
and ethnic communities form the models and 
groundwork for the construction of nations. " 
Smith, 1986, p. 3) 
As such he stands apart from those such as Anderson, Nairn 
and Gellner who believe the nation to be "a wholly modern 
creation with few, if any, roots in earlier epochs. " 
(Smith, 1986, p. 1) These 'modernists', especially 
Anderson and Gellner, share the belief in the contingency 
of nationalism and the modernity of the nation. Smith 
understands and acknowledges their position; 
"In a sense the 'modernists' are right. Nationalism, 
as an ideology and movement, is a phenomenon that 
dates from the later eighteenth century, while a 
specifically 'national' sentiment can be discerned 
little earlier than the late fifteenth or sixteenth 
centuries in Western Europe. The 'nation-state', 
too, as a political norm is quite modern. " (Smith, 1986, p. 11) 
But Smith believes that there is a history of nations and 
nation formation that is not accounted for by the various 
modernist theories of nationalism on offer. As such he 
-231- 
feels it necessary to depart from the assumptions of both 
the main schools of thought on the origin and formation of 
nations. The nation is neither a datum of social 
existence, a primordial unit of human existence, neither 
is it a wholly modern phenomenon. He rejects the claims 
of both the modernists - that there is a radical break 
between pre-modern units and modern nations - and the 
perennialists - modern nations are updated versions of 
pre-modern communities - and adopts a position which 
accords central importance to the concept of 'ethnie' 
(ethnic community) in the formation of nations. In doing 
so he conceded a measure of continuity between traditional 
and modern, but respects "... the transformations wrought 
by modernity and their effects on the basic units of human 
loyalty in which we operate and live. " (Smith, 1986, p13) 
The ethnie acts as a source of 'myths and memories' from 
which the history of the nation is created. Smith sees 
similarities between the construction of ethnie and 
nations which centre on the role of collective memory. 
"Of course, there is much more to the concept of 
the 'nation' than myths and memories. But they 
constitute a sine qua non: there can be no identity 
without memory (albeit selective), no collective 
purpose without myth, and identity and purpose or 
destiny are necessary elements of the very concept 
of the nation. But this is also true of the concept 
of an ethnic community; it too must be felt to have 
an identity and destiny, and hence myths and 
memories. " (Smith, 1986, p. 2) 
His aim is to trace the ethnic foundations and roots of 
modern nations, and thus modify the 'modernist' positions. 
For this reason he places emphasis on the cultural forms 
of "... sentiments, attitudes and perceptions, as these are 
expressed and codified in myths, memories, values and 
symbols" (Smith, 1986, p. 15), wherein the core of 
ethnicity resides. 
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Smith identifies the following fundamental features of 
national identity; 
- an historic territory, or homeland 
- common myths and historical memories 
-a common, mass public culture 
- common legal rights and duties for members 
-a common economy with territorial mobility for members 
Which leads to a definition of the nation: 
"A nation can therefore be defined as a named 
human population sharing an historic 
territory, common myths and historical 
memories, a mass, public culture, a common 
economy and common legal rights and duties 
for all members. " (Smith, 1991, p. 14) 
The above definition of national identity also sets it 
apart from any conception of the state. The state refers 
to public institutions, exercising a monopoly of coercion 
and extraction within a given territory. 
"The nation on the other hand, signifies a 
cultural and political bond, uniting in a 
single political community all who share an 
historic culture and homeland. " 
(Smith, 1991, p. 15) 
The corollary of which is that Smith holds that a 'true' 
nation-state only occurs where the state's boundaries 
coincide with the nation's and the total population of the 
state share a single ethnic culture. Thus Smith would 
seem to support Gellner's position that a 'true' nation is 
one where the 'one culture/ one nation' situation 
prevails. 
This would appear to be a rather limited view of the 
nation-state and sits rather uneasily with Smith's 
assertions that national identity is multi-dimensional, 
and cannot be reduced to a single element, and that 
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national identity draws on other kinds of collective 
identity (and can be combined with) class, religious and 
ethnic identity. On the model outlined above it would 
appear that a form of nationalism based on ethnic 
absolutism would be possible, and therefore nationalism 
could be formed from a single and exclusive core element. 
Also, Smith's assertion that nationalism cannot be induced 
in a population by artificial means, also suggests the 
'authenticity' of nations that fits with the 'one 
nation/one culture' approach. Smith's approach has more 
in common with the work of Gellner than of Anderson in as 
much as he conceives of the project of nationalism as the 
imposition of the state's authority over a delineated 
geographical space that is coextensive with the nation, 
rather than the construction of a common identity. 
Taking Smith's model literally the United Sates of America 
would not qualify as aa nation-state and neither would 
any of the world's other multi-ethnic states. In the 
context of C19th Europe it was the task of nationalism to 
create nation-states out of a diversity of ethnic peoples, 
to impose a homogeneous cultural and political framework 
on heterogeneous raw material. Implicit in this is the 
idea that national identities have to be created, they are 
not pre-existing identities looking for a home. In 
explaining this Anderson is more useful than either 
Gellner or Smith. 
There are two important points to be drawn from this 
discussion. Firstly, the role of the state as a promoter 
of nationalist sentiment is very different in the theories 
of Smith and Anderson. Secondly, there are obvious 
differences between the formation of C19th nation-states 
and the post WWII developments. In the contemporary 
context the break-down of European nation-states has 
revealed a firm link between nation-states and ethnic 
-234- 
homogeneity. " What needs to be investigated is whether as 
Smith claims, ethnic identity pre-dates the more 'modern' 
national identity. 
As we have previously established Smith seeks to discover 
the ethnic basis of national identity. In order to do so 
it is necessary for him to demonstrate how ethnie form the 
basis for modern nations. The ethnic community which pre- 
dates the nation has the following attributes; a 
collective proper name, a myth of common ancestory, shared 
historical memories, common culture that distinguishes the 
community from other communities, an association with a 
specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for 
significant sectors of the community. It is necessaryýto 
look at these in more detail. 
(i) a collective name. The identifying mark of an ethnie 
in the historical record. 
"By invoking a collective name, by the use of 
symbolic images of community, by the generation 
of stereotypes of the community and its foes, 
by the ritual performance and rehearsal of 
ceremonies and feasts and sacrifices, by the 
communal recitation of past deeds and ancient 
heroes exploits, men and women have been 
enabled to bury their sense of loneliness and 
insecurity in the face of natural disasters 
and human violence by feeling themselves to 
partake of a collectivity and its historic 
fate which transcends their individual 
existences. " (Smith, 1986, p. 46) 
(ii) a common myth of descent. The sine qua non of 
ethnicity, "... provides the means of collective location 
in the world and the charter of the community which 
explains its origins growth and destiny. " (Smith, 1986, , 
p. 24) Myths provide a framework of meaning for the ethnic 
community (a mythomoteur) without which a group is unable 
to define itself to itself or others. Smith defines 
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mythomoteur as the constitutive myth of the ethnic polity 
which describes how and why the collectivity was created, 
why it is unique, and what its mission is. 
(iii) A shared history. 
"Ethnie are nothing if not historical 
communities built up on shared memories. 
A sense of common history unites successive 
generations, each with a its set of experiences 
which are added to the common stock, and it 
also defines a population in terms of 
experienced temporal sequences, which convey 
to later generations the historicity of their 
own experiences. " (Smith, 1986,1 p. 25) 
(iv) A distinctive shared culture. Ethnie are 
differentiated by culture, which facilitates community 
solidity and separates them from outsiders. 
"The most common shared and distinctive traits 
are those of language and religion; but 
customs, institutions, laws, folklore, 
architecture, dress, food, music and the 
arts, even colour and physique, may augment 
the differences or take their place. " 
(Smith, 1986,1 p. 26) 
(v) Association with a specific territory. The ties to 
location may be residential or symbolic (a homeland to 
which it may return). Nostalgia for territory can lead to 
a renewed emphasis on social cohesion. 
(vi) A sense of solidarity. An ethnie is a community with 
a sense of identity and solidarity. In times of stress 
this can override class or factional divisions within a 
community. Following which Smith offers this definition; 
... ethnie (ethnic communities) may now be defined as named human populations with 
shared ancestory myths, histories and cultures, 
having an association with a specific territory 
and a sense of solidarity. " (Smith, 1986, , p. 32) 
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Smith acknowledges that nations are modern phenomena and 
as such are distinct from ethnie. This is because; 
- they require a unified legal code of common rights and 
duties, with citizenship rights where the nation is 
independent. 
- they are based on a unified economy with a single 
division of labour, and mobility of goods and persons 
throughout the national territory. 
- they need a fairly compact territory, preferably with 
'natural' defensible frontiers, in a world of similar 
compact nations. , 
- they require a single political culture and public, 
mass education and media system, to socialise future 
generations to be citizens of the new nation. Nations and 
nationalism did not exist in the pre-modern period. Put 
succinctly; mass citizen-nations can only exist in the era 
of industrialism, citizenship and democracy. 
In order to establish the link between ethnie and nation 
Smith traces two routes by which different kinds of ethnic 
community were transformed into nations. The first is 
state-sponsored; centralised state tried to incorporate 
outlying regions through military, fiscal, juridical and 
administrative processes, and in doing so welds disparate 
populations into a single political community based on the 
cultural heritage of the dominant core. 
The second route, more common, starting from smaller, 
demotic communities required an active intelligentsia to 
mobilize 'the people', through an appeal to the 
community's alleged ethnic past. 
-237- 
"To do this they had to provide cognitive maps 
and historical moralities for present 
generations, drawn from the poetic spaces 
and golden ages of the communal past. In 
this way they hoped to transform a backward 
traditional ethnic community into a dynamic, 
but vernacular political nation. " 
(Smith, 1991, p. 69) 
The significance of Smith's version of how nations came 
into being is that unlike Gellner and Anderson he puts 
forward on endogenous explanation for the transition from 
ethnie to nation. Gellner and Anderson favour exogenous 
explanations; pre-modern societies are transformed as a 
result of their experience of external forces 
(industrialisation and modernisation for Gellner, colonial 
exploitation for Anderson) Smith's ethnie are transformed 
from within; incorporation by an expanding state or 
mobilization by the intelligentsia. Smith's explanation 
relies heavily on the efficacy of the ideology of 
nationalism to perform these tasks, hence the following 
definition of nationalism: 
"... an ideological movement for attaining 
and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity 
on behalf of a population deemed by some of 
its members to constitute and actual or 
potential 'nation'. " (Smith, 1991, p. 73) 
Nationalist ideology evokes sentiments and aspirations 
relating to three main things: territory, history and 
community. It appeals to a golden age and it makes the 
realization of fraternity possible through symbols, rights 
and ceremonies, which bind the living to the dead and 
fallen. It does this by overlaying or replacing older, 
less durable modes of civic, religious and familial 
education. As Smith says "nationalism is a form of 
culture - an ideology, a language, mythology, symbolism 
and consciousness - that has achieved global resonance... " 
(Smith, 1991, p. 92). 
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Smith's work on nationalism is founded on the idea that 
nations were formed out of pre-existing communities of an 
ethnic complexion. The processes identified by Smith by 
which these communities were transformed into nations are 
very different from those proposed by Gellner and 
Anderson. The differences revolves around the importance 
accorded by Smith to the rediscovery of the ethnic past, 
the 'authentic' community of which the modern nation is 
the latest incarnation. For Anderson the construction of 
a this history is one of the main tasks of nationalism. 
History and heritage are important, not necessarily 
because they are 'real' but because they legitimize the 
nation, they symbolise the longevity and inviolability of 
the national lineage. , 
In the context of contemporary Europe and the trend 
towards particularisms of the ethnic type Smith's work 
would appear to have an important application. His 
insistence on the ethnic origins of nations leads to the 
view that. nations were built upon the foundations of an 
ethnie, and these underlying communities are somehow more 
authentic, more stable and more durable than modern 
nations. This is the 'sleeping beauty' interpretation of 
Smith's work which holds that the revitalisation of 
ethnicity in the break-up of the Soviet Union for example, 
should be interpreted as a desire to return to those type 
of communities. However, a different interpretation of 
the events in the Soviet Union and elsewhere suggests 
itself. Rather than nations having ethnic origins, 
ethnicity has been nurtured by nationalism. In other 
words, instead of the ethnic origins of nations we should 
be studying the nationalist origins of ethnicity. By this 
I mean that the contemporary movements of ethnic 
nationalism have their origins in the history and 
dissolution of C19th nation-building, and the states they 
gave rise to. 
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Nationalism and the nation 
Miroslav Hroch, in his essay From National Movement to 
Fully-Fledged Nation: the Nation Building Process in 
Europe (Hroch, 1993) asserts that it is misleading to look 
at nation formation as the unfolding or spread of ideas of 
'nationalism'. For him, national consciousness does not 
create the nation, rather for nationalism to exist there 
must be something to be conscious of. In other words, 
national consciousness follows from the prior idea of the 
nation (or proto-nation). Hroch advances the following 
definition of the nation. It is; 
"... a large social group integrated not by 
one but by a combination of several kinds of 
objective relationships (economic, political, .' 
linguistic cultural. religious, geographical, 
historical), and their subjective reflection 
in collective consciousness. " (Hroch, 1993, p. 4) 
Three ties are vital to the nation-building process; 
-a 'memory' of some common past, treated as the 'destiny' 
of the group 
-a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a 
higher degree of social communications within the group 
than without it 
-a conception of the equality of all members of the group 
organized as a civil society 
While this formulation is useful there is little to 
distinguish Hroch's nation from Smith's ethnie. There is 
nothing modern about Hroch's nation, no strong sense of 
citizenship, for example. Nation-building can be dated 
from the moment when selected groups within the non- 
dominant ethnic community started to discuss their own 
ethnicity and to conceive of it as a potential nation-to- 
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be. This move to achieve the attributes of a fully- 
fledged nation he calls a national movement (not 
nationalist, which is an ideology that prioritises the 
nation over all other values and interests). The goals of 
a national movement are as follows; 
- development of a national culture based on language and 
its use in education, administration and economic life 
- achievement of civil rights and political self- 
administration (including autonomy and independence) 
- creation of complete social structure from the ethnic 
group (including educated elites, entrepreneurs and 
workers) 
Following on from an earlier work (Hroch, 1985) in which 
he posited that the type of political mobilization that 
characterises nationalism in the nineteenth century 
proceeded in three distinct phases, each drawing support 
from different social groups, Hroch now asserts that there 
are three phases of a national movement; 
Phase A- in which the intelligentsia turn their attention 
to their language, history and culture, and support 
organisations designed to promote these. This involves the 
dissemination of an awareness of the linguistic, cultural 
and social attributes of the non-dominant group, without 
pressing national demands. 
"... the modern nation-building process started 
with the collection of information about the 
history language and customs of the 
non-dominant ethnic group, which became the 
critical ingredient in the first phase of 
patriotic agitation. The learned researchers 
of Phase A discovered' the ethnic group and 
laid a basis for the subsequent formation of 
a 'national identity'. " (Hroch, 1993, p. 9) 
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Phase B- in which this interest spreads to other sectors 
of the population, who form pressure groups (rather than 
nationalist parties), and transform an interest in 
cultural history into political agitation. These tasks 
are carried out by the 'nationalists' (Hroch calls them 
patriots). This is the period described as the 
'fermentation process of national consciousness', the 
project of creating a future nation; patriotic agitation 
to 'awaken' national consciousness 
Phase C- in which the national cause is adopted by the 
mass of the population and nationalist parties come into 
being. Hroch sees as central, 
"... the relationship between the transition 
to phase B and then to Phase C, on the one 
hand, and the transitional to constitutional 
society based on equality before the law, on 
the other hand - what is often generically 
called the moment of 'bourgeois revolution. " 
(Hroch, p. 7) 
Hroch asks-the question; why should affection or loyalty 
to a region pass into identification with an ethnic group 
as a nation-to-be? The answer lies in three processes; 
- the social or political crisis of the old order 
- the emergence of discontent 
- the loss of faith in traditional moral systems 
(religion) 
This may explain procession to Phase B but does not 
automatically lead to the birth of the modern nation. 
What circumstances would create the mass movement of Phase 
C? This is where Hroch's schema is at its weakest because 
what he does not do is establish the mechanism by which 
one stage transforms into the next, as Alter puts it, 
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"... he is silent on the precise 
takes nationalist mobilization 
qualitative stage to the next. 
to know, however, is why the i 
minority elite in the national 
the basis of a mass movement. " 
impetus that 
from one 
What we wish 
nterest of a 
uestion becomes 
Alter, p. 79) 
He lacks an obvious motor for such change although, as in 
the case of Smith, his is an endogenous explanation which 
does not rely on outside stimuli to trigger the 
nationalist moment. Whereas Gellner's model attributes 
the growth of nationalism to the experience of 
industrialization, Hroch and Smith find the motor of 
change in the ideology of nationalism itself. This also 
means that Hroch is not reliant on the same periodisation 
as the 'modernists', "... most of the national movements in 
Europe emerged well before the arrival of modern 
industry... " (Hroch, p. 10) 
What Hroch offers by way of a mechanism of change is 
social mobility and communication. Members of patriotic 
groups belonged to professions with high vertical 
mobility. 'The growth of national movements went hand in 
hand with the advance in social communication and 
mobility. Social communication increases awareness and 
understanding of national sentiment. Also important is 
"... a nationally relevant conflict of interests... " 
(Hroch, p. 11) For example, in the C19th new university 
graduates coming from a non-dominant ethnic groups created 
tensions within the existing social order. A closed elite 
experienced a challenge to their grip on leading positions 
in state and society. 
A successful national movement includes four elements; 
-a crisis of legitimacy 
- vertical social mobility 
- high level of social communication 
- nationally relevant conflict of interests 
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Hroch's work, concentrating as it does on the history of 
nationalism in Eastern Europe may provide some insights 
into the new nationalisms of Eastern and Central Europe. 
Are they the result of long frozen conflicts, suppressed 
under Communism, now in full revival? 
"It is more plausible to see the forces 
reshaping Central and Eastern Europe duriný 
the last decade as 'new national movements , 
whose goals offer many analogies with those 
of the nineteenth century, as well as some 
significant differences. ' (Hroch, p. 14) 
Following the model of nation-building outlined by Hroch 
it is possible to identify the following features of 
contemporary Eastern Europe which correspond to his 
schema; 
- linguistic and cultural demands. Examples include; the 
former Soviet Union where Russian was imposed as the 
language of public life, and the campaign to separate 
Croat as a fully independent language from Serb. 
- the near universal call for democracy corresponds to the 
demand for civil rights in the programme of C19th. The 
desire for full independence recalls the drive for ethnic 
autonomy in C19th. 
- the leaders of the new national movements aim to 
'complete' the social structure of the nation by creating 
a capitalist class corresponding to that of Western 
states. 
- with the breakdown of Communism traditional ties have 
been dissolved, leaving insecurity - the national idea 
takes over the role of collective integration. "In 
conditions of acute stress, people characteristically tend 
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to over-value the protective comfort of their own national 
group. " (Hroch, p. 15) 
Under political conditions where the masses are not 
politically educated appeals to the political discourse of 
civil or human rights may not be effective: a common 
language or customs can provide a much more effective 
rallying point. In Eastern Europe today an education in 
civil society is still missing so linguistic and cultural 
factors may again act as substitutes for articulated 
political demands, for example Yugoslavia, Romania and the 
Baltic sates. 
What of the role of nationally relevant social conflict in 
contemporary conditions? The old order has disappeared 
leaving a political and social vacuum. A new ruling class 
is recruited from apprentice politicians, veteran 
bureaucrats, and emergent entrepreneurs. 
"The fight within, and among, these groups 
for positions of privilege has so far yielded 
the most intense conflicts of interest in post- 
Communistic society; and wherever members of 
different ethnic groups live on the same 
territory, it generates the leading tensions 
of a nationally relevant character today. " (Hroch, p. 18) 
Nationalism and ethnicity 
It is interesting to compare Hroch's version of 
nationalism with that of Suny who argues for an exogenous 
origin for the nations that emerged from the ruins of the 
Soviet Union. Rather than autonomous intellectual 
movements of proto-nations aware of their ethnic roots, 
Suny stresses that not only were nations such as 
Uzbekistan created by the policies of the Soviet empire, 
but also that their very ethnicities were constructed and 
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consolidated by Communist rule. As such, Suny's work is 
closer to that of Anderson than any of the other 
theorists. 
There are two main schools of thought on the relationship 
between the Soviet Union and the nationalism of its 
constituent Republics. The first acknowledges the 
importance of the 'nationalities question' and its role in 
the dissolution of the Russian empire, but treats the 
nations as pre-given, relatively homogeneous ethnic 
homelands. This position is expressed by Lapidus; 
"The complexity of the nationalities question 
in contemporary Soviet politics stems from 
the fact that the key actors are... nations 
and nationalities inhabiting or laying claim 
to historical territorial homelands... 
political-administrative boundaries in the 
USSR tend to coincide with ethnic boundaries, 
infusing centre periphery relations with 
heightened emotional intensity and injecting 
the nationalities question into virtually 
every aspect of Soviet policy. " 
(Lapidus, p. 432) 
Suny favours the argument advanced by writers such as 
Brzezinski that communism in fact created and nurtured the 
nationalism that eventually destroyed the Soviet 
Union, "... communism in fact intensified popular 
nationalist passion... [and] fused with and even reinforced 
intolerant nationalism... " (Brzezinski, Z- quoted in 
Suny, 1991a, p416). 
This means that Suny explains Soviet nationalisms not in 
terms of the 'sleeping beauty' approach - nationalism as 
the essential and authentic expression of ethnic 
communities - but rather as a result of 'the making of 
nations' approach. It is certainly the case that much of 
the nation building in the Russian empire took place in 
the Soviet period than in the years before 1917. Suny's 
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'making of nations' approach not only confronts Smith's 
idea that nations have an ethnic origin by positing that 
nations were created under the Soviet regime, but also 
introduces the idea that ethnicity was also constructed, 
systematised and consolidated by a succession of Communist 
policies. 
"One of the central ironies of Soviet history 
is that a regime dedicated to effacing 
nationality and creating a supraethnic 
community and a party that posited that class 
rather than nationality was the key 
determinant of social structure have presided 
over a long historic process in which modern 
nations have been formed within the union 
they governed. These Soviet nations, though 
built on earlier ethnic communities and elite 
nationalist movements, are largely the result 
of the complex history of the last seventy 
years. " (Suny, 1991a, p. 416) 
In order to understand this approach it is necessary to 
appreciate the pre-revolutionary history of the Soviet 
Union, and the pre-modern nature of the Tsarist empire. 
"Before the revolutions of 1917, most of the 
constituent peoples of what now makes up the 
Soviet Union were not yet fully formed, 
self-conscious nations. Though ethnolinguistic 
communities with distinct religious and ethnic 
cultures had existed on what is now Soviet 
territory since prehistoric times, few of the 
peoples of the Russian empire had coalesced 
around the more modern notions of a secular, 
territorial nation. Most had never had a state 
in the past, and nationalist ideas expressed by 
urban intellectuals had not yet spread to the 
less educated, either in towns or the 
countryside. " (Suny, 1991a, p418-419) 
At the end of the Civil War, those nationalities under 
Soviet rule were organised into a federal state - with its 
political units based on ethnicity. So there were 
Republics created for the Armenians, Georgians, Ukrainians 
etc. A hierarchical, imperial relationship was soon 
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created between the centre and the periphery. The 
republics never had real autonomy, but maintained their 
own language and culture and native cadres dominated the 
administration. 
"This polic of 'nativization' (korenizatsiia 
in Russian), encouraged by Lenin (and even 
supported by Stalin for a time) was sincerely 
carried out in the 1920's with spectacular 
results. The ethnic republics became 
demographically and culturally more ethnic. " 
(Suny, 1991a, p. 419) 
The power of the Soviet system to impose conformity on its 
vast geographical area was considerable but the policies 
of the Soviet state had contradictory effects. 
"The deeply contradictory policy of the Soviet 
state, on the one hand, nourished the cultural 
uniqueness of distinct peoples and thereby 
increased ethnic solidarity and national 
consciousness in the non-Russian republics, 
and on the other, by requiring conformity to 
an imposed political order frustrated full 
articulation of a national agenda. " (Süny, 1991b, p. 113) 
Under Stalin the notion of federalism became less 
important and was replaced by a unitary state, highly 
centralised, with little autonomy for the peripheries. 
Russian culture was promoted - to the extent that it was 
made compulsory in schools. Industrialization led to the 
migration of hundreds of thousands of Russians and other 
Slavs to Central Asia, and after they were annexed in 
1940, to the Baltic states. Non-Russian peoples were 
subordinated to the Soviet State's economic and political 
priorities. Tens of thousands of ethnic Communist leaders 
were imprisoned or executed in the Great Purges. 
More recently, three aspects of Gorbachev's reform program 
played critical roles in bringing the question of 
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nationalities to the fore. Firstly, the impact of 
glasnost gave impetus to the expression of deep-seated 
grievances by legitimising public discussion of issues 
which previously had been taboo. The Soviet media began 
to speak out against overcentralization, linguistic and 
cultural Russification, and the repression of national 
elites. Secondly, political democratization, which was at 
the centre of Gorbachev's reform plans and the 
encouragement of grass-roots political activity, expanded 
the boundaries of permissible political activity and 
enabled the emergence of popular fronts (in the Baltic 
republics, for example). 
"In virtually every republic, embryonic 
political organizations had emerged, 
embracing a broad spectrum of political 
positions, from explicitly separatist parties 
in several of the non-Russian republics, to 
extreme Russian chauvinist organizations 
like Pamyat, to the progressive Popular 
Fronts= to Christian, Social-Democratic, 
'Green 
, and other movements. " (Lapidus, p436) 
Finally, economic stringency, and the upheaval of economic 
reorganization, was a major source of discontent. Under 
Gorbachev "... the gradualist politics of early perestroika 
was transformed into the ethnopolitics of national self- 
determination and democratization" (Suny, 1991a, p423) 
Gorbachev admitted that "we had underestimated the forces 
of nationalism and separatism that were hidden deep within 
our system and their ability to merge with populist 
elements creating a socially explosive mixture" (quoted in 
Suny, 1991a, p424) 
"These massive ethnic expressions represented 
the emergence of civil society and were far 
more the product of Soviet history than any 
primordial ethnicity or striving for self- 
determination" (Suny, 1991a, p424) 
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This was because the history of the Soviet peoples has 
been one of consolidation of ethnic nations, heightened 
national consciousness and an increased capacity to act in 
defence of their perceived national interests. The period 
of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' presided over by Gorbachev 
created the opportunity, by redefining and restricting the 
power of the state and for the expression of nationalist 
agendas. 
The rise of regionalism 
Regionalism, here defined as an ideology and political 
project that prioritizes the region over other units of 
socio-political organization, such as the nation, is an 
increasingly important feature in contemporary Western 
Europe. The rise of regionalism has corresponded to a 
decline in big-state nationalism. Globalisation - the 
creation of a single world market - has led, in the words 
of Stuart Hall "to a strengthening of 'local' allegiances 
and identities" (Hall, 1992); not to uniformity, but to a 
proliferation of ethno-social cultures. The rise of 
regionalism has also corresponded to the growth, or 
regeneration of ideas of European Union and federalism in 
the past ten years. For all these reasons there appears 
to be a decline in the fortunes of independent nation- 
states. In other words, the nation-state has come under 
attack from both below and above. 
"Like the idea of European unity, regionalism seems 
to signal the end of the age of homogeneous and 
independent nation-states. On the one hand, 
nation-states have come under external pressure 
to delegate some major areas of economic and 
socio-political responsibility to over-arching 
supra-national institutions such as the EC; on 
the other, they have run up against demands at 
home for the decentralization of political and 
economic power. " (Alter, p. 136) 
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Alter views the rise of regionalism in the following way. 
Nationalism is often (pace Gellner) tied up with economic 
development and modernisation. This era has now ended and 
the nation is not such an important vehicle for collective 
identity, hence the rise of regionalism. What rises to 
the surface with the break-down of big-state nationalism 
is regional tensions - periphery versus centre - which are 
created through, but held in check by, the political power 
of the nation-state. Within the boundaries of every 
nation-state there are richer and poorer areas, areas of 
greater resources and opportunity, and areas of 
concentration of capital and population . Economic 
heterogeneity and cultural and linguistic disparity make 
the regional tensions manifest. "The breeding ground for 
regionalism in capitalist nation-states is provided by the 
continuing presence of both economic and cultural and 
linguistic disparity. " (Alter, p. 136) 
Uneven development of the economy disadvantages peripheral 
groups and may generate tensions between the centre and 
the margins. Social underprivilege gives a decisive boost 
to regionalist tendencies. To give an example, in Britain 
England is relatively (although differentially) 
prosperous, whereas the Celtic periphery is less so as a 
result of unequal economic development. this leads to an 
unequal distribution of political power - some regions 
grow at the expense of others - resulting in what Alter 
terms (after Hechter) 'internal colonialism'. 
This thesis although helpful in supporting the view that 
one outcome of the project of nation-building has been a 
rise in particularisms, is heavily bound up with the 
economic growth, modernisation theory. We need to look 
more closely at the recent trend towards regionalism and 
examine why authority is being decentered from previous 
national states, simultaneously upwards to Euro- 
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institutions and downwards to this range of new and more 
local powers. We can advance the following reasons which 
would seem, in general terms, to underpin the erosion of 
the importance of the nation-state in all its specific 
manifestations; 
- the discrediting of nationalism. Nationalism in its 
extreme form - Fascism and right wing extremism - is seen 
to be a wholly undesirable facet of democracy. 
- the end of East/West confrontation. A strong nation- 
state was seen as a vehicle for ensuring that democracy 
was entrenched in the countries of Western Europe in the 
post-war period. The nation-state as a bulwark against 
communism. 
- the arbitrary nature of the nation-state. The nation 
was frequently a political imposition on ethnically 
diverse and previously independent communities (Yugoslavia 
and Britain, for example), which then became dominated by 
one ethnic group at the expense of others. Similarly, the 
nation-state was also imposed on disparate regions (Italy) 
- the advent of a supra-national framework. The 
availability of a wider economic, political and social 
framework (The European Union) makes sub-national regions 
more viable. 
- separatism. The role of the EU makes the possibility of 
a Europe of the regions more likely. This in turn 
stimulates the ideology of regionalism, especially within 
those regions who perceive that they are being 'held back' 
by their partners in the nation-state. This is the case 
with the Czech Republic, Catalonia and the Northern 
Leagues in Italy. 
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Eric Hobsbawm makes the following points about 
contemporary popularity of regionalism (of the separatist 
kind) in the former Eastern bloc and elsewhere. First, 
the collapse of communism, which imposed political 
stability over such a large portion of Europe, has 
"re-opened the wounds of the first world war, 
or more precisely, of the misconceived and 
unrealistic peace settlements after it. The 
explosive nationalist issues in central and 
eastern Europe today, are not ancient ethnic 
conflicts but those created during the formation 
of the successor states to the collapsing multi- 
ethnic Habsburg, Ottoman and Tsarist Russian 
empires. " (Hobsbawm, 1991, p. 17) 
The point being that tensions between, say, the Serbs and 
the Croats could not have occurred prior to the formation 
of Yugoslavia, which did not begin to happen until the 
1920s. For centuries prior to that Serbia had been 
dominated by the Ottoman empire and Croatia by the 
Habsburgs. The disintegration of the centralised, 
Communist, (of sorts) Yugoslav state has encouraged its 
republics to "assert independence as a means of self 
preservation" (Hobsbawm, 1991, p. 17 
The second reason is the rise in xenophobia created by the 
massive population movements of the past forty years. 
"Xenophobia encourages ethnic nationalism since the 
essence of both is a hostility to other groups. " 
(Hobsbawm, 1991, p. 17) Thirdly, Hobsbawm cites political 
illiteracy; 
"... the politics of group identity are easier 
to understand than any others, especially for 
peoples who, after decades of dictatorship, 
lack political education and experience. " 
(Hobsbawm, 1991, p. 17) 
In other words, a nationalism couched in terms of language 






rather than the 'other' beyond the perceived community. 
That xenophobia feeds ethnic nationalism is not in 
dispute, but it is equally likely that ethnic nationalism 
creates xenophobia. The key point to make is that the 
rise of ethnic, exclusive nationalisms is endogenous, that 
is to say coming from within the social, compared with 
C19th nationalism which was largely exogenous. 
His third and forth points are closely related. A 
combination of political illiteracy and social instability 
encourage peoples to fall back on comforting and 
reassuring identities such as those offered by close knit 
ethnic communities or aggressive nationalisms, 
particularly when fuelled by a sense of injustice or 
persecution, as with the Serbs. This is a seductive 
theory and one which has much to support it; the countries 
of Eastern Europe had no tradition of democracy to speak 
of, the fall of planned economies and centralised 
bureaucracies created a political vacuum. 
Before proceeding to the case of the Lega Nord and an 
examination of the relevance of Laclau and Mouffe's ideas 
to contemporary regionalism and nationalism it is 
necessary to review the various approaches to nationalism 
considered above. As I have already indicated the various 
theories can be divided into endogenous and exogenous 
explanations. Exogenous approaches such as Gellner, 
Anderson, Hobsbawm and Suny, for example, focus on the 
importance of external forces as a mechanism of change. 
Endogenous approaches - Smith and Hroch - highlight the 
role of the ideology of nationalism in mobilising existing 
social forces. These approaches hold that ethnicity is 
already present in society and acts as a focus for 
national sentiment. 'Ethnic nationalism' on this model is 
an authentic expression of deep rooted and previously 
hidden sentiments. 
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The exogenous approaches considered here do not offer a 
common or unified theory of nationalism. In fact, the 
differences in approach are enormous, and in order to 
justify my typology I must add the caveat that all of what 
I see as valuable in the exogenous approach does not apply 
to Gellner. What these approaches do offer is the 
opportunity to view all collective identities as 
constructed rather than given. This means that they are 
more productive when giving consideration to the 
construction of ethnicity which underpins any 
understanding of regionalism or 'ethnic nationalism'. 
The Northern Leagues 1; 
The construction of collective identity via ethnicity is 
characteristic of the rise of the Lega Nord (Northern 
Leagues) in Italy. The Lega Nord is an example of 
contemporary regionalism, dominated as it is by ideologies 
which privilege the sub-national region in such a way as 
to threaten the continued existence of the Italian nation- 
state. This example of regionalism is comparable to other 
contemporary particularisms and 'ethnic nationalisms' such 
as those in Yugoslavia, although without the tragic 
consequences. The Lega Nord represents ethnic and 
exclusive collective identity rather than the type of 
collectivities constructed by C19th nationalists. 
The emphasis on ethnicity as the sine qua non of 
nationalism or regionalism can lead to the view that this 
is somehow a more 'authentic' - one culture/one nation - 
type of nationalism. This is particularly true when 
expressed by spokesmen for the Leagues, such as Miglio. 
But such a view does not account for the construction of 
ethnicity, rather it views ethnicity (as do Smith and 
Hroch) as pre-given. In fact, ethnicity - like 
nationalism - has to be constructed in order for people to 
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be able to view themselves as being united in some 
profound sense, despite the many other social divisions - 
class, religion, gender etc - that may otherwise divide 
them. 
"No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, 
but as social formations are nationalised, the 
populations included within them, divided up 
among them or dominated by them are ethnicized 
- that is - represented in the past or in the 
future as if they formed a natural community, 
possessing of itself'an identity of origins 
culture and interests which transcends indiv- 
idual and social conditions. " (Balibar, p. 96) 
This means that in order to understand the Lega Nord we 
must examine the contemporary construction of political 
identity rather than view regionalism or nationalism as a 
'return' to an underlying ethnicity. 
The Leagues claim legitimacy from the artificiality of the 
Italian nation which has been imposed on the peoples of 
Italy to the detriment of them all, and which never 
succeeded in forging national unity. Poche expresses this 
feeling thus; "To understand the League phenomenon it is 
important to acknowledge that Italy never became a real 
nation-state. " (Poche, p. 71) Thus, legitimacy for this 
federal approach is sought in the 'myth of the nation' and 
the belief that the Italian nation 'unified' disparate 
historical, cultural and ethnic groups which resulted in 
particularism being sacrificed to the nation-state. 
Central to this view is the assertion that "... Italy lacks 
the ethnic, cultural and historical homogeneity for 
becoming a 'unitary' state. " (Miglio, p. 32) 
Interestingly, in this example of 'the nationalist origins 
of ethnicity' the myth common to many nationalisms - that 
the nation is an authentic entity which has its origins in 
antiquity - is here inverted. The legitimation of the 
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region is a product of the youth, artificiality and 
failure of the nation. 
In part, the Leagues' popularity is the result of a 
successful appropriation of the people versus the (corrupt 
and inefficient) state antagonism. In the mid and late 
1980s the Italian state was in crisis; public services 
were inadequate and overburdened with bureaucracy. 
Clientism - 'the dominance of political parties over the 
state and their channelling-, of public resources to their 
clients - was rife. The Lombard League in particular gave 
voice to these grievances. It is axiomatic for the Lega 
Nord that the crisis of Italian unity can only be resolved 
through a federal solution. "Italians do not constitute 
an ethnic and cultural entity sufficiently homogenous to 
sustain a centralised unitary state. " (Miglio, p. 19) The 
Leagues' position reinforces the idea that a nation cannot 
exist if it is not based on ethnic homogeneity. The Lega 
Nord's orientation in terms of a traditional right/left 
classification is confusing. 
"It has some regionalist features and some 
clearly fascist ones. It is very clearly a 
party of the right, yet its attack on the 
Christian-Democrat and Socialist oligarchies 
and impassioned solidarity with the 
investigating magistracy has led some 
observers to view it as in some ways a 
progressive force, the vanguard of a 
democratic revolution against the entrenched forces of Old Corruption. " (Abse, pp. 11-12) 
The recent electoral coalition between Berlusconi's Forza 
Italia, the fascists and the Lega suggests that it is 
quite at home on the right. 
The aims of the Lega Nord (prior to the 1994 electoral 
pact) can be summarised as follows; 
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- to decentralise and federate the present unitary state 
to create an Italy of regions who could be members of the 
EU without the handicap of Europe's most inefficient and 
corrupt state. 
- to create the conditions that would allow the 
populations to retain their identity (language, customs, 
culture) 
- to ensure that (lower) public offices are held by local 
people (those families who have lived in territory for 
more than one generation, and share cultural and ethnic 
background of those they govern). This stems from the 
wish 'not to be dominated by outsiders'. 
- to privatise and manage public services by local people 
- to redistribute public funds throughout the various 
parts of Italy. A right to use one's own resources and an 
end to assistance to other regions. 
There are many issues raised by these developments. Is 
the history of the modern state coming to an end? Is the 
nation-state, with its imposed homogeneity and myths of 
national solidarity, disintegrating? Are regions more 
appropriate units? For the Leagues the answers to these 
questions is certainly 'yes'. 
"As an enterprise once optimal for satisfying 
people's needs, the great national State with 
precise borders is obsolete. It will be increasingly displaced by a texture without 
preconstituted boundaries. Its configuration 
will be a function of peoples concrete needs, 
extending from a plurality of modest, natural 'basic' aggregations such as regional states up 
to conditional arrangements for vast areas (primarily economic ones) (Miglio, p. 42). 
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The Leagues advocate cultural, economic and political 
self-determination in order to rid themselves of 
corruption and inefficiency, the cause of which is 
contamination by the 'Mediterranean mentality' of the 
Southerners. As Miglio explains, 
"The Mediterranean mentality belongs to a different 
part of Europe. The concept of authority which 
prevails in the Europe of Spain, southern France 
and southern Italy is that of the person in charge. 
In 'cold Europe', citizens want to be subject to 
laws, not to people or protectors, But, unfortun- 
ately, the Southern model has polluted Northern 
Euro e. " (Miglio, quoted in The Guardian 1 December 
19935 
In this way differences between 'Mediterranean' 
southerners and 'European' northerners are polarised 
according to models of personal and economic relations. 
Relations of personal dependence (redolent of pre-modern, 
almost feudal ties of fealty) in the South, versus 
impersonal rule and individual rights (modern, 'European' 
and egalitarian). These differences are of central 
importance in the construction of the self-identity of 
Northerners and as such are raised to the level of ethnic 
differences. This identity is consolidated by the 
addition of a series of 'wrongs' to which the ethnic 'us' 
have been subjected. The issue of regional autonomy is 
re-cast not simply in people versus the state terms, but 
also along the lines of the Republic (nation-state) 
denying local inhabitants the right to self-determination. 
"... the problem of unsatisfactory public services 
and political corruption is explained in terms of 
destruction of the values of work identified with 
the Lombard community. Here again the culprits are 
the southerners, whose particular culture and lack 
of a work ethic allegedly has colonized the Italian 
state and its political parties. Many Lombards feel 
part of a 'middle-European' culture. They are proud 
of their economic success and feel exploited by the 
south. (Ruzza and Schmidtke, p. 58). 
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There have been two main factors in the League' success. 
Firstly, they have been able to articulate and focus 
previously dispersed themes of popular dissatisfaction, 
for example political corruption and state inefficiency. 
Secondly, they have politicized dormant social sectors by 
means of a new cultural identity - Lombard identity. The 
extent to which this identity is in fact an ethnic 
identity is the subject of some debate, what is not denied 
however is its power to mobilize support. 
"... the Lombard League does not represent a 
Lombard 'ethnic identity'. The League's electoral 
successes are not dependant on its organisational 
ability to mobilize a distinct ethnic and linguistic 
group, but on its abilit to constitute a regional 
identity. " (Woods, p. 117) 
The history that has been appropriated for this purpose - 
the 'myth-symbol complex' of the Lombard League - is the 
C12th league of Lombard cities, a history that permits it 
to perceive itself as Italy's 'hen that lays the golden 
eggs', and which is presently exploited by Rome and the 
South. Culturally it focuses on 
"... the 'culture of the Alps and the Po Valley', 
thus successfully bringing together three main 
themes: 1) the region's spatial unity; 2) an 
economic tradition based on rich agriculture 
and on active industry...; and 3) a similar 
history from the old free cities to the cradle 
and origin of the Italian Kingdom... " (Poche, p. 77) 
The root of its success in articulating dissatisfaction 
with the state and political corruption is the 
reinterpretation of national problems as north-south 
problems. The elements of this dissatisfaction can be 
summarised thus; 
- political corruption has its origins with organised 
crime (the Mafia). "What does Northern Italy have to do 
with the Mafia? If the people of the South really want to 
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fight it, let them do something about it. " (Miglio, quoted 
in The Guardian 1 December 1993) 
- inefficient and bureaucratic central state and 
inadequate public services. "Why is 90% of our civil 
service made up of southerners? " (Miglio, quoted in The 
Guardian 1 December 1993) 
- waste of public resources. Over-centralised, 
bureaucratic and profligate' government 
- immigration. A 'problem' to be solved by the Leagues, 
"... grassroots Lega activists play the 
immigration card as often as possible, 
arguing that crime and unemployment can be 
eliminated provided the wave of southerners 
who came to the northern cities in the wake 
of the economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s 
are sent home, along with the millions of 
Arabs, principally Moroccans, and Africans, 
principally Senegalese, who have entered 
Italy... over the last decade. " (Abse, p. 12) 
The Leagues have been successful in mobilizing this 
support by articulating themes of public discontent, and 
has been described by the media as 'an army of uneducated 
villagers challenging the Italian intelligentsia' (quoted 
by Ruzza and Schmidtke, p. 58). The rise of the Lombard 
League coincided with a decline in support for all 
traditional parties. Over the past few years citizens of 
the north have abandoned national parties such as the 
Christian Democrats, who have become associated with 
clientism, financial profligacy and the corruption endemic 
to Italian politics. 
The Lombard League is the major partner of the Lega Nord, 
other participants are the Venetian League and Autonomous 
Piedmont. Founded in 1984 it became fully established in 
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the 1990 administrative elections with 15 out of 80 seats 
in the regional Council of Lombardy. (Poche, p. 76) Its 
rise has been rapid; in 1985 it obtained 2.5% of the 
regional vote, in 1991 this had risen to 19% (Ruzza and 
Schmidtke, p. 57). 
The social profile of the Leagues' supporters reveals that 
its activists are young (typically 18 - 25 years old), 
poorly educated (left school at 15), rural (from small 
villages), but form the wealthier strata of their society. 
The Leagues appeal to informal groups based on existing 
communities who exhibit a strong sense of territorial 
belonging. Their supporters would have little experience 
of urban based organisational belonging such as is found 
in universities, schools or factories. 
"The League's activists share a common ideological 
outlook centred on a Lombard identity, ie. honest 
hard work as a moral duty and as a prized personal 
inclination. It extends to an appreciation of 'facts rather than words' and a distrust for career 
politicians, their convoluted language and corrupted 
morals. " (Ruzza and Schmidtke, p. 64). 
The 150 year long project to create an Italian nation- 
state has failed. The very workings of that nation-state, 
its disfunction, and the economic disparities that it 
spawned - in the ways suggested by Alter, Geliner and 
others - has allowed the Leagues to portray Lombardy (and 
the North in general) as a region deprived of what it is 
supposedly entitled to by a wasteful political and 
economic system. This Lombard identity is new and its 
influence and power over the popular imagination can be 
explained, according to Ruzza and Schmidtke, in the same 
way as as nationalism. They express this in terms heavily 
imbued with Anderson's influence. 
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"Lombardy is the ingenious creation of the 
Lombard League. Through it the League was 
able to overcome narrow localism and present 
itself as the herald of a shared heritage and 
the expression of a broader social movement. 
Ettinic identities tend to appear timeless, even 
if they have been minted yesterday. " 
(Ruzza and Schmidtke, p. 64). 
Mingione places the Italian experience of regionalism in 
the wider context of the changing role of the nation- 
state. Regionalist movements are the result of, 
"... the weakening of the system of nation- 
states, under attack from above as a result 
of the need for global economic regulation 
and from below as a result of the resurgence 
of particularistic social clusters... " (Mingione, p. 305). 
The Northern Leagues make much of the diversity within 
Italy, to the point where the differences assume the 
status of different ethnicities not compatible with a 
unitary state. For 150 years the Italian nation-state 
attempted to forge a sense of national identity, as did 
every other nation-state, with a certain amount of 
success. That attempts to homogenise culture and language 
through eduction never eliminated Italy's multi-cultural 
ancestory is not only evidence of failure as far as the 
Northern Leagues are concerned, but also an indication of 
the undesirability of the project. As Mingione correctly 
points out the decline in importance of the nation-state 
is in tension with the continued political centrality of 
the idea of the nation-state. This tension is evidenced 
by the centrality of the Italian nation-state in the 
ideology of the Lega Nord: it is the idea (and existence) 
of the unitary nation that the Lega Nord is opposed to, 
and the process of 'demonising' the nation-state is 
constitutive of ethnicity. 
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"The nation-state remains the key to the system 
by which social identities are divided. It is 
not by chance that the borderlines of what we 
call societies or economies coincide with the 
boundaries of nation-states. Even international 
forms of solidarity organised around class, 
religious, humanitarian or cultural issues have 
been channelled or managed at the nation-state 
level. " (Mingione, p. 307) 
So the nation-state, through its insertion in the global 
versus local matrix, acts to regulate the regionalist 
impulse. In Italy as elsewhere, particularisms thrown up 
by globalist/regionalist tensions have been encouraged by 
the decline in importance of the nation-state. What is 
particular to the Italian case is that the north-south, 
divide, while previously unable to fatally undermine the 
viability of the nation-state, has with reinforcement from 
new forms of inclusion and exclusion arising from 
particularism, been re-worked by the Northern Leagues as a 
marker of ethnic difference. It was this difference that 
the Italian nation sought to suppress. 
In this way the rise of the Lega Nord is tied to wider 
social and economic tensions in Italy (and beyond). 
Mingione identifies three sources of socio-economic 
tension that have particular relevance to the Italian 
case. Firstly, the changing employment structure leading 
to a polarization between high-income and low-income jobs. 
Secondly, the conflicts generated by global versus 
particular interests, 
"... the nation-state constitutes a crucial 
stress point of the present transition 
in various different ways related to 
globalisation and particularistic 
tendencies... " (Mingione, p. 307). 
Thirdly, the Italian political scene has become unstable 
as a result of a; 
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"... decreasing capacity to govern the new 
complexity on the part of the associate 
political order that matured within the 
system'of notional democracies as definitively 
consolidated in the Fordist-welfarist age. " 
(Mingione, p. 306) 
Each of these sources of socio-economic tension has been 
successfully utilised by the Lega Nord in the construction 
of their regional identity. The inability of the 'old 
order', bedevilled by corruption and clientism, to grasp 
the 'new complexity' was a major factor in enabling the 
Lega Nord to present itself as a new political force. The 
Lega Nord's new coalition partners, Berlusconi's Forza 
Italia recognised this and succeeded in creating for 
itself an image of freshness, untainted by the scandals 
embroiling the old guard. 
The politics of 'us and them' 
In the introduction to her book The Return of the 
Political (Mouffe, 1993) Chantal Mouffe addresses the 
'explosion of pluralisms' that characterise the post- 
Communist period. She takes as her starting point the 
collapse of Communism, from which common origin the 
resurgence of nationalism and the emergence of new 
antagonisms appear to have stemmed. Are we witnessing 
progress towards the universalisation of liberal democracy 
as Fukuyama would have it, or a challenge to Western 
universalism? Fukuyama holds that with the demise of 
Marxism the notion of antagonism can be dispensed with. 
Mouffe, on the other hand, sees antagonism as being at the 
heart of democratic politics; every identity depends on 
the "... affirmation of a difference, the determination of 
an 'other' that is going to play the role of a 
'constitutive outside... " (Mouffe, 1993, p. 2) 
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Affirmation and mutual acceptance of difference leads to 
collective identifications, the creation of an 'us' in 
opposition to a 'them'. It is conceivable that this 
us/them relationship can turn into a friend/enemy 
relationship. This occurs when the mutual recognition of 
identity (difference) breaks down, to be replaced by 
identities that threaten to destroy one another. This is 
the site of a political antagonism. As such, the 
political "... must be conceived as a dimension that is 
inherent to every human society... " (Mouffe, 1993, p. 3) 
Until the collapse of Communism the most important 
political frontier of the friend enemy type was that of 
democracy/totalitarianism. Now we are witnessing the 
redefinition of collective identity and the establishment 
of new political frontiers. Mouffe identifies two 
developments deriving from the fall of Communism that are 
of particular importance in relation to nationalism and 
the construction of ethnic identity. Firstly, 
"In the former Communist bloc, the unity 
created in the common struggle against 
Communism has vanished and the friend/enemy 
frontier is taking on a multiplicity of new 
forms linked to the resurgence of old 
antagonisms - ethnic, national, religious 
and others. " (Mouffe, 1993, p. 3) 
In ethnic, religious and nationalistic politics the 
opponent is perceived not as an adversary, but as an enemy 
to be destroyed. Thus, the problem here is the lack of 
adversarial positions around which a pluralist politics 
could be constructed. Democracy is not possible for 
Mouffe where no adversarial identities exist and 
furthermore the growth of identities around religious, 
nationalist or ethnic identities makes adversarial 
positions less likely. 
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Second, the identity of democracy is at stake in the West. 
The Communist 'other' was constitutive of that democracy 
as it constituted its negation. Thus democracy requires a 
new frontier. The collapse of right/left adversarial 
positions is also "... harmful for democratic politics, as 
it impedes the construction of distinct political 
identities. " (Mouffe, 1993, p. 5) Mouffe is seemingly 
arguing for a field of politics that is defined in terms 
of a traditional left/right orientation, and in which 
shades of democratic political opinion are represented by 
political parties in parliament. In discussing the work 
of Niklas Luhmann she says; 
"the current blurring of political frontiers 
between left and right is harmful for democratic 
politics, as it impeded the constitution of 
distinctive political identities. This in turn 
fosters disaffection towards political parties and 
discourages participation in the political process. 
Hence, the growth of other collective identities 
around religious, nationalist or ethnic forms of 
identification. " (Mouffe, 1993, p. 5) 
Mouffe is saying that the old left/right division of the 
political field was 'good' for democracy. What is 'bad' 
for democracy are the blurred political distinctions of 
the post-Cold War period. The problem for the West is to 
successfully create a pluralist democratic order by means 
of antagonism - agonistic pluralism is constitutive of 
modern democracy - through the recognition of adversarial 
positions. Where this does not successfully happen, as 
with the case of the extreme right who - with immigrants - 
have already identified their 'enemy within'. Mouffe 
says, 
"I submit that the growth of the extreme right 
... can only be understood in the context of 
the deep crisis of political identity that 
confronts liberal democracy following the 
loss of the traditional landmarks of 
politics. " (Mouffe, 1993, p. 4) 
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Tile two important developments identified by Mouffe are 
closely linked and deserve detailed consideration. With 
the first development Mouffe accounts for the political 
crisis in some of the former Communist countries. Under 
Communism the friend/enemy lines were clearly demarcated 
and oppositional forces could enter (in the terms outlined 
in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy) into chains of 
equivalence, thereby dividing the social into two 
antagonistic camps. Now, the frontier is confused because 
of the 'resurgence of old antagonisms' and difference, not 
equivalence characterises the social field. By 'old 
antagonisms' Mouffe is referring to ethnic and other 
particularistic identities which I have elsewhere argued 
are not necessarily old at all. 11 
One thing that is most surprising about her formulation is 
that it combines an insistence on the constitutive natu re 
of exclusion in respect to political identities, with a 
marginalisation of the constructed nature of those 
identities. Consider for example Mouffe's decision not to 
differentiate between nationalist, religious or ethnic 
collectivities. All are characterised as 'archaic' and 
antithetical to the development of pluralistic 
democracies. As I have indicated, in the case of the 
Northern Leagues the ethnic identity is very much a 
constructed one, not a reversion to an atavistic past. 
This line of thinking on the construction of ethnicity is 
certainly owes a debt to the work of Laclau and Mouffe (of 
the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy period). Extending 
this approach one could argue that identities emerging in 
the former Communist Asiatic Republics of the ex-Soviet 
Union for example, have been constructed to a large ext ent 
by the experience of Communism, and that the religious 
inflexion that this gives to their nationalism is very 
much a contemporary phenomena. 
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The implications of the fall of Communism for democracy 
within the former Eastern bloc are not explored by Mouffe, 
except to the extent that a proliferation of enemies to 
the exclusion of adversaries precludes this from 
happening. How it might be possible to introduce new 
political frontiers for example, is not explored. It is 
the other side of the coin, the impact of the fall of 
Communism on the politics of Western Europe, that Mouffe 
is really interested in. The most important change has 
been the removal of democracy's 'other', by which it was 
defined. For Mouffe pluralist democracy requires 
antagonism (antagonism is constitutive of the social); 
"It requires that, within the context of the 
political community, the opponent should be 
considered not as an enemy to be destroyed, 
but as an adversary whose existence is 
legitimate and must be tolerated. We will fight against his ideas but we will not 
question his right to defend them. The 
category of the 'enemy' does not disappear 
but is displaced; it remains pertinent with 
respect to those who do not accept the 
democratic 'rules of the game' and who 
thereby exclude themselves from the 
political community. " (Mouffe, 1993, p. 4) 
It is interesting to note that Fukuyama reaches the 
opposite conclusion. For him the end of the Cold War has 
brought about the 'end of history' characterised by the 
resolution of all the major ideological conflicts of the 
last 200 years and the inevitable march of capitalism. 
Capitalism does not need an enemy such as Communism, it is 
quite capable of completing its own development. Mouffe 
characterises democratic thinking today as rationalist, 
universalist and individualist and it 
"cannot but remain blind to the specificity of the political in its dimension of conflict/ decision, and that it cannot perceive of the 
constitutive role of antagonism in social 
life. " (Mouffe, 1993, p. 2) 
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The existence of every identity is the affirmation of 
difference, that which creates the 'other' (the 
constitutive outside). 
"In the domain of collective identifications 
where what is in question is the creation 
of a 'we' by the delimitation of a 'them', 
the possibility always exists that this we/ 
them relation will turn into a relation of 
the friend enemy type... This can happen when 
the other, who was until then considered 
under the mode of difference, begins to be 
perceived as negating our identity... From that 
moment onwards, any type of we/them relation, 
be it religious, ethnic, national, economic 
or other, becomes the site of a political 
antagonism. " (Mouffe, 1993, p. 3) 
From the above formulation it is clear that the emphasis 
on exclusion as a 
. 
prime mover in the creation of a 'we' 
also creates the potential for a break-down of the vital 
antagonistic forms of political recognition; the frontier 
separating us/them form friend/enemy is unstable. 
Political parties are for Mouffe an important mechanism 
for stabilising this frontier. They 
"... can play an important role in giving 
expression to social division and the conflict 
of wills. But if they fail in their job, 
conflicts will assume other guises and it 
will be more difficult to manage them 
democratically. " (Mouffe, 1993, p. 5) 
Mouffe argues that the loss of the totalitarian/democratic 
opposition that was the main political frontier has led to 
the need to redefine collective identities and establish 
new political frontiers. This allows us to return to the 
two developments identified by Mouffe that have resulted 
from the fall of Communism - the new friend/enemy 
frontier, and the crisis of identity of democracy. In the 
first case the polarisation of Europe along East/West 
lines was largely a product of the Cold War; Western 
paranoia and ideological insecurity is neatly encapsulated 
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in the Iron Curtain as symbol of Communist threat to our 
way of life. The spectre of totalitarianism was invoked 
to encourage solidarity throughout the West and as a 
mechanism to encourage Western Europeans to put a high 
value on democracy. The bi-polar division of Europe is in 
fact too simple, in the post-war period there were many 
countries in Europe that were neither Communist or 
'democratic'; Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey had 
significant spells under right-wing dictators for example, 
and the case of Yugoslavia and Albania demonstrates that 
the Communist bloc was less than homogenous. 
Mouffe's argument that the old friend/enemy frontier was 
based on the binary division of Europe along Cold War %, 
lines is too simplistic; even for a model that depends on 
exclusion to create the 'us and them' divide. We must 
also question Mouffe's notion of 'the unity created in the 
common struggle against Communism'. In the satellite 
states of the Soviet Union the people could possibly have 
been unified against the imperialism of the Soviet Union 
or the totalitarian state perhaps, but not against 
Communism itself. Large numbers of people in these 
countries were Communists for one thing, and it would be 
possible to argue that the Yugoslavs were unified 
Communism, not in opposition to it. Within the Soviet 
Union the various republics were unified by their 
opposition to the Russian Empire more than Communism per 
se. Influence in the local Communist party would have 
provided them with leverage against Russification. 
The collapse of the Communist regimes has allowed "the 
resurgence of nationalism and the emergence of new 
antagonisms. " (Mouffe, 1993, p. 1) We must also question 
the assertion that these are old ethnic, national or 
religious antagonisms. Following Suny, I would argue that 
these conflicts are new. Antagonisms along ethnic, 
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religious or national lines are not necessarily new per 
se, but what is new is the construction of antagonisms 
resulting from the fall of Communism. For example, the 
Serb/Croat conflict is more about the uncertainties 
resulting from the balance of power created by the 1974 
Yugoslavian constitution, and the way that this left both 
the Serbs and the Croats exposed and vulnerable, than it 
is a resurrection of WWII hostilities. 
The predisposition to identification with particularistic 
principles stems from the lack of democratic political 
struggles. This prevents the construction of an 
'adversary' in favour of an 'enemy' who must be destroyed. 
As Mouffe puts it; 
"When there is a lack of 
struggles with which to 
is taken by other forms 
ethnic, nationalist or 
the opponent is defined 
(Mouffe, 1993, p. 6) 
democratic political 
identify, their place 
of identification, of 
religious nature, and 
in those terms too. " 
Throughout this thesis I have argued above that (Laclau 
and) Mouffe's work is characterised by a theory of 
democracy in the absence of a theory of the state, and 
nowhere is this better illustrated than in the context of 
their ideas on nationalism. Mouffe talks of a crisis of 
political identity rather than a crisis of the nation- 
state being the source of new collective identifications. 
Throughout this chapter I have argued that the rise of the 
Lega Nord is the product of the failure of the Italian 
nation-state, and that nationalism (whether in its C19th 
form or more recent manifestations such as ethnic 
nationalism) cannot be understood outside of the nation- 
state context. All the major theorists of nationalism 
reviewed here believe there to be a strong link between 
the state and nationalism. In this sense nationalism is 
best understood as a state-sponsored ideology. This line 
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of enquiry is not open to Mouffe. Neither can she 
conceive of democracy (in its widest sense) as being 
embedded in the institutions of the state. For her as for 
Laclau, democracy exists as ideas and beliefs, and is 
propagated through political struggle. 
In relation to the Northern Leagues I have argued that 
their rise is the result of their appropriation of the 
people versus (corrupt) state antagonism. Mouffe does 
not talk about the people versus the state in relation to 
the construction of democratic identity. Her us/them 
antagonism does not easily apply to the Northern Leagues' 
situation. The break down of traditional left/right 
orientation of Italian politics evidenced by the 
popularity of the Leagues also fits uneasily into her 
scheme. While it is certainly true that the loss of the 
democracy/totalitarian frontier has had a profound effect 
on contemporary Italian politics, the construction of 
collective political identity has proceeded along the 
lines ordained by the break-up of the nation-state rather 
than by the creation of adversarial collective political 
identities. 
The antagonism along north-south lines characteristic of 
Italy is appropriated by the League as an issue of self- 
determination. Their adversaries are not the southerners 
or the old political parties as such, but the state 
apparatus that permits the promotion of the South and the 
continuance of corrupt practices or clientism. The state 
occupies the adversary/enemy position because it is 
denying self-determination to the League. Mingione's 
point that the nation-state is constitutive of social 
identities is more useful in explaining the Italian case 
than Mouffe's reliance on democratic antagonisms (or their 
absence) fulfilling this role. 
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Collective identity and exclusion 
It is interesting to compare Mouffe's work with the 
approach adopted by Laclau in The Making of Political 
Identities (Laclau, 1994). Laclau also wishes to address 
the explosion of pluralisms that characterise the 
contemporary world. He holds that the end of the Cold War 
has coincided with the end of the globalizing ideologies 
that have dominated the political arena since 1945. On a 
larger scale this represents the end of the political 
ideology of modernity; the universality of political 
ideology. The post-Cold War world, which I take to mean 
the world in the period since 1989, is marked by 
"a proliferation of particularistic political 
identities, none of which tries to ground 
its legitimacy and its action in a mission 
predetermined by universal history - whether 
that be the mission of a universal class, or 
the notion of a privileged race, or an 
abstract principle. " (Laclau, 1994, p. 1) 
This 'crisis of universalism' permits us an awareness of 
the construction of social reality by removing the scales 
of universality from our eyes. The "very tangible 
emergence of its void, of what we could call the presence 
of its absence" (Laclau, 1994, p. 1) reveals the contingent 
nature of the social. That we were not aware of it before 
is because we could not see the wood for the trees, as it 
were. What we now see is not an object but rather its 
conditions of possibility. This Laclau terms historicist 
deconstructivism. 
From this platform Laclau introduces the term 'radical 
constructivism' which harnesses this retreat from 
universalism and opens up an 'horizon of possibilities' by 
broadening the range of strategies that are possible 
within the social. For example, institutions may be 
viewed not as immutable, but as the outcome of 'merely 
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contingent possibilities'. With the age of universalism 
behind us we are freed from the requirement to view the 
formation of political identity as a matter of simply 
recognizing that identity (the process by which Marx's a 
class in itself becomes a class for itself, for example). 
We must look to the construction of social and political 
identity not merely its recognition. 
Laclau posits a distinction between identity and 
identification, moreover this distinction represents a 
'constitutive split in all social identity'. The 
distinction between the social and the political, as 
developed in New Reflections is utilised by Laclau in the 
context of identity formation. The social is the 
sedimented, solidified realm of repetition and routine 
whose original conditions of possibility are submerged. 
However, the political character of these sediments is 
increasingly revealed - by historicist deconstructivism - 
in the modern world. Repetition gives way to 
reconstruction as the contingent nature of the social is 
revealed. It would seem that the social is fundamentally 
unstable - neither fully constituted nor totally disrupted 
- and always in a state of flux between the solidification 
of the social (difference) and dislocation. Dislocations, 
antagonisms and the democratic imaginary will always 
prevent the exclusion of the political and the dominance 
of the social. 
The political on the other hand, institutes these social 
practices and the act of institution has no foundation 
outside of itself. This means that the repetitive, 
sedimented social cannot provide the impetus for this 
social innovation, otherwise the "sedimented social 
practices would have as something inherent to themselves 
the principle of their own transformations. " (Laclau, 
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1994, p. 3) This self-founding aspect of the political is 
equated to identification. 
Sedimented social practices do not reveal their political 
foundation - visibility comes only through the struggle 
between contending and contingent alternative institutions 
of the social. An example of this is the Northern 
League's questioning of the legitimacy of the Italian 
state. Through the 'foundation' of the social being 
questioned new acts of identification are socially 
required thus politicising social identities: "... there is 
a politicization of vast areas of social life that opens 
the way for a proliferation of particularistic political 
identities. " (Laclau, 1994, p. 4) The Leagues have 
introduced the idea of Lombard identity as a result of 
declaring the Italian nation as 'artificial', and in doing 
so they have politicised sections of the social. 
This then, is Laclau's explanation for the rise of 
particularýsms. In the case of the Northern Leagues we 
can see how the nation-state was a triumph of the social 
over the political. Even so, the democratic imaginary, 
antagonisms and dislocations, through fiscal crises, 
government and party political corruption, and a 'bottom- 
up' regionalism fuelled by European Union supra- 
nationalism, did emerge and eventually ruptured the 
(imposed) unity of the social. All long-standing social 
issues - north-south disunity, xenophobia - were re- 
presented as issues of regional autonomy. A multiplicity 
of (new) antagonisms and movements exist in a state of 
flux and are preventing a new social from crystalising. 
In such a situation the continual subversion of the social 
by the political does not necessarily lead to a deepening 
of democracy. However, Laclau does not believe that it 
will result in a generalised xenophobic exclusivism 
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either. 
"For the very emergence of highly particular- 
istic identities means that the particular 
groups will have to coexist with other groups 
in larger communities, and this coexistence 
will be impossible without the assertion of 
values that transcend the identities of all 
of them. The defence, for instance, of the 
right of national minorities to self- 
determination involves the assertion of a 
universal principle grounded in universal 
values. These are not the values of a 
'universal' group, as was the case with 
the universalism of the past but, rather, 
of a universality that is the very result of 
particularism. It is, in this sense, far more 
democratic. Whether this new relationship 
between universality and particularism - 
grounded in the notion of ri hts - will 
prevail or, on the contrary, e submerged by 
rampant xenophobia, is something that 
cannot be predicted. But, clearly, it is 
something worth fi hting for. " 
(Laclau, 1994, p. 5) 
It is not clear however, that it will be universally 
considered, as a cause worth fighting for. Coexistence 
implies a respect for the identity of the other that may 
be present in radical democracy, and in fact in many 
variants of liberal democracy, but is not an essential 
component of the politics of identity. Coexistence may 
result if democratic adversaries mutually recognise each 
other but as Mouffe points out, forms of political 
identity based on exclusion often seek to deny or 
obliterate the identity of the opponent: at the point 
where the opponent becomes the enemy. 
The endogenous model advanced by Laclau - the identity 
formation of a group is catalysed by enmity - depends 
heavily on the politics of exclusion. But as we have seen 
with the Lega Nord the identity of one collectivity is not 
solely the result of enmity with another. 
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Reading the above passage one is struck by the extent to 
which Laclau believes that the state of coexistence would 
be fostered by the contending identities, by one group 
recognising the right to exist of others. Expressed in 
political language from a more liberal tradition, some 
would say that the state fulfils (or attempts to fulfil) 
this role and civil society is the resulting terrain of 
coexistence. Laclau's comment that there has been 
"... a decline both of the great historical 
actors and of those central public spaces 
where decisions meaningful for society as 
a whole had been taken in the past. But, 
at the same time, there is a politicization 
of vast areas of social life that opens the 
way for a proliferation of particular-istic 
political identities" (Laclau, 1994, p. 4) 
requires detailed examination in this light. Firstly, this 
statement implies that the importance of the state is on 
the decline, and secondly that the existence of civil 
society is not in and of itself a measure of democracy. 
Thirdly, it is implied that particularistic political 
identities emerge not within, but outside the public space 
constituted by civil society. On Laclau's model the 
emphasis is on the politicization of the social resulting 
in the formation of new political identities rather than 
the more traditional view that stresses the protective 
role of civil society. 
As such, democracy for Laclau is only possible where there 
is: a "plurality of political forces substituting for each 
other in power" (Laclau, 1994, p. 5) Democracy exists in 
the 'gap' between aspirations of social groups and their 
abilities to succeed in such attempts. Civil society, 
once the terrain of politics and contending ideologies, is 
replaced by a 'gap' which exists because of the partial 
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fixity of the social. This is in line with Mouffe's 
formulation that pluralist democracy is; 
"... always democracy 'to come'. Conflict and 
antagonism are at the same time its condition 
of possibility and the condition of 
impossibility of its full realisation. " 
(Mouffe, 1993, p. 8). 
Such ideas permeate Laclau and Mouffe's work. For 
example, dislocation means that every identity depends on 
an outside. This constitutive outside means that identity 
is simultaneously denied, and provides its condition of 
possibility. Laclau talks in the same way about 
identification "... with its explicit assertion of a lack 
at the root of any identity: one needs to identify with 
something because there is an originary and insurmountable 
lack of identity. " (Laclau, 1994, p. 3) There is a radical 
lack which threatens identity but at the same time is the 
condition of its possibility. 
Laclau's thinking is influenced by Zizek, a fellow 
'Phronesis' contributor. Zizek's argument, developed from 
a position informed by Lacanian psychoanalytical 
categories, is that the focus of nationalist sentiment is 
'our way of life', which he calls 'the Nation-Thing'; that 
which "gives plenitude and vivacity to our life" (Zizek, 
p. 52). What the 'Thing' is is not easy to define; 
"All we can do is enumerate disconnected 
fragments of the way our community organises 
its feasts, its rituals of mating, its 
initiation ceremonies - in short, all the 
details by which is made visible the unique 
way a community organises its enjoyment. ' (Zizek, p. 52) 
The 'Thing' will only exist as long as members of the 
community believe in it. The 'other' is constituted by 
those who would spoil our way of life, and spoil our 
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enjoyment (the 'Thing' is enjoyment incarnated). We are 
threatened by the way the 'other' organises its enjoyment 
and its apparent excess: we have a hatred of the way the 
'ocher' enjoys, "... the smell of their food, their 'noisy' 
songs and dances, their strange manners, their attitude to 
work"... (Zizek. p. 54) 
Zizek gives examples from the former Yugoslavia which 
could easily be extended to apply to the Italian case, if 
we substitute Serbs and Bosnians for Southerners and 
Slovenes for Lombards; 
"Slovenes are being deprived of their 
enjoyment by 'Southerners' (Serbians, 
Bosnians) because of their proverbial 
laziness, Balkan corruption, dirty and noisy 
enjoyment, and because they demand bottomless 
economic support, stealing from Slovenes their 
precious accumulation by means of which 
Slovenia could already have caught up with 
Western Europe. The Slovenes themselves, 
on the other hand, are supposed to rob Serbs 
because of their unnatural diligence, stiffness 
and. selfless calculation... " (Zizek, p. 55) 
Zizek makes the point that what we conceal by accusing the 
'other' of the theft of enjoyment is "... the traumatic 
fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen 
from us. " (Zizek, p. 54) Our attribution of various 
qualities to the 'other' is in fact the repression of our 
own enjoyment. In other words, our nationalism is an 
attempt to disguise our own failings and insecurities. 
It can be said that nationalism in Eastern Europe has been 
on the rise since the fall of Communism because of 
increased social disorientation and a lack of social 
cohesion which reveals a true 'lack', which nationalism 
attempts to transfer to the other. In this way 
nationalism acts as a force for cohesion during a time of 
particular instability, but only does so by focussing on 
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the cohesion of one particular group (to the exclusion of 
others), and by denying the full range of democratic 
possibilities. 
Conclusions 
In contrast to the work of their 'early' period Laclau and 
Mouffe have moved, in their less collaborative work, to 
value exclusion as a prime determinant of collective 
identity. We have noted that Chantal Mouffe argues that 
the construction of collective identity is based on 
exclusion, what I have termed the creation of 'us' and 
'them'. Collective identities can only arise under 
conditions of exclusion, and hierarchy. However, the 
prioritisation of the role of exclusion in the formation 
of identity inevitably leads to the conclusion that the 
type of identities that are constructed tend to be of the 
extremely particularistic and intolerant type - ethnic, 
religious, nationalistic. Laclau, along with Mouffe, has 
developed a political theory which views collective. 
identity based on exclusion. For example, from an earlier 
text; 
"Even in the most radical and democratic projects, 
social transformation thus means building a new 
power, not radically eliminating it. Destroying 
the hierarchies on which sexual or racial 
discrimination is based will, at some point, 
always require the construction of other 
exclusions for collective identities to be 
able to emerge. " (Laclau, 1990, p. 33) 
Mouffe's work on collective identity, stressing as it does 
the constitutive role of antagonism, is useful when 
dealing with highly polarized and confrontational 
politics. Radical democracy however makes claims to be 
radical and plural; it is to be conceived as a struggle 
against the multiple forms of subordination that exist in 
social relations. As exclusion tends towards rigidity, 
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hierarchy and particularism, it might be profitable to 
consider 'inclusion' as the basis for democratic political 
identity (as was suggested in the case of European 
identity). Inclusion - rejecting the constitutive nature 
of 'us and them' - would lead to tolerance, flexibility, 
reciprocal recognition and, what we might term, democratic 
multiplicity. It is not conceivable that mutual respect 
and tolerance, the lynchpins of any radical democracy, 
will emerge from the politics of enmity. 
The key to understanding Laclau and Mouffe's politics of 
'us and them' is the utilisation of the term 'difference'. 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy it is established that 
difference serves to engender a complexity of the social 
and makes antagonism impossible. Without antagonism there 
is no hegemony. Equivalence subverts the differential 
logic of the social and makes hegemony possible. 
Equivalence works to simplify the social leading to the 
creation Qf two antagonistic camps. Part of Laclau and 
Mouffe's critique of Marxism is that class opposition can 
never split the social body into two antagonistic camps. 
The relationship between capitalist/worker is one of 
difference, and cannot become antagonistic. The logic of 
difference works towards a complexity of the social and a 
denial of the possibility for hegemony. Difference, once 
established precludes antagonism, and can only be 
disrupted by the political imaginary. 
In the work of the 'later' period Mouffe says that 
difference (the mutual recognition of identity) can be 
broken down by the political imaginary to create an 
antagonism in a way that leads to an 'us and them' 
relationship in which one party threatens to destroy the 
other. This highlights a tendency in their work towards 
theorising the politics of confrontation in a way that 
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views such confrontation as 'good' and that of coexistence 
as 'bad'. This is what I have termed 'the politics of 
enmity'. It is true that Mouffe says that where this 'us 
and them' situation leads to friend/enemy relations then 
the possibility for democratic politics is inhibited. The 
key then is the need for a 'them' who are adversaries not 
enemies. 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy the implications of 
this politics of 'us and them' was not fully drawn out; 
Laclau and Mouffe were theorising the politics of radical 
democracy which was couched in positive and progressive 
terms. The wider ramifications of their 'us and them' 
type politics become clearer only in their 'later' 
writings. Their disapproval of the complexity of the 
social with its concomitant politics of mutual recognition 
and tolerance in favour of the politics of confrontation 
and enmity appears to confound common sense notions of the 
direction that a radical democratic politics should take. 
In their earlier work Laclau and Mouffe say that hegemony 
can only emerge in a field dominated by antagonisms and 
where equivalence occurs; "... the logic of equivalence is 
a logic of the simplification of political space, while 
the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and 
increasing complexity. " (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 130) 
In her discussion of the ramifications of the fall of 
communism Mouffe talks of the collapse of right/left 
adversarial positions as being; 
"... harmful for democratic politics, as it 
impeded the construction of distinctive 
political identities. This in turn fosters 
disaffection towards political parties and 
discourages participation in the political 
process. (Mouffe, 1993, p. 5) 
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In their earlier, post-Marxist mode Laclau and Mouffe 
sought to break down the traditional left/right dichotomy 
on the basis that they could never become antagonistic, 
contribute to a chain of equivalence, or form the basis 
for the politics of hegemony. It is worth stressing that 
the breakdown of the old left/right political 
distinctions, based as they were on the old productivist, 
class-ridden assumptions, were exactly what they wished to 
challenge in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. The 
political potential of NSMs''was based precisely on the 
break down of this dichotomy. Once Laclau and Mouffe 
championed the 'bluring of political frontiers between 
left and right' and the nascent democratic potential of 
NSMs, now they mourn the passing of 'traditional' 
politics. 
This newly discovered valorisation of the traditional 
field of democratic politics is an indication of the 
liberalisation of their thought. The (now qualified) need 
for antagopism evident in The Return of the Political 
requires only an adversary "... whose existence is 
legitimate and must be tolerated" (Mouffe, 1993, p. 4) 
This is some distance from the politics of hegemony where 
antagonism is essential if chains of equivalence can be 
produced and the social split into two camps. Radical 
democracy has given ground to liberal democracy; what 
could be more liberal than Mouffe's statement, "We will 
fight against his ideas but will not question his right to 
defend them"? (Mouffe, 1993, p. 4) 
The revised role played by the term 'difference' surfaces 
again in Laclau's The Making of Political Identities. 
Laclau equates difference with the solidification of the 
social (in contrast to the political which represents the 
unstable, contingent nature of the social. Following on 
from Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau argues that 
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antagonism will always prevent the solidification of the 
social (difference) because of dislocations and the 
political imaginary. 
There is a contradiction between according prime 
importance to the prevention of difference and the 
establishment of the social on the one hand, and a 
reliance on 'us and them' to fashion political identities, 
on the other. It must be the case that the establishment 
of 'us and them' takes place once the social has 
solidified. If the existence of an external source 
(dislocation) constitutes a threat to identity then the 
political frontier must be unstable. If however, the 'us 
and them' is to develop at all the frontier must be quite 
stable. In other words, 'us and them' is the 
establishment of the social to the exclusion of the 
political. 
Laclau accounts for the establishment of particularistic 
groups via, the disruption of the social. However, Laclau 
now does not see this as necessarily leading to a 
simplification of the social. He talks of groups 
coexisting in larger communities, in a way that suggests 
that these are not going to be subject to articulation 
into chains of equivalence. The emergence of highly 
particularistic identities precludes the formation of 
chains of equivalence and moreover a complexity, rather 
than simplification, of the social. 
In situations where highly particularistic groups are 
formed by a process of exclusion or external threat 
leading to a relation of 'us and them' it is evident that 
equivalence is not possible. A complexity of the social 
will be engendered by an absence of a dominant pole, and 
any groups so formed would be unable to enter into 
equivalence. A greater complexity of the social is 
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increasingly likely, particularly where political 
frontiers are of the unstable type that divide adversaries 
from enemies. Laclau's acceptance that the independent 
coexistence of particularistic groups is likely and that 
"this coexistence will be impossible without the assertion 
of values that transcend the identities of all of them. " 
(Laclau, 1994, p. 5) suggests that he has come a long way 
from the politics of hegemony where antagonism, rather 





Laclau and Mouffe's work in the 1980s was a significant 
contribution to contemporary political thought. Their 
critique of Marxism and consequent persuit of an anti- 
essentialist politics are emblematic of a wider political 
shift on the left that can conveniently labelled as a 
shift from Marxism to post-Marxism. In fact, the fate of 
Marxism as a political project was sealed during this 
period. Not only did many leading adherents move towards 
a variety of post-Marxist positions but the credibility of 
Marxism as a political enterprise was compromised by the 
the political fragmentation of the working class, the 
collapse of Communist regimes in eastern Europe, and 
Communist parties in the west. 
Laclau and Mouffe's shift was the result of a twofold 
process. Firstly, they came to a realisation based on 
their extensive and detailed critique of Marxist theory 
that no matter how sophisticated a Marxist position they 
adopted, and no matter to what extent they embraced a non- 
reductionist position, Marxism was irrevocably 
essentialist and determinist. The working class would 
always be granted political centrality as an agent of 
change as a result of the structural primacy of the 
economic. 
The consequence of this is that secondly, Marxism was 
unable to provide them with a vehicle for understanding 
the political importance of the new social movements 
(NSMs). The politics of class, channelled through 
parliamentary political parties and the representatives of 
organised labour are no longer capable of expressing the 
interests of all groups and all people. New subject 
positions have emerged and the project of the left must be 
to democratise the field of political struggle by 
recognising a plurality of political identities. It is 
for these reasons that their work has been described as 
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making an important contribution to our understanding of 
"... the importance of micropolitics, new social movements, 
and new strategies of social transformation... " (Best and 
Kellner, p. 263) 
This prioritisation of new political identities and new 
social movements places Laclau and Mouffe in the tradition 
of a set of theories that can best be described by the 
general term theories of post-industrial society. Laclau 
and Mouffe's 'early period' 'contains the thesis that the 
post-war period has witnessed a shift towards post- 
industrialism, or postmodernism as some would have it. It 
should be noted that a cluster of terms are used in 
connection with this societal transformation and we cari, 
understand the designations 'post-Fordism', 'disorganized 
capitalism' as referring to the same range of phenomena. 
One other characterisation of these changes is 'New Times' 
a designation proposed by the journal Marxism Today, which 
holds that; 
"... Britain and other advanced capitalist 
societies are increasingly characterised by 
diversity, differentiation and fragmentation, 
rather than homogeneity, standardisation and 
the economies and organisations of scale which 
characterised modern mass societies. This is 
the essence of the so-called transition from 
'Fordism', which defined the experience of 
modernity in the first two-thirds of the 20th 
century, to 'post-Fordism'. (Hall and Jacques, p. 12) 
'New Times' is an umbrella term for the many economic, 
political and social changes characteristic of late 
capitalism, and was coined to embrace the 
"... new global interdependence, an emergent 
post-Fordism in production and consumption, 
a decline in the dominance of manufacturing 
and traditional class politics, and so 
on... " (Boyne and Rattansi, p. 19) 
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The 'New Times' formulation is especially pertinent in the 
context of Laclau and Mouffe's work because as Osborne 
points out 'The Manifesto for New Times' received 
"Laclau's endorsement" (Osborne, p. 222), in recognition of 
the parallels with his own work. 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau and Mouffe 
describe the emergence of new political identities 
commensurate with the type of changes associated with 'New 
Times'. They talk about "... an avalanche of historical 
mutations... ", such as 
"... the new feminism, the protest movements 
of ethnic, national and sexual minorities, 
the anti-institutional ecology struggles 
waged by marginalised layers of the population, 
the anti-nuclear, the atypical forms of social 
struggle in countries on the capitalist 
periphery - all these imply an extension of 
social conflictuality to a wide range of areas, 
which creates the potential, but no more than 
the potential, for an advance towards more 
free, democratic and egalitarian societies. " 
(Laclau and Mouffe, p. 1) 
This establishes Laclau and Mouffe's alignment with new 
social movements; the politics of protest, identity and 
lifestyle which are incredibly varied in content but can 
be attributed a core commonality from their non- 
productivist origins. Thus, the newness of NSMs is 
derived from their difference from the more 'traditional' 
form of class politics. 
In a similar vein, in New Reflections Laclau acknowledges 
the 'disorganized capitalism' thesis described by Lasch 
and Urry, the main features of which include; the 
internationalization of capital, a deconcentration of 
capital/ decline in cartels, an increased separation 
between industrial and finance capital, the replacement of 
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Taylorism with more flexible forms of organisation, and a 
growth in the service sector. 
Laclau and Mouffe realised that these movements has 
substantial potential to transform democratic societies 
and were the emerging political potential in the post-war 
period. They calculated that these movements, partly as a 
result of their diversity, and partly as a result of their 
non-productivist origins, were never going to be 
articulated to the class struggle. 
These wide-ranging societal changes are at one point 
summarised by Mouffe in the following way. 
"Since the Second World War Britain and the 
other advanced capitalist countries had seen 
the expansion of capitalist relations into 
most spheres of social life, and this has 
entailed the emergence of new antagonisms 
and new forms of struggle a ainst these 
relations of domination. " 
(Mouffe, 
interviewed in Socialist Review: 66,1982) 
In this sense the era of class politics had come to an 
end. Anti-colonial struggles, civil rights movements, 
environmental concerns, the womens movement, campaigns for 
homosexual equality and the protests of oppressed 
minorities in the countries of advanced capitalism were of 
a different nature to the movements spawned by the class 
struggles of the earlier part of the twentieth century. 
Whereas the trade union movement, the party political wing 
of the labour movement and various working class campaigns 
for employment for example, were all centred on the 
workplace and employment, NSMs rarely are. They are more 
frequently the result of conflicts in the sphere of 
consumption rather than production. Political identity 
now has a range of foci; rather than a single identity 
derived from an insertion into the productive process we 
have a situation where multiple identities are possible as 
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a result of our roles as workers and consumers, as well as 
our gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation, for example. 
The lesson to be drawn from this is that these changes 
have led to the foundation of numerous new antagonisms, 
not all of them economic of course; antagonisms are no 
longer generated solely around the worker/capitalist axis. 
"Today it is not only as a seller of labour- 
power that the individual is subordinated to 
capital, but also through his or her 
incorporation into a multitude of other 
social relations: culture, free time, 
illness, education, sex and even death. " 
(Laclau and Mouffe, p. 161) 
That Laclau and Mouffe saw the transformatory potential of 
these movements early on is one way in which their shift 
from Marxism to post-Marxism can be understood. Their 
shift was also facilitated by changes within Marxism 
itself. Laclau in particular was heavily influenced by 
structuralist Marxism, particularly the work of Althusser. 
This interest in structuralism also extended to the work 
of the post-structuralist French thinkers such as 
Foucault, Derrida and Lacan whose work is incompatible 
with Marxism. In fact, as we have seen, their influence 
assisted Laclau and Mouffe with their critique of Marxism, 
and consequently their rejection of it. 
Their interest in French post-structuralism and 
reformulations of Marxism in persuit of a politics that 
could embrace NSMs enables us to bracket them with others 
working in the field of postmodernism. Laclau and Mouffe 
make a deliberate move away from Marxism in their 
collaborative venture Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, the 
main purpose of which is to theorise the means by which 
collective identity is constructed given that the working 
class is no longer granted ontological centrality. 
Moreover, in order to do this they "... provide strong 
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critiques of modernity and much modern theory, while 
undertaking a postmodern turn in theory which builds on 
and appropriates salvageable aspects of modern theory. " 
(Best and Kellner, p. 278) 
Laclau and Mouffe's work of the Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy period is by far the most interesting and 
influential that they have produced to date. Their 
interrogation of Marxism, out of which they developed the 
politics of hegemony, was a"turning point in contemporary 
social and political theory. Their work gave impetus to 
the idea that anti-essentialism was the way forward for 
conceptualising NSMs, for example, as well as the 
theoretical foundation for a range of political positions 
which sought to displace the centrality of the working 
class. In this sense post-Marxism is not simply a 
strategy which applies to a critique of Marxism. It has a 
much wider applicability. 
This thesis has acknowledged the cogent claims represented 
by Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. The importance of 
Marxist traditions to Laclau and Mouffe's ideas and the 
way these have been 'worked through' is reflected in the 
way that the 'early' work is viewed through a filter of 
Marxist concerns, and critically evaluated from Marxist 
positions. The 'later' work, seen in many ways as a 
deviation from their general position, is examined more 
from a post-Marxist stance, the result of the influence of 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and a further indication 
of the shift in position that their 'later' work 
represents. It is paradoxical that the theoretical 
position developed at the time of Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy, with its emphasis on the contingent nature of 
constructed collective identity, should subsequently 
permit the emergence of 'us and them', a quite different 
argument for establishing collective identity. 
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Theirs is a postmodern politics whose key markers are 
elements of post-structuralism, post-Marxism, and post- 
industrialism. However, in their attempt to theorise the 
role of NSMs their concerns have become ever more narrow. 
The world that Laclau and Mouffe are viewing is one that 
is in fact quite specific in its application. As 
mentioned previously, post-Marxism identifies closely with 
a cluster of post-industrial society theses which 
ultimately limit its usefulness. Their assumptions about 
the nature of (post)modern society are, in a post- 
communist world, too narrow in focus. The societies to 
which they relate only existed in 
'the West' between 1945 
and the mid-80s, if they existed at all. Not only has the 
world beyond these narrow confines changed in the past%. 10 
years, but the very nature of these western or western 
European societies has changed too, as part of the same 
series of processes. The assumptions upon which Laclau 
and Mouffe's radical democratic politics are built are 
beginning to look outdated and restricted. 
In fact the term post-industrial society (and its 
cognates) has always had too narrow a focus to represent 
the entire range of changes that were ongoing from 1945. 
To their rather restricted perspective should be added; 
the role of nationalism and the nation-state in shaping 
political concerns and social identities in the post-war 
period, the long struggle against communism in Eastern 
Europe, the impact of the growing influence of the EU, and 
the rise of the far right (and the decline in influence of 
the far left). All of these have been long-term features 
of post-war Europe and they are all necessary components 
of a much broader and more representative picture than 
those painted by either 'New Times' or Laclau and Mouffe's 
post-Marxist preoccupations. 
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A further effect of the broad swathe of changes associated 
with post-Communism is that the idea of Europe is once 
more the subject of debate. The changes associated with 
post-Communism correspond to what I have termed Laclau and 
Mouffe's 'later' period when there is a liberalisation of 
their theory and a search for a new constitutive outside, 
a search that involves demonstrating the congruence 
between Europe and democracy. In other words, they have 
perceived the need to establish a new theoretical ground 
on which their ideas could have an application. It is not 
so much that Laclau and Mouffe had a strongly developed 
notion of Europe in their early work, rather the case that 
the loss of the clearly demarcated terrain of the post- 
industrial society, meant that a new arena had to be 
found. That this new terrain happened to be construed as 
'Europe' is a result of two processes. Firstly, Laclau 
and Mouffe were working closely with political traditions 
which they increasingly identified as European, and which 
acted as reference points. Secondly, the epicentre of the 
seismic political disturbances of 1989 and after was 
Eastern Europe which immediately placed Europe at the 
heart of the post-Communist world. 
The social and political map of Europe has been 
fundamentally transformed by the events surrounding the 
collapse of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe. The 
fall of Communism was incredibly rapid given the apparent 
strength of those regimes over a forty year period. The 
impact of the wide-ranging changes set in motion by the 
transformation of the Soviet bloc - which itself is still 
very much in process - continues to shape the politics of 
Europe. However, the initial shock waves have now 
subsided leaving a very different Europe in their wake, 
and opening up the very question of 'what is Europe? '. 
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Many old certainties have gone. The east/west divide 
being perhaps the most obvious, and with it the simplistic 
dichotomous democratic division of Europe. This profound 
transformation has had a widespread influence on both the 
domestic politics of European nations, and the very notion 
of the nation itself, as witnessed by the changing role of 
the EU and the growth of regional movements. Italy has 
been perhaps the country most affected by the removal of 
the Iron Curtain; its domestic politics transformed by new 
orientations and priorities. 
Corresponding to the sweeping effects of globalisation has 
been a growth in prominence of particularistic identities, 
especially ethnic and regional identities. In addition to 
the Northern Leagues in Italy there has been an upsurge in 
regionalism activity in Catalonia, Scotland and Belgium in 
the west of Europe, and in Serbia, Russia and Slovakia in 
the east. At the same time some collective identities 
have disappeared; Soviet, Yugoslav, East German, 
Communist,. Czechoslovak. All of these changes can (in 
part) be attributed to the changing role of the nation- 
state. New European conflicts have emerged, in Yugoslavia 
as previously mentioned, but also out of the former Soviet 
Union have emerged conflicts between Chetchnians and 
Russians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, for example. In 
Eastern Europe conflicts between Romanians and Moldavians. 
There has also been the peaceful break-up of 
Czechoslovakia. 
To begin to understand these new European conflicts it is 
necessary to examine the processes of identity formation 
that are prevalent in contemporary Europe. This must 
necessarily focus on the increased importance of 
ethnicity, in the sense that it is both a causal factor in 
many of these conflicts, and also because it is 
increasingly the sine qua non of collective identity. 
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Ethnicity is a key component in the conflicts in Germany, 
Yugoslavia, Turkey and the former Soviet Union. In 
Chapter 7 it was argued that contemporary identity 
formation, including ethnicity, must be understood in 
relation to tree changing role of the nation-state. The 
processes that are shaping Europe at the present time are 
not the same as those that were prominent in the mid-80s. 
Laclau and Mouffe's work on the politics of hegemony and 
ideas of deepening democracy stemmed from their analysis 
of post-war western Europe, and now look a little out of 
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